Harris v. Owens
Decision Date | 21 September 2012 |
Docket Number | 1110421. |
Citation | 105 So.3d 430 |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Parties | William HARRIS, in his official capacity as president of Alabama State University, et al. v. Felisa OWENS. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kenneth L. Thomas, chief legal officer, Alabama State University, Montgomery; and Frederic A. Bolling of The Bolling Law Firm, LLC, Pleasant Grove, for appellant.
Fred F. Bell, Montgomery, for appellee.
The respondents, William Harris (“Harris”), in his official capacity as president of Alabama State University (“ASU”), and the individual members of ASU's Board of Trustees (“the Board”), in their official capacities as members of the Board, appeal from the circuit court's order granting the petition filed by Felisa Owens seeking a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief as a result of the termination of her employment with ASU and awarding Owens full backpay and benefits.
On October 19, 2009, Carmen Douglas, vice president of ASU's Office of Human Resources, delivered a notice-of-termination letter to Owens. The letter stated that Harris had approved a recommendation to terminate Owens's employment and informed Owens of her right to request a hearing in accordance with ASU policy.
On October 20, 2009, Owens requested a hearing. On October 22, 2009, Owens was placed on administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of the hearing. After conducting a hearing, the hearing officer recommended that Owens be suspended for 30 days without pay.
ASU's Office of Human Resources received a copy of the hearing officer's findings and recommendation on January 4, 2010. Douglas subsequently sent Owens a letter dated February 1, 2010. In that letter, Douglas stated that Harris had rejected the hearing officer's findings and recommendation; that the termination of Owens's employment was upheld; that the termination of her employment was effective January 31, 2010; and that she would cease receiving benefits effective March 1, 2010. Owens appealed her termination to the Board.
Owens stopped receiving salary and benefits on March 1, 2010. Subsequently, Douglas sent Owens a letter dated May 7, 2010, informing her that the Board had upheld the decision to terminate her employment.
On June 29, 2010, Owens filed a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” in the Montgomery Circuit Court. Harris was named as a respondent in his official capacity as the president of ASU. Elton Dean, Oscar Crawley, Bobby Junkins, Taylor Hodge, Buford Crutcher, Thomas Figures, Lawrence Lemak, Marvin Wiggins, and Herbert Young were also named as respondents in their official capacities as members of the Board. In her petition, Owens alleged that, at the time she was notified that Harris had approved the recommendation to terminate her employment, she was a permanent employee of ASU; that § 2.6 of the Non–Academic Handbook (“the handbook”) stated that a permanent employee may not be dismissed except through the due-process procedures set forth in the handbook; and that, in terminating her employment, the respondents did not comply with the due-process procedures set forth in the handbook.
On August 17, 2010, the respondents filed a motion for a summary judgment in which they argued that Owens could not meet the initial requirement for a writ of mandamus, i.e., she could not establish a clear legal right to the order sought because she had received written notice of the allegations against her and had had an evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer; that the procedural defects about which Owens complained did not amount to violations of the handbook; and that, even if the defects did amount to violations of the handbook, any error was harmless and would not support Owens's claim for relief.
On September 7, 2010, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the respondents' motion for a summary judgment,1 and, on October 6, 2010, the circuit court denied the motion for a summary judgment. After conducting some discovery, the respondents, on June 21, 2011, renewed their motion for a summary judgment, in which they again argued that the alleged procedural defects did not amount to violations of the handbook and that, even if the defects did amount to violations of the handbook, any error was harmless and did not justify the relief sought by Owens. Owens filed a response, and, after conducting a hearing,2 the circuit court denied the renewed motion for a summary judgment.
On September 14, 2011, the circuit court entered a final order. In that order, the circuit court stated that the facts were undisputed and that the issue involved was predominantly a legal one. The circuit court found that, in terminating Owens's employment, the respondents did not comply with the procedures set forth in the handbook. It also found:
“The Foreword to the Handbook makes clear that ‘[a]ny policies issued by any individuals or agency in conflict with these policies are null and void.’ The actions of the officials at ASU in terminating [Owens] conflict with the policies set forth in the Handbook. Respondents do not dispute the sworn allegations of [Owens]; rather, they argue the Respondents' failure to follow the mandated policies at ASU amounts to harmless error and that they are afforded wide discretion. The Court is not persuaded and disagrees.
“....
“By refusing to follow the mandates of the Handbook, Respondents abused their discretion and exercised that discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. As such, mandamus will lie to compel a proper exercise of that discretion. The Court finds that [Owens's] request for mandamus and declaratory judgment relief is due to be GRANTED.
“The Court having reviewed the petition, answer, motions and responses, oral arguments of counsel, the applicable law, and having reviewed the submissions of the parties, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECLARED as follows:
“(A) that the Respondents have violated their mandatory policies with respect to the termination of [Owens];
“(B) that [Owens] has not been properly terminated pursuant to the mandatory policies of ASU;
“(C) that [Owens] still has permanent status as an employee of ASU; “(D) that [Owens] still has permanent status as an Academic Records Analyst at ASU;
“(E) that the Respondents follow their mandated policies, reinstating [Owens] to her former position or another position with commensurate duties, salary and benefits, with full back pay and back benefits;
“(F) that Respondents reinstate [Owens's] pay from the date that it ceased to the present, with a reinstatement of benefits and a reinstatement of [Owens] assuming the duties of her position; and
“(G) that costs are taxed against the Respondents for which execution may commence.”
(Capitalization in original.)
On October 13, 2011, the respondents filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's final order, which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.
Regions Bank v. Reed, 60 So.3d 868, 877 (Ala.2010). We note that, in Ex parte Miles, 841 So.2d 242, 243–44 (Ala.2002), we stated:
“ ‘ '
The respondents argue that the circuit court erred when it granted Owens's petition for a writ of mandamus and her request for declaratory judgment and awarded Owens backpay and benefits. The respondents contend that they are immune from any claim for monetary damages under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901, and that there was not sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's judgment.
Initially, the respondents contend that the circuit court erred in awarding Owens backpay and benefits because, they say, they are immune from liability for monetary damages pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901.3
“
Ex parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 88 So.3d 837, 842 (Ala.2012). In Vandenberg v. Aramark Educational Services, Inc., 81 So.3d 326 (Ala.2011), this Court stated:
“This Court has held that the immunity afforded the State by § 14 applies to instrumentalities of the State and State officers sued in their official capacities when such an action is effectively an action against the State. Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.2d 257, 261 (Ala.2003). We have specifically ‘extended the restriction on suits against the State found in § 14 “...
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