Deese v. Parks

• Decision Date: 13 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 61058,61058
• Citation: 276 S.E.2d 269,157 Ga.App. 116
• Parties: DEESE v. PARKS et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 269

276 S.E.2d 269

157 Ga.App. 116

DEESE v. PARKS et al.

No. 61058.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 13, 1981.

Clifford C. Perkins, Jr., Carrollton, for appellant.

David H. Tisinger, Carrollton, Jack F. Witcher, Bremen, for appellees.

QUILLIAN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff brought suit in Carroll Superior Court against the defendants, Jean Parks, Leonard Jackson and World of Security and Services, Inc. Plaintiff alleged that his wife, Brenda Deese, was an employee of Koffee Kart and worked in the snack area of Southwire Company's plant. While so employed, she received injuries which it was alleged were cause by the negligent acts of the individual defendants as employees of the corporate defendant, World of Security.

The defendants filed answers denying the material allegations of plaintiff's claim. Two of the defendants also filed defenses which raised the issue that a certain "vendor identification agreement" served to bar the plaintiff's right to recover against those defendants. The "vendor identification agreement" which was signed by plaintiff's wife prior to her injury contained the following provision: "that Brenda Deese will protect and hold harmless Southwire Company and its affiliates, their officers, employees and stockholders, from any loss, damage, or harm resulting from a visit to Southwire's plant or other facilities or from any occurrence while he is on Southwire's premises..." It further provided: "Brenda Deese further agrees to make no claim against Southwire Company, its affiliates, their officers, employees and shareholders for any loss, damage, harm or injury which he might suffer while on the premises of Southwire Company or its affiliates."

As is revealed by the record, World of Security and Services is an affiliate of Southwire Company.

The three defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the pleadings and on the affidavits of the individual defendants as well as that of the plaintiff's wife. The case came on for hearing and the trial judge granted each of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals to this court. Held :

1. Counsel for the defendant urges that the judgment of the court below should be sustained for the reason that the plaintiff's claim failed to contain a demand for judgment.

In Allied Asphalt Co. v. Cumbie, 134 Ga.App. 960, 962(2), 216 S.E.2d 659, this court considered a similar contention and held: "Code Ann. § 81A-154(c) provides, in part: '(E)very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings'. This procedural provision 'makes it clear that the demand for judgment is no part of the claimant's cause of action.' 2A Moore's Federal Practice § 8.18, p. 1803 (Now p. 8.216). 'Inasmuch as the demand for relief does not constitute part of the pleader's claim for relief, a failure to demand the appropriate relief will not result in a dismissal. The question is not whether plaintiff has asked for the proper remedy but whether he is entitled to any remedy.' Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2664, p. 108."

Hence, the contention that a demand for judgment was lacking furnishes no basis to sustain the trial judge's grant of the motions for summary judgment on behalf of the defendants.

2. The plaintiff's wife executed the so-called "vendor identification agreement" which contained provisions agreeing to indemnify and hold harmless Southwire Company and its affiliates (which would include the named defendants) and in effect gave up her right to sue. It is therefore urged that since the husband's right for loss of services and consortium is derivative of that of his wife's, he also is barred.

Of course, exculpatory clauses are not permitted in contracts of construction or repair or involving the landlord-tenant relationship with regard to a dwelling place. Country Club Apts. v. Scott, 246 Ga. 443, 271 S.E.2d 841. Such situation does not pertain here. Hence, we must determine whether the husband is precluded from asserting his claim because of the agreement entered into by his wife.

As has been pointed out, "(w)hen a married woman is injured by the wrongful conduct of another, two different causes of action may arise: the one in her favor for her own pain and suffering, and the other in favor of the husband for the loss of...