Deer Mesa Corp. v. Los Tres Valles Special Zoning Dist. Com'n

• Decision Date: 05 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 8024,8024
• Citation: 103 N.M. 675,712 P.2d 21,1985 NMCA 114
• Parties: DEER MESA CORPORATION, a New Mexico Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOS TRES VALLES SPECIAL ZONING DISTRICT COMMISSION and Board of County Commissioners of Taos County, Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District Commission, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 21

712 P.2d 21

103 N.M. 675

DEER MESA CORPORATION, a New Mexico Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOS TRES VALLES SPECIAL ZONING DISTRICT COMMISSION and Board

of County Commissioners of Taos County,

Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District Commission,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8024.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Dec. 5, 1985.

[103 N.M. 676] K. Lee Peifer, Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.A., Albuquerque, Peggy J. Nelson, Taos, for defendant-appellant.

Susan Ross, Natelson & Ross, Taos, Steven Barshov, Potter, Kelly & Barshov, Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

WOOD, Judge.

This appeal involves the Special Zoning District Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, Sections 3-21-15 to -26 (Repl.1985). Deer Mesa Corporation (Deer Mesa) sued Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District Commission (District) and the Board of County Commissioners of Taos County (County). The complaint stated alternative and different theories of relief, NMSA 1978, Civ.P.Rule 8(a) (Repl.Pamp.1980), including a request for declaratory judgment. ¹ The trial court ruled that the Act was "unconstitutional on its face in that it unconstitutionally delegates power to private persons and allows arbitrary exercise of power by individuals." The County did not appeal; the appellant is the District. We discuss: (1) procedural matters, and (2) unconstitutional delegation.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

There are three procedural matters. The District contends the trial court should not have decided the constitutional question. Deer Mesa contends this court should not decide this appeal. Deer Mesa contends the Act is unconstitutional on two additional grounds.

(a) The trial court's constitutional ruling.

The trial court held a hearing to consider a variety of pending motions. One motion was Deer Mesa's motion for summary judgment which alleged the Act was facially unconstitutional. The trial court granted this motion. The ruling did not involve any factual matters; only a legal question was involved. See generally, Westgate Families v. County Clerk of Incorporated County of Los Alamos, 100 N.M. 146, 667 P.2d 453 (1983).

The District's contention is that other issues should have been decided prior to the constitutional question. This claim was made at the motions hearing, and requires identification of the showing of undisputed facts before the trial court at the time it granted the summary judgment.

The facts before the trial court, not controverted at the time of the summary judgment ruling, see NMSA 1978, Civ.P.Rule 56(d) (Repl.Pamp.1980), are found in various documents. The documents are: 1) facts stated in the verified complaint on the basis of personal knowledge of the affiant, the president of Deer Mesa, see Martinez v. Metzgar, 97 N.M. 173, 637 P.2d 1228 (1981); Rekart v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.M. 491, 468 P.2d 892 (Ct.App.1970); 2) the District's admissions in its answer to Deer Mesa's complaint, see Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673 (Ct.App.1972); 3) the written stipulation of Deer Mesa and the County; and 4) the exhibits admitted at the motions hearing without objection.

The facts were:

(1) On August 12, 1982, a petition and a map were filed with the Taos County Clerk, which, if legally sufficient, created the District. See Sec. 3-21-18.

(2) An election for special zoning district commissioners was held on November 9, 1982, and commissioners were elected. The election was held eighty-nine days after creation of the District, thus, not within the sixty-day period provided by Section 3-21-20.

(3) Deer Mesa applied to Taos County for preliminary plat approval of the Deer Mesa Subdivision on April 29, 1983. The application pertained to ninety-one acres owned by Deer Mesa.

(4) On June 10, 1983, the district commissioners adopted an ordinance which, if enacted in a legally sufficient manner, took effect on July 8, 1983. The ordinance contains a comprehensive land use plan and regulations. The filing stamp on the ordinance indicates it was filed with the county clerk on May 20, 1983, apparently three weeks prior to its adoption, but no issue is raised as to this in this appeal. Accordingly, we have not reviewed the statutes incorporated by reference in Section 3-21-22.

(5) The Taos County Planning Commission approved Deer Mesa's subdivision application and preliminary plat on September 15, 1983.

(6) The proposed Deer Mesa Subdivision is in compliance with applicable state and county subdivision laws and regulations.

(7) The District contains approximately 50,000 acres, and Deer Mesa's ninety-one acres are included within the District.

(8) The proposed Deer Mesa Subdivision does not comply with the District's ordinance as to lot sizes and the maximum number of lots in a subdivision. The proposed subdivision was not a "grandfathered" existing use under the ordinance. The proposed subdivision has not been approved by the District as a planned unit development under the ordinance.

(9) The County "will not grant a final plat approval on the proposed Deer Mesa Subdivision unless the proposed subdivision complies with the Ordinance and any other applicable laws of the District."

Deer Mesa's complaint in this suit stated three theories for relief. Count I challenged the constitutionality of the Act on various factual and legal grounds, including the claim that the Act was facially unconstitutional. Count II challenged the validity of the ordinance on constitutional grounds, on statutory grounds and on the facts. Count III asserted that Deer Mesa's proposed subdivision was not subject to the District's ordinance because of all of its preliminary work on the subdivision, including a drainage and flood hazard study, a soils report, a master plan, a water futures study, and the drilling of a test well. Deer Mesa alleged that this preliminary work occurred in 1982 and was included in its application, filed and pending, before the District's ordinance was adopted.

Deer Mesa filed a separate suit in quo warranto challenging the formation of the District under the Act. The quo warranto suit was not consolidated with this suit, nor was the trial court asked to do so. Nothing indicates that any hearing has been held in the quo warranto suit or the status of that suit. The District, however, includes the quo warranto suit in its procedural argument.

The District contends there is a pecking order for deciding the issues in this case. In the trial court, it asserted that the quo warranto suit, which raised the issue of whether the District was properly formed, must be decided first. If properly formed, the District claimed the second issue was that raised in Count III, which asserted that the proposed subdivision was not subject to the District's ordinance. If the proposed subdivision was subject to the ordinance, only then could constitutional questions be decided. In the trial court, the District did not suggest which of the numerous constitutional issues could be decided first if constitutional questions were to be decided. The District's brief suggests that all factual predicates for all constitutional issues would have to be decided before there could be a ruling on any constitutional issue as a matter of law. The District asserts the trial court was "required * * * to decide determinative non-constitutional issues * * * before reaching the constitutional issues."

The trial court rejected the argument that it was required to decide all nonconstitutional issues before considering whether the Act was constitutional as "contrary to the doctrine of judicial economy * * *." The trial court's meaning of judicial economy is illustrated by its comment that if the Act was unconstitutional there would be no need for a trial. The District asserts that economical and efficient use of a judge's time must yield to the rule "reserving constitutional determinations until all determinative non-constitutional issues have been resolved."

The District's briefs ignore Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972). In Montoya the trial court declared a statute unconstitutional. In affirming the trial court, the supreme court stated: "When the issue has been placed before the court, the decision as to the constitutionality of a statute is generally within the judicial discretion of the judge." The issue was before the trial court in this case; Deer Mesa sought a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional on its face. The trial court's ruling disposed of this litigation at the trial level, and made unnecessary a trial of the numerous factual issues. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The District, contrary to Montoya, contends the trial court lacked discretion to make the constitutional ruling. It states: "It is well settled in this jurisdiction that if an actual controversy between parties can be otherwise fairly decided and disposed of, the court will refrain from deciding constitutional issues." The District cites State ex rel. Huning v. Los Chavez Zoning Commission, 97 N.M. 472, 641 P.2d 503 (1982), in support of its contention, asserting that Huning "is virtually identical * * *." We disagree.

In Huning there was an appeal after a trial on the merits. The supreme court reviewed the evidence and decided the case on that basis, stating: "We do not reach the constitutional issue raised in this case as this Court will not rule upon a constitutional question if the merits of the case may otherwise be fairly decided." This states a rule for deciding appeals. Property Tax Department v. Molycorp, Inc., 89 N.M. 603, 555 P.2d 903 (1976), pointed out that appellate courts have "a duty to avoid a constitutional adjudication where a ruling on another issue would terminate the controversy." Molycorp also pointed out that the determinative nonconstitutional issue must be met if there is a record on which the decision can be based. Huning does not address the trial court's discretion in deciding a constitutional issue. There is...