Deeter v. Smith
| Decision Date | 10 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 52592-7,52592-7 |
| Citation | 721 P.2d 519,106 Wn.2d 376 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | John DEETER, Respondent, v. Lyle SMITH and Pierce County, Washington, Appellants. |
William Griffies, Pierce County Prosecutor, Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Kathleen Proctor, Deputy County Prosecutors, Tacoma, for appellants.
Samuel Allotta, Tacoma, for respondent.
This is an automobile forfeiture proceeding brought in Pierce County pursuant to the seizure and forfeiture provisions of this state's Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 1 The trial court ordered the automobile returned to the owner, John Deeter. Pierce County and Lyle Smith, its sheriff, appeal.
In criminal proceedings brought against the defendant John Deeter for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the trial court found his arrest and the police seizure of controlled substances on his person and in his automobile to be unlawful. The trial court then ordered this evidence suppressed and dismissed the criminal charge against him.
In the appeal before us, which is from a separate proceeding brought to forfeit Mr. Deeter's automobile, neither the Sheriff nor the County cite legal authority supporting the validity of the arrest, or of the search or the seizure of the controlled substances. In this posture of the case, we deem it unnecessary to further discuss the facts because, like the trial court, we also conclude that the arrest and the search and seizure of the controlled substances were invalid.
One principal issue is thus presented.
Does the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule apply in an automobile forfeiture proceeding brought under this state's version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, RCW 69.50.505?
CONCLUSION. Since this automobile forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies and the Sheriff and County cannot rely on illegally obtained evidence to sustain the forfeiture. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order requiring that Mr. Deeter's automobile be returned to him.
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 1250-51, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies not only to criminal proceedings, but also to those forfeiture proceedings which are quasi-criminal in character. That case also indicated that a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal if it is intended to impose a penalty on an individual for a violation of the criminal law.
The vehicle forfeiture provisions of this state's Uniform Controlled Substances Act are contained in former RCW 69.50.505(a)(4) which provides:
(a) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture:
* * *
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of [illegal controlled substances] ...
Clearly then, forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to this statute are quasi -criminal in nature since their purpose is to penalize individuals who participate in the illegal transportation of controlled substances. 2 Numerous other courts have held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is applicable to vehicle forfeiture proceedings of this kind. 3 Accordingly, we likewise apply the exclusionary rule to the vehicle forfeiture case before us.
In this vehicle forfeiture proceeding, the Sheriff and County are thus prohibited from using as evidence the controlled substances which were illegally seized from Mr. Deeter's person and automobile. Lacking such evidence, the County cannot in this case show that Mr. Deeter used his automobile for the purposes described in the forfeiture statute (RCW 69.50.505(a)(4)). We hold that Mr. Deeter's automobile may not be forfeited and must be returned to him as ordered by the trial court.
By our decision herein, however, the Sheriff and the County are not required to return the controlled substances which were also seized 4 since public policy expressly forbids Mr. Deeter's possession of such contraband. 5
Two other issues may be disposed of more briefly.
First, the trial court erroneously held that Mr. Deeter could reclaim his automobile at the forfeiture proceeding by merely proving that he was the registered owner of the vehicle. The trial court based its decision on the following provision of RCW 69.50.505(e):
The seizing law enforcement agency shall promptly return the article or articles to the claimant upon a determination by the administrative law judge or court that the claimant is the present lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession thereof ...
This statutory provision must be construed in light of the forfeiture statute as a whole. 6 When so construed, it is apparent that the claimant of an automobile may be deemed its "lawful owner", and thus entitled to possession thereof, only if the automobile is not forfeitable pursuant tothe state's vehicle forfeiture provisions. 7
Finally, the trial court properly held that Mr. Deeter is not entitled to attorneys' fees. The forfeiture statute allows an award of attorneys' fees only "[i]n a court hearing between two or more claimants to the article or articles involved". RCW 69.50.505(e) (part). A reading of this...
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1995 CORVETTE VIN# 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City Council of …, 63
... ... E.A. Clore Sons, Inc., 222 Va. 543, 548 n. 4, 281 S.E.2d 901, 904 n. 4 (1981) ; Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash.2d 376, 378-79, 721 P.2d 519, 520 (1986) ... 7. Only two cases appear to question whether Plymouth Sedan ... ...
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State v. Catlett
...I, § 9 of our constitution. Catlett asserts prior case law conclusively establishes RCW 69.50.505 is punitive, citing Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash.2d 376, 721 P.2d 519 (1986), because forfeiture proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and punitive in effect. Supplemental Br. of Resp't at 4; A......
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Sims v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n
...to the criminal law in its objectives. It seeks to punish and deter those in possession of illegal drugs. Cf. Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash.2d 376, 721 P.2d 519, 520-21 (1986) (forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to the state's Uniform Controlled Substances Act "are quasi-criminal in nature......
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Swanson Hay Co. v. State
...that do not seek to exact a penalty or forfeiture. 65 Wash.App. at 366, 828 P.2d 81. Barlindal , like our Supreme Court's decision in Deeter v. Smith before it, merely recognized that in forfeiture proceedings, which are quasicriminal in nature, the Fourth Amendment17 exclusionary rule appl......
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Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2005 Update
...702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 1251, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 176 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings); Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378-79, 721 P.2d 519, 520-21 (1986) (en banc) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because civ......
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Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2013 Update
...380 U.S. 693, 702, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable to forfeiture proceedings); Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 376, 378-79, 721 P.2d 519 (1986) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies because civil forfeitures are quasi criminal in nature). Courts hav......