DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., St. Louis

• Decision Date: 15 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1599,76-1599
• Citation: 558 F.2d 480
• Parties: 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 573, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7692 Emma DeGRAFFENREID et al., Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS ASSEMBLY DIVISION, ST. LOUIS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 480

558 F.2d 480

15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 573, 14 Empl. Prac.

Dec. P 7692

Emma DeGRAFFENREID et al., Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS ASSEMBLY DIVISION, ST. LOUIS, et al., Appellees.

No. 76-1599.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 18, 1977.

Decided July 15, 1977.

Marilyn Holifield, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City, for appellant; Louis Gilden and Doreen Dodson, St. Louis, Mo., and Jack Greenberg, New York City, on brief.

Edwin G. Fabre, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., for appellee, Unions; Morris Levin, St. Louis, Mo., James Youngdahl, Little Rock, Ark., and John A. Fillion, Jordan Rossen, M. Jay Whitman, Detroit, Mich., on brief.

James E. McDaniel, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee, General Motors; Frazier F. Hilder, Eugene L. Hartwig, Louis H. Lindeman, Jr., Detroit, Mich., and Doris J. Banta, St. Louis, Mo., on brief.

Lutz A. Prager, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae, EEOC; Abner W. Sibal, Gen. Counsel, Joseph T. Eddins, Associate Gen. Counsel, Beatric Rosenberg, Attys., Washington, D. C., on brief.

Before BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and URBOM, Chief District judge. ^*

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Five black women have brought this action against their former employer, General Motors Corporation (designated in the complaint as General Motors Assembly Division, St. Louis) (GM) and the United Automobile Workers (the international union and its Local 25) charging, among other things, that the seniority system and "last hired-first fired" layoff policy mandated by GM's collective bargaining agreement with the Union perpetuates the effect of GM's past race and sex discrimination, in violation of federal law proscribing discrimination in employment Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of all black women who are the victims of GM's alleged discrimination.

In response to cross-motions for summary judgment the court dismissed on the merits the sex discrimination claims, and dismissed without prejudice the claim charging racial discrimination, ruling that a complaint such as this one under Title VII might state a "cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both." DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division, St. Louis, 413 F.Supp. 142, 143 (E.D.Mo.1976). The plaintiffs, Emma DeGraffenreid and others, bring this timely appeal. We affirm in part, for reasons not addressed by the district court, and reverse and remand in part.

Although plaintiffs advance broad claims of race and sex discrimination in defendant's employment practices, the defendant's seniority system and "last hired-first fired" layoff scheme are the main centers of controversy and the only issues addressed by the parties on appeal. The relevant facts stand largely undisputed. Before 1970, GM employed only one black female; she served as a janitor. GM concedes that until May 1, 1970, it excluded all women from assembly line work at its St. Louis plant except in areas where the women could always be sent home after a nine-hour shift without disrupting production when the plant worked longer hours. Pursuant to that pre-1970 policy, GM did employ some women in the cushion room, where automobile seats and upholstery are produced. However, no black females served as employees in the cushion room. In justification for the almost complete exclusion of women from its production facilities, GM stated in its brief:

Until shortly before employment was opened to females in all departments at GMAD St. Louis, state laws and regulations prohibited the employment of females for more than nine hours per day * * *, and prohibited an employer from working women around moving machinery. * * * General Motors had placed restrictions on the height and weight of its production employees which also may have reduced the employment of females.

GM began disregarding these state protective laws on or about May 1, 1970.

Plaintiff Emma DeGraffenreid applied for employment with GM in St. Louis in 1968, and again on June 5, 1973. She asserts that but for GM's discriminatory employment practices, she would have applied for employment with GM in 1965. GM did hire Ms. DeGraffenreid on June 12, 1973. Because of a business recession, GM laid off Ms. DeGraffenreid and a number of other employees on January 15, 1974. This employee has no recall rights under the collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff Brenda Hines applied for employment at GM on May 5, 1971, and again on May 31, 1973. She asserts that but for GM's discriminatory employment practices, she would have applied in 1965. GM hired Ms. Hines on June 1, 1973. She worked until September 26, 1973, when she temporarily left her employment, claiming sick leave. The company placed her on a layoff status in mid-January 1974. Her employment recall rights have expired.

Plaintiff Alberta Chapman applied for employment with GM on May 12, 1971, and again on June 5, 1973. She alleges that she would have applied in 1965, but for GM's discriminatory employment practices. She was hired on June 12, 1973, and laid off in mid-January 1974. Her recall rights have also expired.

Plaintiff Brenda Hollis applied for employment on November 17, 1970, and was hired on December 7, 1970. She was laid off on December 17, 1971. She again applied for employment on May 24, 1973. She alleges that were it not for GM's discriminatory employment practices, she would have applied for employment in 1966.

Plaintiff Patricia Bell applied for employment at GM on November 17, 1970, and was hired on December 7, 1970. She was laid off effective May 8, 1972, at the end of a sick leave period. She was rehired May 16, 1973, and again laid off January 14, 1974. She apparently retains recall rights to employment. She asserts that she would have applied for employment in 1967, were it not for GM's discriminatory employment practices.

Plaintiffs DeGraffenreid, Hines, and Chapman filed a complaint with the EEOC on or about August 28, 1974. The EEOC subsequently issued a right-to-sue letter, and this action was filed on June 2, 1975.

As previously noted, prior to 1970, GM employed but one black female employee, as a janitor. GM hired 6 black female hourly production workers in 1970, 11 in 1971, none in 1972, and 137 in 1973. In late 1973, GM employed 155 black women out of approximately 8,500 employees. Immediately before the January 1974 layoffs, the GM St. Louis plant employed 8,561 workers; after the layoff, only 6,378 remained. Layoffs affected workers with dates of hire after May 24, 1968, including all of GM's black women production employees, save the one janitor. Only two of the black women laid off retained recall rights.

Our attention has been called also to population statistics disclosing that black women represent nearly 22% of the population of metropolitan St. Louis.

The district court discussed three issues in granting appellees' motion for a dismissal of the action. First, it determined that black women do not constitute a special class protected under Title VII, reasoning:

The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have been discriminated against. However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to create a new "super-remedy" which would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both. (413 F.Supp. at 143.)

Second, the court ruled GM was free of unlawful discrimination against women in its hiring, seniority, and layoff policies for the following reasons: (1) GM's reliance on provisions of Missouri law relating to employment of women insulated it from charges of sex discrimination; (2) GM's seniority system did not perpetuate past discrimination because GM had hired female workers before the effective date of Title VII; and (3) assertions by plaintiffs that GM's illegal employment practices actually deterred several plaintiffs from applying for employment between 1965 and 1967, amount to "conclusory allegations" which cannot support a valid claim to constructive seniority or other relief under Title VII. The district judge also considered a consent decree entered by another judge of that court on January 9, 1973, and renewed on April 16, 1976, dealing with the hiring of women at GM, as "a further indication that the seniority practices of the defendants do not discriminate on the basis of sex." 413 F.Supp. at 144.

Third, the district court recognized that plaintiffs had raised viable claims of race discrimination, but decided that these claims should be consolidated in the interests of judicial economy with similar litigation pending against GM before another judge in the Eastern District of Missouri, Mosley, et al. v. General Motors, D.C.Mo., 63 F.R.D. 127. ¹ After the district judge in Mosley (Hon. John F. Nangle) refused to allow consolidation, the court below then dismissed this action in its entirety.

Appellants raise the following contentions on this appeal:

1) The district court erred in concluding that appellants cannot bring suit for a class of black women only and that a prima facie case could not be made by showing a statistical underrepresentation of black women in GM's workforce.

2) The district court erred in summarily dismissing the sex discrimination claims on their merits.

3) The district court erred in dismissing the race discrimination claims for reasons of judicial economy.

We do not subscribe entirely to the district court's reasoning in rejecting appellants' claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII. However, after the submission of this case, the Supreme Court issued two opinions which make clear that we must sustain the...