Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. City of Gloucester
| Citation | 334 Mass. 287,135 N.E.2d 20 |
| Parties | DEHYDRATING PROCESS CO. OF GLOUCESTER, Inc., and another, v. CITY OF GLOUCESTER and others. |
| Decision Date | 07 June 1956 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Carlton W. Wonson, City Solicitor, Gloucester, for the City of Gloucester and others.
Melvin I. Bernstein, Gloucester, for Gloucester Community Pier Ass'n, Inc.
C. Richard Clark, Gloucester, for Gloucester By-Products, Inc.
Harry Bergson, Jr., Boston, for Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc.
Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Two taxpayers bring this bill for a declaratory decree as to the validity of the assessment against them of certain real estate taxes, arising out of their occupancy or possession of portion of the State Fish Pier in Glucester, for the years 1952, 1953, and 1954. The defendants are the city, its collector of taxes, its board of assessors, and Gloucester Community Pier Association, Inc. (hereinafter called the pier association). The pier association's answer contains a prayer for a binding declaration that if the plaintiffs are liable for any taxes assessed, they have no right of reimbursement from the pier association. The other defendants' answer contains a prayer for a binding declaration that similar assessments may be lawfully made in the future so long as the plaintiffs use the Commonwealth's land for the maintenance of buildings and structures. The case was heard on the pleadings by a judge, by whose order there was entered a final decree declaring that the taxes are illegal and void, and that the assessors have no authority to assess real estate taxes in connection with the State Fish Pier, its structures and facilities, to anybody. The defendants other than the pier association appealed.
The judge made these findings of fact. For the purpose of improving and developing Gloucester harbor for the promotion of the fish industry and the commercial facilities of the city, legislation has been enacted for the construction and leasing by the Commonwealth of a fish pier. St.1931, c. 311; St.1936, c. 303; St.1937, c. 29; St.1954, c. 252.
By St.1937, c. 29, § 1, a lessee of the pier, 'if not the city of Gloucester, shall be a corporation organized for the purpose of administering said pier and its facilities without profit and in such manner that said pier and its facilities shall be available, to the extent of their capacity, to fishermen, fish dealers and the fishing industry generally, subject to such reasonable regulations under the lease as the corporation may deem necessary or desirable for the purpose, and to the right of the corporation from time to time to sublease or license the use of portions of such pier or its facilities, or structures on such pier, to persons engaged in the fishing industry or business incidental thereto in such manner as will, in the judgment of the corporation, best and most equitably promote the purposes of this chapter; and the members of the corporation shall be the members of the municipal council, the city treasurer and city auditor of the city of Gloucester from time to time in office.' By St.1954, c. 252, § 1, the membership was changed to consist of five residents of Gloucester to be appointed by the mayor for three year terms.
In compliance with these statutory requirements the pier association was organized under G.L. (TerEd.) c. 180, as amended, and accepted a lease of the pier, which with its facilities has been made available to the extent of the pier's capacity to fishermen, fish dealers, and the fishing industry generally. In conformity with the statutory permission, the pier association sublet to various persons engaged in the fishing industry or business incidental thereto, in such a manner as would most equitably promote the fish industry and the commercial facilities of the city.
The judge ruled that the pier association is exempt from taxation under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 5, Third, and that the leasehold is personal property. The judge also purported to 'find that such subletting in no way transferred any interest in real estate,' and that the pier association was in possession of the pier and its buildings under a lease dated March 1, 1937, with the Commonwealth at an annual rental with certain rights of renewal. The lease contained a provision that any buildings erected by the lesseee should attach to the realty, and that title thereto should accrue to the Commonwealth at the expiration of the lease or any extension. At the time of the execution of the lease the structures on the pier consisted of a large building, designed for the making of ice and the freezing and storing of fish, and a row of ten stores, designed for the handling, processing, and selling of fish. Thereafter the pier association leased the large building to one corporation and the stores to various persons. The large building and stores were occupied under these leases in 1952, 1953, and 1954.
On June 11, 1948, the pier association leased a portion of open space on the pier to the Dehydrating Process Company, which sublet to the plaintiff Dehydrating Process Company of Gloucester, Inc. On June 17, 1948, a similar lease of open space was given to the plaintiff Gloucester By-Products, Inc. Thereafter the plaintiffs respectively erected buildings and tanks equipped with machinery for manufacturing fish by-products.
Purporting to act under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 3A, as appearing in St.1951, c. 667, § 1, and with knowledge of the lease between the Commonwealth and the pier association, the assessors, as of January 1, 1952, levied assessments for real estate taxes upon both plaintiffs in various amounts based entirely upon the assessors' valuation of the buildings and tanks. 1 These levies were repeated in 1953 and 1954. The plaintiffs alone, among the various lessees, occupants, or persons in possession of any portion of the pier, its structures or facilities, have been so assessed. No levy has been made against the pier association.
Upon the foregoing facts and rulings, the judge made the following rulings: (1) The taxes levied on the plaintiffs are void. (2) The pier, its structures, and facilities are owned by the Commonwealth, and are used or occupied for public purposes, and G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 3A, does not apply to them. (3) The pier constitutes a single unit of property. (4) The purposes of the legislation are a public use, and the utilization of the pier constitutes a use and occupation for public purposes. (5) The assessors are without legal authority to assess a real estate tax upon certain buildings alone and are without legal authority to assess the land upon which these buildings rest.
The provisions of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 3A, as appearing in St.1951, c. 667, § 1, are: ...
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Opinion of the Justices
...exemptions.' As to leased properties see Boston Fish Market Corp. v. Boston, 224 Mass. 31, 112 N.E. 616; Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc. v. Gloucester, Mass., 135 N.E.2d 20. With respect to question 18: Statute 1929, c. 297, § 12, provides that whenever the Sumner tunnel tolls e......
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Tregor v. Board of Assessors of City of Boston
...other, but he is still a victim of the discrimination in favor of residential property. Cf. Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc. v. Gloucester, 334 Mass. 287, 293, 135 N.E.2d 20 (1956) (assessment of only two of a much larger number of occupants of a pier, illegal and void). In such ......
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Cabot v. Assessors of Boston
...that tax exemption was an appropriate incident of the legislative scheme. There is nothing in Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc., v. City of Gloucester, 334 Mass. ----, 135 N.E.2d 20, in Opinion of the Justice, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795, or in Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass.......
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Opinion of the Justices
...facilities to private enterprises is not a novelty. See e.g. the situations considered in Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc. v. City of Gloucester, 334 Mass. 287, 135 N.E.2d 20; Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Assessors of Gloucester, 337 Mass. 23, 147 N.E.2d 820, and Board of......