DeFourneaux v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B 78-437.
• Citation: 503 F. Supp. 2
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Nina DeFOURNEAUX, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerome F. DeFourneaux, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STURM, RUGER & CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

503 F. Supp. 2

Nina DeFOURNEAUX, Administratrix of the Estate of Jerome F. DeFourneaux, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STURM, RUGER & CO., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Civ. No. B 78-437.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

April 3, 1980.

M. Mitchell Morse, Jacobs, Jacobs, & Grudberg, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff-appellant.

Stephen L. Sanetti, D. S. Maclay, Timothy G. Atwood, Marsh, Day & Calhoun, Bridgeport, Conn., for defendant-appellee.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

ELLEN B. BURNS, District Judge.

This case involves a Connecticut defendant's allegedly negligent manufacture of a gun which accidentally discharged in Missouri and killed plaintiff's decedent, a twenty-seven-year old Missouri resident. Defendant has moved to dismiss the entire case on the basis that Missouri's one-year statute of limitation on wrongful death has passed.

Missouri's wrongful death statute, Vernon's Annot.Mo.Stat. § 537.080(2), is unusual. It provides that claims for wrongful death vest in the decedent's spouse and minor children for a period of one year from the date of death, if the decedent's parents survive him. After one year, the claim vests in the decedent's parents.

Plaintiff's counter the motion to dismiss with the contention that Connecticut law should apply to this case, and that the action would not be barred under Connecticut's two-year statute of limitation on wrongful death actions.

A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state where it sits, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), including its choice-of-law rules, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). The question, then, is whether a Connecticut court would apply the law of Missouri to this case or whether it would allow its own law to govern.

In any conflicts of laws issue, the first step is to characterize the problem, and characterization is done according to the law of the forum. Clearly under Connecticut law, the wrongful death cause of action sounds in tort. After careful consideration of counsel's exceptionally helpful briefs and the cases cited therein, this court believes that a Connecticut court would apply Missouri law to this matter. In Patch v. Stanley Works (Stanley Chemical Co. Div.), 448 F.2d 483, 491 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit stated, "For choice of law purposes under Connecticut law, a tort is committed not where the wrongful act or omission occurs, but where the injury is sustained." This court is, of course, bound by the decisions of the Second Circuit, and unless Connecticut law has changed since the Patch decision, Patch must control.

The most recent Connecticut case to discuss conflicts of laws analysis is Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977) where the court recognized that in other jurisdictions there has recently been some tendency to depart from the traditional "lex loci delicti" rule in favor of the "most significant relationship" or "center of gravity" approach. However, the court went on to observe that "under this newer approach, the developing rule is still very much in a transitional stage, and the present case presents no compelling reason to abandon the traditional rule." 172 Conn. at 411, 374 A.2d 1061. From this language, it appears that the Connecticut Supreme Court would require a compelling reason to adopt the significant contacts approach. This court does not believe a compelling reason exists in this case. Perhaps if neither party had any meaningful relationship with the state whose law would govern under the old rule, Connecticut would apply the new approach. But here, the decedent and the plaintiff are both Missouri residents, and it is not offensive to traditional notions of justice or to normal expectations to apply Missouri law to adjudicate a claim of wrongful death when the death of a Missouri resident occurs in Missouri.

Plaintiff has argued that to apply Missouri law (and thus bar the action) would be contrary to Connecticut's policy interest in regulating its firearms industry and the use of guns in general. A variation of this argument would be that this action has significant contacts with Connecticut based on Connecticut's interest in firearms regulation. Either approach might theoretically be used to support Connecticut's application of its own law. But Connecticut's interest in regulating the use and manufacture of firearms will not be frustrated by application of Missouri law. Under Missouri law, a cause of action exists to redress wrongs which result in death, and this cause of action presumably has the concomitant benefit of causing manufacturers of firearms to take steps to produce safe products. This court does not think that the fact that an action in Missouri can be instituted by the spouse and surviving child during only one year, as opposed to two in Connecticut, is such a substantial difference as to cause a Connecticut court to prefer Connecticut law. The existence of the cause of action itself provides the deterrent effect which Connecticut favors.

Furthermore, Connecticut has no particular interest in how Missouri residents are compensated for their losses. Whatever the policy reasons for Missouri's unusual statute, Connecticut has an interest only in seeing that the opportunity for redress exists-its absence would, of course, offend Connecticut's public policy and Connecticut might refuse to apply such a law. But any limit on the time within which an action may be initiated is based on considerations of fairness to potential litigants, certainty as to the potential for litigation, and prevention of stale claims, all of which are valid legislative concerns in every state. Decisions on these issues will rarely result in the enactment of a law which another state would find...