Deeves v. Fabric Fire Hose Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1963
• Citation: 19 A.D.2d 735,242 N.Y.S.2d 955
• Parties: Harold DEEVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FABRIC FIRE HOSE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 955

242 N.Y.S.2d 955

19 A.D.2d 735

Harold DEEVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FABRIC FIRE HOSE COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

July 8, 1963.

Albertson, Simmons & Butler, New Rochelle, for appellant; Sperry Butler and Aaron Simmons, New Rochelle, of counsel.

Arthur, Dry, Kalish, Taylor & Wood, New York City, for respondent; Walter Barthold, New York City, of counsel.

Before UGHETTA, Acting P. J., and KLEINFELD, BRENNAN, RABIN and HILL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injury, plaintiff appeals: (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated September 17, 1962, which, upon the granting of his motion for reargument, adhered to the court's prior decision [or order] of January 24, 1961 granting defendant's motion to dismiss the second cause of action in the amended complaint; and (2) from said prior order of January 24, 1961.

On the motion for reargument, plaintiff also requested, by way of alternative relief, permission to serve and file a second amended complaint but no disposition was made by the court with respect to such request and no further action relative thereto was taken and it apparently abandoned.

Order affirmed, without costs.

It is alleged in the complaint that plaintiff, a fireman employed by the City of New Rochelle, was injured when a fire hose, manufactured and sold by defendant to the City, burst while plaintiff was testing it at a water pressure of not more than 370 pounds per square inch. In this action against the manufacturer and seller, the first cause of action sounds in negligence and its sufficiency in law is not challenged. The second cause of action is for breach of warranty and further alleges that defendant both by express and implied warranties had represented that the hose would withstand a specified pressure of 600 pounds per square inch; that those warranties had been breached; and that the hose was defective and not suited for the purpose for which it was intended and was not of marketable quality.

On the first motion instituted by notice dated November 6, 1960 the Special Term dismissed the second cause of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, on the ground that the doctrine which requires privity of contract between the injured person and the seller or manufacturer had not yet been sufficiently relaxed to permit such an action by an employee against a manufacturer or seller who was in privity with his employer, the purchaser. Despite a tacit invitation in the Special Term's opinion to test its determination by an appeal (29 Misc.2d 136, 138, 210 N.Y.S.2d 903, 905), no appeal was taken. Long after the time to appeal had expired in this case, the Court of Appeals in another case dispensed with the traditional requirement of privity of contract (Randy Knitwear Inc. v. American Cyanamid Company, 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399). Express warranties and implied warranties of fitness and merchantability are now held to run from the seller to the purchaser's employees for whose use the article of personal property has been purchased (Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 A.D.2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476; Thomas v. Leary, 15 A.D.2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137). Thereafter the instant motion for reargument resulting in the order appealed from was made, more than a year after the time to appeal had expired.

We recognize that since the decision on the original motion to dismiss there has been marked change in the applicable law (see also Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81), and that this change would have indicated a contrary conclusion had it been declared prior to that decision. Nonetheless, on a motion for reargument made after the expiration of the time to appeal, the original decision determining the rights and position of the parties should not be reversed simply because an appellate court, in the interim has overruled its own or another statement of existing law (1 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice, pp. 680-682, and cases there cited).

Appeal from original order dated January 24, 1961, dismissed as academic, having been superseded by the order on reargument.

UGHETTA, Acting P. J., and KLEINFELD and HILL, JJ., concur.

BRENNAN and RABIN, JJ., concur in the dismissal of the original order but dissent and vote to modify the...