Deinhardt v. State

• Decision Date: 05 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 308,308
• Citation: 348 A.2d 286,29 Md.App. 391
• Parties: Michael William DEINHARDT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 391

29 Md.App. 391

348 A.2d 286

Michael William DEINHARDT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 308.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 5, 1975.

Certiorari Denied March 2, 1976.

William F. C. Marlow, Jr. and W. Stanwood Whiting, Assigned Public Defenders, Baltimore, for appellant.

John A. Austin, Asst.Atty.Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty.Gen., Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty., Baltimore County and Steven Silverman, Asst. State's Atty., Baltimore County on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before MOYLAN, GILBERT and MELVIN, JJ.

GILBERT, Judge.

Michael William Deinhardt, appellant, was convicted at a non-jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of rape. Following the sentencing of appellant which occurred the same date, an appeal was noted to this Court. Appellant vigorously urges, inter alia, that the trial judge erred in refusing '. . . to allow cross-examination seeking to establish the bias of the complaining witness, where her testimony was the only proof tending to establish lack of consent. . . .'

The appellant met the prosecutrix, apparently for the first time, at approximately 10:45 P.M. on June 1, 1974, in Sweeney's Lounge, where the prosecutrix worked as a waitress in the restaurant downstairs, in Baltimore City. A conversation ensued between the appellant and prosecutrix, and the two danced and conversed during the course of the evening. Shortly after midnight, the prosecutrix decided to leave the upstairs lounge. She retrieved her purse from behind the bar and, when offered a ride home by the appellant, readily accepted.

According to the State's case, appellant drove north on the Jones Falls Expressway towards Baltimore County. The prosecutrix noticed that they had passed the exit from the Jones Falls Expressway which led to the street upon which she resided. She wanted to leave the vehicle, but the appellant produced a switchblade knife, 'flicked' it open, told her that she could not leave the car, and he then increased the vehicle's speed to '. . . a hundred miles an hour.' According to the prosecutrix the appellant stopped his car '. . . about twenty, (to) twenty-five minutes . . .' later on a 'deserted road' where there were '. . . no lights whatsoever.' The prosecutrix testified that the appellant drove his car into such a position that the passenger's door could not be opened because of its proximity to a tree. After the appellant had brought the vehicle to a halt, he had the prosecutrix change places with him on the front seat. When the prosecutrix moved onto the driver's side of the front seat, she attempted to open the door to make good an escape, but she was prevented from doing so by the appellant. A struggle ensued for possession of the knife, and during the course of that altercation, the appellant and the prosecutrix each received several cuts upon their person. The prosecutrix received lacerations on her right hand index finger, her legs and her back. Once the appellant regained control of the knife, he struck the prosecutrix upon the side of her face and ordered her into the back of his vehicle, a station wagon, where she was compelled to disrobe and submit to sexual intercourse.

The prosecutrix told the trial judge that after the sexual act had been completed the appellant stated to her that he '. . . was going to kill me on up the road.' The appellant drove the car for a period of about '10 minutes' when the prosecutrix observed another car approaching. She leaped from the appellant's car, ran to the approaching vehicle where she sought and obtained the protection of the operator of that car, who telephoned for an ambulance. She was subsequently transported to the Carroll County Hospital. There the prosecutrix was treated for her injuries and the police were notified.

Appellant's version of the incident is in startling contrast to that of the prosecutrix. He states that he picked up the prosecutrix in Sweeney's Lounge, and that he drove her at her request into the countryside. They stopped near New Freedom, Pennsylvania, and from the hill on which they were parked one could see the lights of New Freedom. Then the prosecutrix left the vehicle for the purpose of relieving herself. When she returned she grabbed his knife from its resting place on the dashboard, and she immediately stabbed him with it. In his attempt to recover the knife from her, she was cut on the hand. Appellant stated that he threatened to have the prosecutrix arrested, presumably for assault upon his person, and at one point he told her that she could get 'thiry years' for her having stabbed him. Immediately thereafter, the appellant says, the prosecutrix became extremely friendly and made sexual advances to him. Mutually voluntary sexual intercourse ensued.

At trial the appellant apparently sought to establish that the rape charge was brought by the prosecutrix in an effort to take the legal initiative and thus diminish the effect of the appellant's obtaining a warrant charging her with '. . . assault with intent to murder.' ¹

The record reveals the following on cross-examination of the prosecutrix:

'Q. Did Mr. Deinhardt ever threaten to have you charged with assault that night?

Mr. Silverman (Assistant State's Attorney): Objection.

The Court: Sustained.

Mr. Marlow (Defense Counsel): Your Honor, I think this clearly goes to the bias of the witness, and why these charges were brought initially.

The Court: The objection has been sustained, Mr. Marlow. If he would make any complaint against her, there is a proper way to prove it.'

We think the trial judge has missed the thrust of the purpose of defense counsel's attempted interrogation as to the prosecutrix's motivation in bringing the charge. The question is not whether the appellant did '. . . make any complaint against her . . .,' but rather whether the prosecutrix was biased, prejudiced, or acting from some ulterior motive. If her answer to the objected to question had been 'yes,' the court, depending upon the circumstances, may have attached less credibility to the witness's testimony. As it was, the judge referred to her as a 'woman on the loose' and as an 'easy pick up.' If he, as a result of the answer to the question to which he sustained the objection, had learned that she was motivated by fear of a possible prosecution of assault with a knife, he may have completely discredited her testimony.

On September 23, 1975, this Court in State v. DeLawder, Md.App., 344 A.2d 446, 449 (1975), observed that under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, included the ". . . 'primary interest secured by . . . the right of cross-examination.' Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, (1076,) 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965)." The Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, infra, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, pointed out that "Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." 344 A.2d at 449. Our adversary system permits, if not encourages, the advocate to inquire into the witness's testimony in order to test memory and perception, as well as to impeach the witness so as to discredit his testimony. Cross-examination, however, is not without bounds. The trial judge is vested with broad discretion so as '. . . to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation . . ..' ² 344 A.2d at 449.

Chief Judge Orth, in DeLawder, noted that a witness may be discredited by a '. . . cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.' 344 A.2d at 449. Bringing to the surface, for view and scrutiny the witness's motivation for testifying is both a proper and important function of cross-examination and, as such, is a constitutionally protected right. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). DeLawder declares that the denial of effective cross-examination is constitutional error of such magnitude that it is immaterial whether prejudice is not shown or is even totally lacking. See Greene v. McElroy, supra...