Robson v. Rodriquez

• Decision Date: 28 April 1958
• Docket Number: No. A--97,A--97
• Citation: 141 A.2d 1,26 N.J. 517
• Parties: Wilfred ROBSON, Administrator ad prosequendum of the Estate of Mary E. Robson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Victor RODRIQUEZ, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 517

26 N.J. 517

141 A.2d 1

Wilfred ROBSON, Administrator ad prosequendum of the Estate of Mary E. Robson, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Victor RODRIQUEZ, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--97.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 4, 1958.

Decided April 28, 1958.

Martin L. Haines, Mount Holly, argued the cause for the appellant (Dimon, Haines & Bunting, Mount Holly, attorneys).

Robert W. Criscuolo, Mount Holly, argued the cause for the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (Parker, McCay & Criscuolo, Mount Holly, attorneys).

David M. Satz, Jr., argued the cause for the intervenor (Harold Kolovsky, Acting Atty. Gen.).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

The primary question raised by this appeal is the constitutional validity of N.J.S.A. 39:6--70(d) of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law, L.1952 c. 174 (N.J.S.A. 39:6--61 et seq.) which precludes a person who sustains personal injury or property damage caused by a financially irresponsible motorist from receiving payment out of the Fund, if at the time of the accident he was operating or riding in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him, or his spouse, parent or child.

The plaintiff is the administrator Ad prosequendum of Mary E. Robson, who was killed in an automobile accident on June 5, 1955. The accident involved a collision between the automobile owned and operated by the decedent and an automobile owned and operated by Victor Rodriquez. Neither owner carried liability insurance.

The plaintiff, after obtaining a consent judgment against Rodriquez for $5,500, applied to the trial court for an order directing payment of the judgment out of the Fund pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6--69. The Fund and the Attorney-General, who appeared for the State as an intervenor, opposed the plaintiff's application on the ground that the decedent was operating an uninsured motor vehicle owned by her, therefore, the plaintiff, as her administrator Ad prosequendum, was precluded from recovery by subsection (d). The pertinent provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:6--70 read as follows:

'The court shall proceed upon such application, in a summary manner, and, upon the hearing thereof, the applicant shall be required to show

'(d) He was not at the time of the accident, operating or riding in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him or his spouse, parent or child, and was not operating a motor vehicle in violation of an order of suspension or revocation.'

At the hearing below, the plaintiff contended that subsection (d) creates an arbitrary and unreasonable classification which violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; the concept of equality in our State Constitution, and the prohibition of the enactment of certain private, special or local laws; and that the subsection violates the provision of our Constitution that 'every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.' Const.1947, art. IV, § VII, par. 4. Finally, the plaintiff urged that although the subsection purports to prohibit recovery out of the Fund by an applicant who was operating an uninsured vehicle owned by him at the time of the accident, it does not preclude recovery by his personal representative.

The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in all respects and further held that subsection (d) prohibited recovery by the personal representative of the decedent. Robson v. Rodriquez, 44 N.J.Super. 262, 130 A.2d 74 (Law Div.1957). We granted plaintiff's motion for certification prior to consideration by the Appellate Division. 25 N.J. 283, 135 A.2d 590 (1957).

Plaintiff contends that the challenged provision of the statute violates the constitutional mandates in that the classification is 'arbitrary and capricious' and does not bear a substantial relation to the objective of the statute. Specifically, he argues that there is no rational basis for excluding a person who is injured or sustains property damage when he is operating or riding in an uninsured vehicle owned by him, or his spouse, parent or child, while permitting recovery by an uninsured owner who was not present in his vehicle at the time of the accident. In short, he argues that the subsection is unconstitutional since it does not exclude all uninsured owners from recovery.

The guaranty of due process as it applies to cases of the type here under consideration requires only that a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall bear a rational relation to the legislative object sought to be obtained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934); Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 414, 88 A.2d 607 (1952); Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert 23 N.J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956). Similarly, the constitutional requirement of equal protection is met by legislation that treats all persons within a class reasonably selected, in a like or similar manner. Guill v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 122 A.2d 881 (1956); State v. Garden State Racing Ass'n, 136 N.J.L. 173, 54 A.2d 916 (E. & A.1947).

The relation of these guaranties to a particular legislative classification was stated by Justice Heher in the Guill case, 21 N.J. at pages 582, and 583, 122 A.2d at page 885:

'The classification satisfies the constitutional test of equality and reasonableness if it rests upon some ground of difference having a real and substantial relation to the basic object of the legislation or some relevant consideration of public policy. Even though the distinction by narrow, it suffices if it is reasonably concerned with the end legitimately in view. Ring v. Mayor and Council of Borough of North Arlington, 136 N.J.L. 494, 56 A.2d 744 (Sup.Ct.1948), affirmed 1 N.J. 24, 61 A.2d 508 (1948). If the local legislative action be not plainly unreasonable or unduly oppressive or discriminatory in this regard, its policy is not a justiciable question. Independent Warehouses, Inc., v. Scheele, 134 N.J.L. 133, 45 A.2d 703 (E. & A.1946), affirmed 331 U.S. 70, 67 S.Ct. 1062, 91 L.Ed. 1346 (1947). In the selection of the class for police regulation, neither 'abstract symmetry' nor 'mathematical nicety' is requisite. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78--82, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369, 377--379 (1911); Patsone v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144, 34 S.Ct. 281, 58 L.Ed. 539 (1914); Tigner v. State of Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 84 L.Ed. 1124, 130 A.L.R. 1321 (1940). There is no 'infallible or all-inclusive' test to determine whether 'a given difference between the subjects of legislation is enough to justify the subjection of one and not the other to a particular form of disadvantage'; the nearest approach to a definite rule is that, while the 'difference need not be great,' the classification cannot be arbitrary or illusory, but must bear some just and reasonable connection with the primary object of the legislation; a particular classification is not repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment merely because 'inequality actually results'; every classification of persons and things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree; to vitiate the regulation the inequality must be 'actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.' Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 520, 109 A.2d 640 (1954). See also Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1 (Sup.Ct.1878); State v. Guida, 119 N.J.L. 464, 196 A. 711 (E. & A.1938). It suffices if the classification have a rational and just relation either to the fulfillment of the essential legislative design or to some substantial consideration of policy or convenience bearing upon the common welfare. * * * 'Arbitrary selection can never be justified by terming it classification. Classification must itself be fair and impartial and not arbitrary or illusory, grounded in material distinctions and differences concerned with the central legislative policy; and it satisfies the constitutional standard if there by any conceivable state of facts affording a just ground for the action taken, a difference of degree having material relevancy to the police policy in view. If there be a reasonable distinction of circumstance, there is not the oppressive inequality at odds with the equal protection principle. Washington National Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545, 64 A.2d 443 (1948).'

Thus, if the exclusion of the class selected bears some rational relation to the fulfillment of an essential legislative design or to some substantive consideration of policy bearing upon the common welfare, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the legislative object might be more fully achieved by another more expansive or inclusive classification, for the Legislature may recognize degrees of harm and hit the evil where it is most felt. New Jersey Restaurant Ass'n v. Holderman, 24 N.J. 295, 131 A.2d 773 (1957). The Legislature has a large measure of discretion in selecting the means of accomplishing its goals, and distinctions of degree will be presumed to rest upon a rational basis if there be any conceivable state of facts which would afford reasonable ground therefor. Board of Health of Weehawken Tp. v. New York Central R. Co., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950).

Our inquiry, then, is whether there is any conceivable state of facts bearing a reasonable relation to the object of the act which affords a basis for the classification. In other words, is there a sufficient difference, even if only in degree, between those persons who may and those who may not benefit from the Fund, to constitute a basis for the legislative distinction?

The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund law is remedial legislation that was enacted as a result of concern over the economic hardship imposed upon persons who sustain personal injuries or property damage, or both, caused by financially irresponsible and uninsured...