DeCoe v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1225,93-1225 |
| Parties | 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2917, 128 Lab.Cas. P 11,138, 9 IER Cases 1255 Robert DeCOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION; Debra A. Kline; Phyllis L. Evans; Karan S. Maurina; Marjorie E. Crocker-Hampton; Jerri Lynn Kronenweth; Ann M. Glynn; Roxanne M. Durham; and Cynthia S. White, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Glen N. Lenhoff (argued and briefed), Flint, MI, for plaintiff-appellant.
M. Beth Sax (argued and briefed), Gen. Motors Corp., Office of the Gen. Counsel and Ron D. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued and briefed), Office of the Atty. Gen. of Michigan, Detroit, MI, for defendants-appellees.
Leonard R. Page (briefed), Associate Gen. Counsel, International Union, UAW, Detroit, MI, for amicus curiae.
Before: RYAN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; and KRUPANSKY, Senior Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, Robert DeCoe, appeals a summary judgment dismissing his claims of slander, tortious interference with economic relations, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against his former employer, defendant General Motors Corporation. DeCoe's claims were made in response to publicized allegations made by DeCoe's former co-employees at GM, that DeCoe had sexually harassed them. The district court held that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, preempted all of the plaintiff's claims. At issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff's proofs require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or rely on a right created by the CBA. We conclude that they do, and therefore we agree with the district court that section 301 preempted all of the plaintiff's claims.
In 1987, the plaintiff, a tool and die maker employed by GM, ran for the union office of district committeeman for skilled trades at the GM Coldwater plant in Genesee County, Michigan. The plaintiff succeeded in his bid to become committeeman for the United Auto Workers, Local 326, and was reelected in 1990.
The CBA between GM and the UAW set forth the responsibilities of district committeemen, such as the plaintiff, to include the processing of grievances and appealed grievances, and, within specified time constraints, the handling of "other legitimate representation functions." The CBA also established the number of district committeemen allowed per plant, based on number of hourly employees. In addition, the CBA defined the qualifications necessary to hold the office, and set forth rights unique to committeemen, such as special seniority and recall privileges.
In March 1991, defendant Jerri Lynn Kronenweth complained to the labor pool committeeman, Jim Crossnoe, that the plaintiff had offered her $1,000 in exchange for sex. Kronenweth and most of the other individual defendants were employed in the labor pool, a group that the plaintiff openly had termed a "scab labor work force." Shortly after filing her grievance with Crossnoe, in June 1991, Kronenweth and the other individual defendants filed administrative charges with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, alleging that the plaintiff had sexually harassed each of them.
GM maintained a detailed policy prohibiting sexual harassment, which GM and the UAW had appended to the CBA. The policy provided, in relevant part:
General Motors facilities must be free of hostility resulting from sexually-oriented behavior. It is the responsibility of management and each employe to maintain an environment free of hostility.
... [I]f you believe you have been subjected to sexual harassment, you may bring your concerns to the attention of either your immediate supervisor, personnel director or representative, or you may utilize appropriate and existing internal complaint procedures.
The following affirmation accompanied the policy statement:
General Motors and the UAW are in agreement that complaints of sexual harassment should be dealt with promptly and fairly under existing internal procedures as provided under Paragraph (6a) of the National Agreement.
Pursuant to paragraph (6a) of the CBA, "The grievance and arbitration procedure shall be the exclusive contractual procedure for remedying ... discrimination claims." The grievance procedure, a four-step process included in the CBA, established the requirements for presenting a grievance to the employee's foreperson (step 1), appealing the grievance to the shop committee (step 2), appealing to GM and the International Union (step 3), and finally, appealing to an impartial umpire (step 4). If the grievance involved a sexual harassment claim, the CBA expressly provided that the shop committee had the option of handling it internally or delegating investigation and resolution to a member of the local union's civil rights committee.
In October 1991, the plaintiff filed his complaint in Genesee County, Michigan, Circuit Court, charging all defendants with slander, civil conspiracy, tortious interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. According to the complaint, GM's Coldwater plant manager, Al Herold, induced the individual defendants to take action against the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants were willing to defame him because they wanted to deprive him of his committeeman post. The plaintiff summarized the defendants' conduct as follows:
The combination of Plant Manager Herold's encouragement and the said political reason for seeking Plaintiff's discharge caused the individual Defendants in this case to file sham and spurious sex harassment complaints against Plaintiff and to state, on many occasions, to third persons in the plant, that Plaintiff had committed vulgar and offensive sexual touchings and had directed vulgar and obscene language toward them.
Herold was among the third persons to whom the statements allegedly were made. The plaintiff, who remained a GM employee and union official, claimed that the defendants' actions damaged his performance as a committeeman.
The defendants filed a timely petition removing the complaint to federal district court, on the basis that it was, in effect, an unfair labor practice claim under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a), and that it was a claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The removal precipitated a remand motion, which the district court denied based on section 301 preemption.
Subsequently, GM and the individual defendants brought motions for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint based primarily on his failure to exhaust his contractual remedies. The plaintiff concurred in both motions, and in two orders, the district court dismissed all claims. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the district court's refusal to remand the complaint.
Pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). Since 1962, the Supreme Court has held that section 301 preempts state law rules that substantially implicate the meaning of collective bargaining agreement terms. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962)). "[A] suit in state court alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract must be brought under Sec. 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law." Id. This rule is necessitated by the need for uniformity and predictability in interpreting the meaning of contract terms. Id. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911.
As the Supreme Court has clarified, however,
Sec. 301 pre-emption ... says nothing about the substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements....
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for Sec. 301 pre-emption purposes.
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (footnote omitted). Thus, state courts may evaluate state law claims "involving labor-management relations only if such [claims] do not require construing collective-bargaining agreements." Id. at 411, 108 S.Ct. at 1884.
In light of these directives, we have developed a two-step approach for determining whether section 301 preemption applies. First, the district court must examine whether proof of the state law claim requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement terms. Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946, 110 S.Ct. 2204, 109 L.Ed.2d 531 (1990). Second, the court must ascertain whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the collective bargaining agreement or by state law. If the right both is borne of state law and does not invoke contract interpretation, then there is no preemption. However, if neither or only one criterion is satisfied, section 301 preemption is warranted. Id. See also Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1331 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 110 S.Ct. 539, 107 L.Ed.2d 537 (1989).
In order to make the first determination, the court is not bound by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, but rather,...
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