Deeugenio v. Borough of Glassboro

• Decision Date: 08 July 2020
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-20521-NLH-AMD
• Parties: DR. LEWIS DEEUGENIO, JR. and SUMMIT CITY FARMS, Plaintiffs, v. BOROUGH OF GLASSBORO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

DR. LEWIS DEEUGENIO, JR. and SUMMIT CITY FARMS, Plaintiffs, v. BOROUGH OF GLASSBORO, et al., Defendants.

1:19-cv-20521-NLH-AMD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

July 8, 2020

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

GARY EDWIN FOX

FOX & MELOFCHIK, L.L.C.

12 CHRISTOPHER WAY

SUITE 101

Eatontown, NJ 07724

On behalf of Plaintiffs

SETH LAWRENCE LAVER

GOLDBERG SEGALLA LLP

1700 MARKET STREET

SUITE 1418

PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103

On behalf of Defendant Timothy D. Scaffidi

PATRICK JOSEPH MADDEN

MADDEN & MADDEN, PA

108 KINGS HIGHWAY EAST

SUITE 200

PO BOX 210

HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033-0389

On behalf of all other Defendants

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter concerns a parking ordinance enacted by the Borough of Glassboro to alleviate parking issues caused by Rowan University students parking on Glassboro's residential streets. Plaintiffs, who own and operate a commercial farm, claim that the parking ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, and without rational basis, is discriminatory as applied to Plaintiffs, violates their due process and equal protection rights, and must be declared void.

Defendants removed Plaintiffs' case from state court to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with the Court having supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).¹ The purported basis for federal question jurisdiction is Plaintiffs' single averment in their complaint that "Defendants' actions violate Plaintiffs' State and Federal civil rights." (See Plaintiff's Complaint, Docket No. 1 at 14 ¶ 27; see also Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1 at 2 ¶ 6.) The six counts in Plaintiffs' complaint, however, either do not specify the law upon which Plaintiffs rely, or cite to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et seq. (See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Docket No. 1 at 14-17 ¶¶ 28-42.)

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety on numerousbases, including Plaintiffs' failure to state viable claims.² Plaintiffs have moved to remand, arguing that their claims arise solely under New Jersey law and they have not asserted any federal claims, which was intentional and by design.

Although as discussed below the issues are somewhat intertwined, before addressing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Court must first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the asserted claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction which possess "only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992)); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). It is presumed that a cause of action lies outside of this limited jurisdiction and this presumption places a burden upon the removing party toestablish federal jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).

The federal removal statute permits a defendant to remove a civil action from state court to the district court when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action and the district court geographically encompasses the state court where the action was originally filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Once the case has been removed, however, the court may nonetheless remand it to state court if the removal was procedurally defective or "subject matter jurisdiction is lacking." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Costa v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D.N.J. 2013). The removal statutes "are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111 (citing Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987).

Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides the district courts with original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Generally, "determining whether a particular case arises under federal law turns on the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule." Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)).Under this rule, subject-matter jurisdiction as described under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 may only be exercised when a federal question is presented on the face of the complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99) (explaining that because the plaintiff is "the master of the complaint," the well-pleaded-complaint rule enables him, "by eschewing claims based on federal law, . . . to have the cause heard in state court").

"[T]he party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon," but "it is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule that a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." Franchise Tax Bd., 1 463 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted). "Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Id. at 27-28.

Here, in their motion to remand Plaintiffs argue that they only intended to assert claims premised solely on state law. Even though statements in Plaintiffs' brief in support of theirmotion to remand cannot alter the contents of their complaint, it is apparent when examining the complaint under the well-pleaded complaint rule that Plaintiffs' claims arise only under New Jersey state law, despite Plaintiffs' single use of the word "Federal" in their complaint.

As noted above, in paragraph 27 of their complaint, Plaintiffs plead, "Defendants' actions violate Plaintiffs' State and Federal civil rights." (See Plaintiff's Complaint, Docket No. 1 at 14 ¶ 27.) In Plaintiffs' first count against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege:

29. Borough of Glassboro Ordinance Number 16-26 is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and without any rational basis.

30. The enforcement of this Ordinance has caused the Plaintiffs damages.

(Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Plaintiffs do not cite to what law or constitutional provision supports their claim that the ordinance is "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and without any rational basis." Applying the well-pleaded complaint standard, this Count does not implicitly or explicitly assert a violation of a federal substantive right. Whether an ordinance is "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and without any rational basis" in violation of the federal or state constitution is a standard for proving a constitutional violation claim rather than the substantive right itself, such as due process or equalprotection.³ See Behne v. Union County College, 2018 WL 566207, at *11 (D.N.J. 2018) (citing Broad St. Surgical Ctr., LLC v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 2012 WL 762498, at *10 (D.N.J. 2012)) ("Plaintiff's 'arbitrary and capricious' claim must be dismissed as this is a legal standard, not an independent cause of action."); see also Pitt v. Pine Valley Golf Club, 695 F. Supp. 778, 783 (D.N.J. 1988) (citing Cleburne v. City of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)) (other citations omitted) ("Absent a fundamental right or suspect classification, the proper standard of review for both due process and equal protection challenges is the rational relation test. . . . Under this rational relationship test, the legislation must not be arbitrary or capricious and must be reasonably related to a legitimate state interest."); Robson v. Rodriquez, 141 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1958) (citations omitted) ("The guaranty of due process as it applies to cases of the type here under consideration requires only that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall bear a rational relation to the legislative object sought to be obtained. Similarly, the constitutional requirement of equal protection ismet by legislation that treats all persons within a class reasonably selected, in a like or similar manner.").

To the extent that Plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious count can constitute an actionable stand-alone claim, such a claim would arise under New Jersey law. See Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Township of Warren, 777 A.2d 334, 338-39 (N.J. 2001) cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002) (citations omitted) ("Municipalities possess broad police power to zone for the public good insofar as the Legislature delegates that authority. . . . . Although a strong presumption of validity insulates a zoning ordinance from challenge, a plaintiff overcomes that presumption through an affirmative showing that the ordinance in whole or in application to any particular property is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute. In evaluating whether a zoning ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, a court's role is not to pass on the wisdom of the ordinance; that is exclusively a legislative function. Rather, a court engages in a review of the relationship between the means and ends of the ordinance. In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses whichdo not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases is whether...