Deese v. Collins

• Citation: 133 S.E. 92,191 N.C. 749
• Decision Date: 12 May 1926
• Docket Number: 431.
• Parties: DEESE v. COLLINS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

133 S.E. 92

191 N.C. 749

DEESE v. COLLINS.

No. 431.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 12, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Union County; McElroy, Judge.

Action by J. S. Deese against Ellison Collins. From judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Action to recover damages for slander. Plaintiff is a white man. He alleges that defendant spoke of and concerning him words by which he intended to charge and did charge that plaintiff along with other members of his family, had negro blood in his veins; that said charge was false and malicious, and was made with the intent and purpose to damage plaintiff. He neither alleged, nor offered evidence tending to prove special damages resulting from said charge. At close of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit. Motion allowed. From judgment rendered dismissing the action, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.

Special damages must be alleged and proved in action for slander only when words spoken are not actionable per se.

Julian C. Brooks and Vann & Milliken, all of Monroe, for appellant.

John C Sikes, of Monroe, for appellee.

CONNOR J.

The sole question presented by this appeal, as stated in appellant's brief, is whether a false statement made by defendant that plaintiff has negro blood in his veins, is actionable per se, under the law of this state. Unless this question be answered in the affirmative, no action for damages can be maintained therefor, without allegation and proof of special damages resulting from the false statement. On the contrary, if the words are actionable per se, the plaintiff is required neither to allege nor prove damages the law presumes damages, as necessarily resulting from the false statement. If words falsely spoken of and concerning the plaintiff by the defendant charge him with an infamous offense, or with having an infectious disease, or impeach his trade or profession, such words are per se actionable because these words necessarily tend to his degradation and injury, and the plaintiff may recover as a matter of course, without showing that he has actually sustained damages. But when the words spoken are such as do not on their face import such degradation as will of course be injurious, then plaintiff must aver some special damages, which is called laying his action with a per quod, and he must show by proof that he has in point of fact sustained a loss before he can recover. Pegram v. Stoltz, 76 N.C. 350. This distinction between an action founded upon words which are actionable per se, and an action founded upon words which are not actionable per se, based upon the common law (3 Bl. Comm. 123) has been uniformly recognized in this state. Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 113...