Deen v. Williams
| Decision Date | 11 April 1907 |
| Citation | 57 S.E. 427,128 Ga. 265 |
| Parties | DEEN v. WILLIAMS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The fact that the defendant in ejectment claims under the plaintiff's grantor is equivalent to an admission of title in the grantor, and dispenses with further proof of title in him.
Where the plaintiff has a valid deed, based upon a valuable consideration, though not recorded, his title thereunder is superior to the right of a grantee from the same grantor in a subsequent deed, which is not based upon a valuable consideration, though recorded in the time allowed by law.
A contract to suppress a criminal prosecution, for a consideration personal to the prosecutor, is immoral and contrary to public policy.
Where a deed to land is executed to the prosecutor only for the purpose of suppressing a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor, being himself at fault, cannot, on the strength of such deed alone, invoke the aid of an equitable estoppel against another, not a party to the deed, and in whom the legal title was vested at the time of the execution of the deed, in order to prevent such true owner from asserting his title.
Where one takes a deed under circumstances enumerated in the fourth headnote, and there is no surrender of possession by the true owner, the fact that such owner participated in the negotiations which led to the execution of the deed to the prosecutor, and may have deceived the prosecutor by leading him to believe that his grantor still had legal title to the property to be conveyed, will not authorize such prosecutor either to evict the true owner, or, after eviction, sustain a defense against the assertion of the legal title by the true owner, under the principle, "In pari delicto melior est conditio possidentis."
The case of Beard v. White, 48 S.E. 400, 120 Ga. 1018 distinguished.
In view of the rulings made in this case, it is not necessary to deal with the assignments of error which complain of the admission of evidence.
Upon the point that the plaintiff's deed did not embrace the land in dispute, and upon all of the questions at issue, the evidence, considered in connection with the admissions made in the pleadings, was of such character as to make it erroneous for the trial judge to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Error from Superior Court, Appling County; T. A. Parker, Judge.
Action by Joe Deen against G. W. Williams. From the judgment, Deen brings error. Reversed.
W. W Bennett, for plaintiff in error.
Thomas & Parker, for defendant in error.
1. The defendant does not claim under any one except the plaintiff's grantor. Such claim is equivalent to an admission that the plaintiff's grantor had title to the property, and it was unnecessary for the plaintiff in ejectment to make further proof of title in his grantor. See in this connection, Civ. Code 1895,§ 5004; Greenfield v McIntyre, 112 Ga. 691, 38 S.E. 44; Garbutt Lumber Co. v. Wall, 126 Ga. 172, 54 S.E. 944.
2. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had a valid deed to the premises in dispute from the common grantor, based upon a valuable consideration of an older date than the defendant's deed; that the plaintiff's deed was not recorded within the time prescribed by law, nor until after the defendant's deed was executed and recorded; that the defendant's deed was recorded within the time allowed by law; and that the deed to the defendant was not executed upon a valuable consideration. If these facts be true, the plaintiff's title from the common grantor, being the older, is superior to any right which the defendant could have acquired by virtue of his deed. The plaintiff's deed was good as a conveyance of title, and a failure to record within the time allowed by law would not postpone the plaintiff's right to that of the defendant, a subsequent grantee from the same grantor. Civ. Code 1895, §§ 2778, 3618, are to be construed together, and do not apply in a contest between deeds, unless the junior grantee be a bona fide purchaser for value.
3. The record further discloses that the only purpose for which the defendant's deed was executed was to accomplish the suppression of the prosecution of two criminal indictments then pending against the common grantor. In one of the criminal cases the common grantor was charged with the offense of assault and battery, and in the other with the offense of using obscene language in the presence of a female, both being misdemeanors. The assault was not made upon the person of the prosecutor, nor his wife, nor his child, nor his ward, nor his servant; nor was the obscene language charged to have been used in the presence of any one bearing any of those relations to the prosecutor. The plaintiff participated in the negotiations which led to the execution of the junior deed, and was present at the execution thereof, and did not disclose to the prosecutor in the criminal case (the defendant in the case now under consideration) the existence of his alleged older deed. Under the facts just recited it is insisted that the plaintiff is estopped from asserting his legal title. This contention is not well...
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