DeFilippo v. Curtin, 4D17-1477
| Decision Date | 05 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D17-1477,4D17-1477 |
| Citation | 255 So.3d 351 |
| Parties | Antonio F. DEFILIPPO, M.D. and South Florida Psychiatric Services, Inc., Appellants, v. Gregory H. CURTIN and Hillary B. Curtin, as Successor Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Michael J. Curtin, deceased, for and on behalf of the Estate, and the Survivors thereof, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Joelle C. Sharman, Jerome R. Silverberg and Cindy J. Mishcon of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Todd R. Falzone of Kelley Uustal, PLC, Fort Lauderdale, and Ronald D. Poltorack of Ronald D. Poltorack, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees.
ON APPELLEES' MOTION FOR REHEARING
We grant in part and deny in part the appellees' motion for rehearing. We withdraw our opinion issued on July 25, 2018, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
The defendant physician and his medical practice (collectively "the physician") appeal from a jury verdict finding that the physician's negligent supervision of an advanced registered nurse practitioner ("ARNP") caused the death of a patient at a drug detoxification facility. The physician raises several arguments on appeal. We conclude the trial court erred in two respects: (1) by precluding the physician from testifying that he was not at the detox facility when the patient was admitted, and was not notified of the patient's existence until after the patient died; and (2) by instructing the jury that the physician's alleged violation of section 458.348, Florida Statutes (2011), was evidence of negligence. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The physician served as the detox facility's medical director as an independent contractor. The ARNP was hired to provide nursing services for the facility as an independent contractor.
The ARNP's services included evaluating patients to determine whether they could be admitted into the facility or instead required hospital emergency room treatment. The ARNP was permitted to perform these services pursuant to sections 464.003(2) and 464.012(3), Florida Statutes (2011), which define the acts that an ARNP is permitted to perform under a physician's general supervision.
To perform under the physician's general supervision at this facility, the ARNP executed a "Collaborative Practice Agreement" with the physician. Under the agreement, the ARNP was authorized to perform any service for which she was licensed to practice, including admitting patients into the detox facility. As to the physician's responsibilities, the agreement provided, in pertinent part:
The physician shall provide general supervision for routine health care and management of common health problems, and provide consultation and/or accept referrals for complex health problems. The physician shall be available by telephone or by other communication devices when not physically available on the premises. If the physician is not available, his associate as assigned will serve as backup for consultation, collaboration and/or referral purpose.
When the physician entered into the agreement, he was supervising "probably around eight" ARNPs at five to seven different facilities through similar agreements.
One evening, the patient arrived at the detox facility sometime before 8:00 p.m. At that time, the ARNP, but not the physician, was at the facility. The detox facility staff told the ARNP that the patient had track marks consistent with intravenous drug use. Later in the evening, when the ARNP checked on the patient, he was sitting upright, speaking, and his vital signs were improving. The ARNP's clinical assessment was that the patient was experiencing withdrawal. Her plan was to begin the detox process the next morning.
Significantly, the ARNP did not contact the physician for consultation or review. Thus, the physician did not know of the patient's existence.
The ARNP left the detox facility around 11:00 p.m. Before leaving, she instructed the facility's staff to do a bed check on the patient every fifteen minutes and take his vital signs every thirty minutes.
Tragically, sometime in the early hours of the following morning, the patient died. The detox facility staff did not discover the patient's death until they checked on him hours later.
The medical examiner's autopsy concluded that the patient's cause of death was endocarditis
, which is an acute bacterial infection of the inner lining of his heart chamber and valves. The medical examiner further concluded that the patient's recent intravenous drug use contributed to the endocarditis.
The patient's estate later sued the physician, the ARNP, and the detox facility.
The estate's claim against the physician ultimately was pled as a claim for negligent supervision of the ARNP. In the second amended complaint, the estate alleged that the physician violated a duty arising from section 464.012 to "maintain supervision for directing the specific course of medical treatment" rendered by the ARNP. The estate further alleged that the physician failed to comply with section 458.348, Florida Statutes (2011), by exceeding the maximum number of offices he could supervise in addition to his own primary practice location at the time of this incident.
The physician later moved for partial summary judgment, essentially arguing that, as a physician, he owed no duty of care under section 464.012, because ARNPs are the subject of that statute. The trial court denied the motion, holding that, to the extent section 464.012 required an ARNP to work under a physician's supervision, section 464.012 created a duty of care for the manner in which the physician supervised the ARNP.
The estate ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with the ARNP and the detox facility. The estate's case against the physician was set for trial.
Before trial, the physician moved in limine to exclude evidence of his having exceeded the maximum number of offices he could supervise under section 458.348. The trial court denied that motion as well.
During the trial, the trial court sustained the estate's objections to the physician's attempt to testify that he was not at the detox facility during the ARNP's treatment of the patient and did not know of the patient's existence until after the patient's death.
During closing argument, the estate argued that the physician should be held liable because he violated his duties under sections 464.012 and 458.348.
The trial court instructed the jury that the physician's alleged violation of sections 464.012 and 458.348 was "evidence of negligence," and that if it found that he "violated the statute[s], you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances in deciding whether [he] was negligent." The physician objected to these instructions. The trial court overruled the objection.
The jury returned a verdict finding that the physician's negligent supervision was a legal cause of the patient's death, and the estate's damages amounted to $1,312,000.
The physician raises several arguments on appeal. We conclude the trial court erred in two respects: (1) by precluding the physician from testifying that he was not at the detox facility when the patient was admitted, and that he was not notified of the patient's existence until after the patient died; and (2) by instructing the jury that the physician's alleged violation of section 458.348 was evidence of negligence, because the estate did not present any evidence that such violation caused or contributed to the patient's death. We address those errors in turn.
On the first error, although "[t]he determination of relevancy is within the discretion of the trial court," and "an appellate court will not overturn that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion," "[a] trial court's discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence ... is limited by the rules of evidence and applicable case law." Thigpen v. United Parcel Servs., Inc. , 990 So.2d 639, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted).
Under this standard, the trial court erred by precluding the physician from testifying that he was not at the detox facility when the patient was admitted, and that he was not notified of the patient's existence until after the patient died.
Section 90.401, Florida Statutes (2017), defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact." In our opinion, although the argument cuts both ways, a reasonable juror may have considered whether the physician was present or absent when the patient was admitted as tending to prove or disprove whether the physician negligently supervised the ARNP.
Thus, the trial court erred in precluding the physician from informing the jury that he was not present when the patient was admitted, and did not learn of the patient's existence until the following morning, because the ARNP did not contact him about the patient upon the admission. The error was not harmless, and the evidence was not cumulative. Although other evidence was presented on this point, the physician was not provided the opportunity to testify fully on this key point.
On the second error, our standard of review was detailed in Barton Protective Services, Inc. v. Faber , 745 So.2d 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) :
A trial court is accorded broad discretion in formulating appropriate jury instructions and its decision should not be reversed unless the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice or the instruction was reasonably calculated to confuse or mislead the jury . A decision to give or withhold a jury instruction is to be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review. The party defending the instructions on appeal must show that the requested instructions accurately stated the applicable law, the facts supported giving the instruction , and that the instruction was necessary in order to allow...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Healthcare Underwriters Grp., Inc. v. Sanford
...discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence is limited by the rules of evidence and applicable case law. Defilippo v. Curtin , 255 So. 3d 351, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). An appellate court will not overturn that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. "A trial court's discret......
- Fla. Hosp. Med. Servs., LLC v. Newsholme, 4D18-294