Dedis v. Chater

• Decision Date: 11 February 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-30243-MAP.
• Citation: 956 F.Supp. 45
• Parties: Robert DEDIS, Plaintiff, v. Shirley CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

956 F.Supp. 45

Robert DEDIS, Plaintiff, v. Shirley CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 95-30243-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

February 11, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Neil E. Onerheim, Nathanson, Wessler & Onerheim, Lawrence, MA, Robert E. Grey, Grey & Grey, Farmingdale, NY, for Robert Dedis.

Karen L. Goodwin, United States Attorney's Office, Springfield, MA, for Shirley S. Chater.

PONSOR, District Judge.

This Recommendation is hereby ADOPTED, without objection. The Commissioner's Motion to Affirm (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED. The plaintiff's Motion for Judgment (Dkt. No. 9) is ALLOWED, in part. The clerk will enter judgment for plaintiff. So ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (Docket No. 09) AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER (Docket No. 10)

December 30, 1996

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) which provides for judicial review of a final decision by the Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") regarding an individual's entitlement to disability benefits. Plaintiff Robert Dedis ("Plaintiff") is seeking Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner's decision limiting such benefits to a closed period of time is not supported by substantial evidence and has moved, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(c), to reverse and remand the decision. In turn, the Commissioner has moved for an order affirming her decision. The parties' motions have been referred to the Court for a report and recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Commissioner's motion be denied and that the Plaintiff's motion be allowed in part, granting him an extended closed period of benefits, but otherwise denied.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on January 6, 1947 and has one year of college education. (Administrative Record ("A.R.") at 248.) His work experience includes approximately nineteen years in banking where he worked from 1970 to 1989 as an assistant bank manager, a senior bank examiner and a loan review officer. (A.R. at 249-55.) Plaintiff filed an application for SSDI benefits on July 19, 1990, alleging an inability to work since November 2, 1989 due to an injury to his neck, left leg and left foot following a motor vehicle accident. (A.R. at 68, 120.) On February 10, 1992, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") granted Plaintiff's application, but only for the closed period of time from November 2, 1989 to August 20, 1991. (A.R. at 18.) Following denial of his request for review before the Appeals Council, Plaintiff sought judicial review in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the case was remanded by agreement of the parties pursuant to the terms of a class action settlement, Stieberger v. Sullivan, 792 F.Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y.1992). (See A.R. at 3-4, 349-50.)

On March 23, 1995, following a second hearing on December 14, 1994, the ALJ again determined that Plaintiff was entitled to SSDI for the same closed period of time only. (A.R. at 224-34.) On September 16, 1995, the Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's March 23, 1995 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (A.R. at 204-06.) Plaintiff, having moved to Massachusetts in the interim, then filed his complaint in this Court.

III. DISABILITY STANDARD

A claimant is entitled to SSDI benefits if he is under a disability prior to the expiration of his insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) and (d); Torres v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 845 F.2d 1136, 1138 (1st Cir.1988); Cruz Rivera v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 818 F.2d 96, 97 (1st Cir.1986). The Act defines disability, in applicable part, as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). An individual is considered disabled under the Act

only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). See generally Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-48, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2293-95, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The Commissioner uses a sequential five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Goodermote v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir.1982) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520). See also McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 795 F.2d 1118, 1120 (1st Cir.1986).

Once benefits are awarded, they may be terminated only if "a claimant has improved to the point of being able to engage in substantial gainful activity" or if his or her "condition is not as serious as was at first supposed." Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975). In essence, the Commissioner's regulations require (1) that there be improvement in a claimant's medical condition and (2) that the improvement relate to the claimant's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1).¹ While most termination cases concern benefits awarded in a previous proceeding, such cases may also include a situation, like here, "where the disability benefits were in effect awarded and terminated in the same proceeding." Jones v. Bowen, 679 F.Supp. 133, 135 n. 1 (D.Mass.1988). However, as described in Jones, "nothing of importance turns on this distinction." Id.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Once a disability is found, the Commissioner's decision to terminate benefits, including limiting benefits to a closed time period, must be grounded in substantial evidence. Jones, 679 F.Supp. at 135 n. 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Cf. Richardson v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 506, 509-10 (6th Cir.1984) (even if no previous proceeding established that plaintiff was disabled, once it is shown that plaintiff was disabled at some earlier point in time, a presumption arises that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the disability continues). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Rodriguez v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1981). Here, that conclusion revolves around medical improvement.

The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "`more than a mere scintilla.'" Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). That is, even if the record could support multiple conclusions, a court must uphold the Commissioner "`if a reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept it as adequate to support h[er] conclusion.'" Ortiz v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222); see also Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427. At bottom, a court must affirm the Commissioner's decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the record could arguably justify a different result. Rodriguez Pagan v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1987).

V. PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL EVIDENCE

As indicated, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on November 2, 1989, and was thereafter diagnosed with a dislocation of a joint in his left foot, muscle spasms and slight degenerative changes confirmed by a series of x-rays. (A.R. at 119-23.) On December 8, 1989, Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Shafi Wani, a neurologist, for pain and stiffness in his neck and right shoulder, and for pain in his right hand and left leg. (A.R. at 148-50.) Dr. Wani diagnosed Plaintiff with cervical and right shoulder strain, radicular symptoms in the right upper extremities and decreased cervical motion. (Id.) Later, on January 8, 1990, an electromyogram revealed to Dr. Wani that Plaintiff was afflicted with right wrist median nerve dysfunction and mild right carpal tunnel syndrome. (A.R. at 170-71.) Still later, on April 11, 1990, a magnetic resonance imaging of Plaintiff's spine disclosed several herniated discs. (A.R. at 174.) In December of 1990, Dr. Wani diagnosed Plaintiff with "myofascial pain syndrome" and carpal tunnel syndrome on his right side. (A.R. at 156-57.)

On January 25, 1990, Dr. M. Ather Mirza, an orthopedic surgeon, began treating Plaintiff for pain and numbness in his right hand. (See A.R. at 186-87.) Dr. Mirza also diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome and, on April 16, 1991, Plaintiff underwent surgery for relief. (Id.) Due to complicating conditions revealed by surgery, however, Dr. Mirza was unable to state the complete degree of Plaintiff's disability and functional limitations. (A.R. at 185.) During this period, Plaintiff was also receiving physical therapy. (See A.R. at 187.)

Dr. Wani continued to see Plaintiff through the spring of 1991, during which time Plaintiff complained of continued pain in his neck, shoulder and right hand. (See A.R. at 164-67, 201.) In May of 1991,...