Dees v. State
Docket Number | CR-20-0276 |
Decision Date | 08 October 2021 |
Citation | 351 So.3d 567 |
Parties | Kristen Marie DEES v. STATE of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Megan M. Nix, asst. public defender, and Christopher S. Youngpeter, asst. public defender, Mobile County Public Defender's Office, Mobile, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and William D. Dill, asst. att'y gen., for appellee.
Kristen Marie Dees appeals the Mobile Circuit Court's order denying her petition seeking a writ of mandamus directed to the Mobile District Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
In December 2019, the State filed a complaint in the district court alleging that Dees had committed theft of property in the third degree, a Class D felony. See § 13A-8-4.1, Ala. Code 1975. Dees subsequently filed a motion for discovery in which she sought an order directing the State to provide her with certain discovery. In response, the State argued that the district court's limited jurisdiction over Dees's felony charge did not include the authority to issue a discovery order. The district court denied Dees's discovery motion and scheduled a preliminary hearing. Dees filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that Rule 16, Ala. R. Crim. P., which governs discovery, "does not contemplate that [a discovery] request cannot be filed in district court." (C. 32.) Dees also cited caselaw from this Court that, she said, authorizes a district court to order discovery at the preliminary-hearing stage of a felony case. The district court denied Dees's motion to reconsider.
A few days before the preliminary hearing was originally scheduled to occur, Dees, relying on the arguments she had made in the district court, filed in the circuit court a petition for a writ of mandamus in which she argued that the district court erred by denying her requested discovery order. In response, the State noted that the district court's authority in felony cases is limited under § 12-12-32(b), Ala. Code 1975, to receiving guilty pleas in noncapital cases and to holding preliminary hearings. Thus, the State argued, Dees could not demonstrate that she had a clear legal right to relief because, the State argued, the authority to order discovery is not encompassed within those two limited functions. The State further argued that, even if discovery is permitted in the district court, the court has discretion in determining whether to order discovery and that Dees was not entitled to mandamus relief because, it said, she had not demonstrated an abuse of that discretion.
On January 12, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Dees's petition for a writ of mandamus. Following that hearing, the circuit court issued an order denying Dees's petition on the basis that she had not demonstrated a clear legal right to discovery in the district court. In support of its ruling, the circuit court cited § 12-12-32(b) and concluded that, " ‘because a district court's jurisdiction is limited in felony cases and the proceedings within the district court's limited jurisdiction do not involve discovery, a district court does not have authority to issue discovery orders in felony cases.’ " (C. 75 (quoting State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 655, 661 (Ala. 2018) (Stuart, C.J., concurring the result)).) Dees filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court.
Harris v. Owens, 105 So. 3d 430, 433 (Ala. 2012). " ‘Mandamus is the "proper means of review to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion in ordering discovery, in resolving discovery matters, and in issuing discovery orders so as to prevent an abuse of the discovery process by either party." ’ " Hooks v. State, 822 So. 2d 476, 478 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Compass Bank, 686 So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Ala. 1996), quoting in turn Ex parte Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So. 2d 358, 360 (Ala. 1993) ).
On appeal, Dees argues that the circuit court erred by concluding that she did not have a clear legal right to discovery in the district court. In support of her claim, Dees relies on State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (" Brown I").
In Brown I, Kentory Dashawn Brown had been charged with burglary and theft offenses, and, before a preliminary hearing occurred in the district court, Brown moved to have the State provide all discovery permitted by Rule 16.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. The district court granted Brown's motion, but, on the date the preliminary hearing was scheduled to occur, the State had not provided the requested discovery. Thus, Brown sought a continuance, which was granted, but when the parties appeared for the rescheduled preliminary hearing, the State had yet to provide the requested discovery because, according to the State, discovery was neither proper nor allowed at that stage of the proceedings. The district court apparently did not address the discovery issue at that time and proceeded with the preliminary hearing, and Brown's cases were subsequently bound over to a grand jury.
Three days after the preliminary hearing, the district court ordered the State to provide Brown with discovery within seven days. In response, the State petitioned the circuit court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate the discovery order. The circuit court denied the State's petition, and the State then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that, "in a non-capital case, the district court has authority only to accept a guilty plea and to hold preliminary hearings." Brown I, 259 So. 3d at 685. Brown countered with the argument that § 12-12-32(b) impliedly vests a district court with the authority to perform other functions, including ordering discovery, in conjunction with its limited jurisdiction in felony cases. Brown also argued that "nothing in Rule 16 limits its applicability only to circuit courts." Id. at 686. In concluding that the State had not satisfied the "heavy burden" required to obtain mandamus relief, id. at 688, this Court stated:
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