Dejarnett v. Willis

• Decision Date: 04 October 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:12–cv–846–MEF.
• Parties: Sandra DEJARNETT, Plaintiff, v. Jerry WILLIS, individually and as Mayor of the City of Wetumpka; Tex Grier, individually and as an employee of the City of Wetumpka; and City of Wetumpka, a municipal corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

976 F.Supp.2d 1271

Sandra DEJARNETT, Plaintiff,

v.Jerry WILLIS, individually and as Mayor of the City of Wetumpka; Tex Grier, individually and as an employee of the City of Wetumpka; and City of Wetumpka, a municipal corporation, Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–cv–846–MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

Oct. 4, 2013.

Jimmy Lee Debardelaben, Jim L. Debardelaben Attorney at Law, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

April Willis McKay, Rick A. Howard, Holtsford Gilliland Higgins Hitson & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Jerry Willis (“Mayor Willis”), Tex Grier (“Grier”), and the City of Wetumpka (the “City”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on June 14, 2013. (Doc. # 13.) Having carefully reviewed the submissions of the parties, the applicable law, and the record as a whole, the Court finds that Defendants' motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 1343 (civil rights), and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving part has met its burden, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a district court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After the non-moving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the district court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. FACTS

The Court has carefully considered the submissions of the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following material facts:

A. Dejarnett's Employment with the City

Plaintiff Sandra Dejarnett (“Plaintiff” or “Dejarnett”) is an African–American female who was hired to work full-time as Permit Clerk for the City on December 21, 2006. The Permit Clerk position is a classified position within the Building Department. As Permit Clerk, Dejarnett issued municipal permits, including building, plumbing, mechanical, and gas/electrical permits, scheduled inspections, and filed inspection results. Dejarnett had to work with the public on a routine basis, as she was the “contact” person for developers, contractors, and business owners who were seeking to obtain or had questions regarding building inspections and permits in the City.

Dejarnett was the Permit Clerk throughout her employment with the City. She was also the only full-time African–American female ¹ working in the Administrative Building ² during that time. Defendant Grier was the City's Building Inspector and Director of the Building Department and served as Dejarnett's supervisor during the relevant time. Defendant Willis was the City's Mayor ³ and served as its Chief Administrative Officer during the relevant time.

B. The City's Discipline Policies

The City's Personnel Policies Manual sets forth a progressive disciplinary policy, which applies to classified employees. Employee offenses are divided into two categories: group one and group two offenses. Group one offenses are defined as “instances of unacceptable conduct by an employee which, while serious, do not normally merit a suspension without pay or dismissal upon the first occurrence, and therefore, may normally be addressed by a lesser degree upon the first occurrence[.]” (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) Examples of group one offenses include, among others, failing to give proper notice of an absence, tardiness, safety violations, and inefficiency. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) Disciplinary actions normally recommended for a group one offense are: (1) a written warning for the first offense; (2) suspension without pay for the second offense; and (3) termination for the third offense. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.)

Group two offenses, on the other hand, are defined as “instances of unacceptable conduct by an employee which are very serious and constitute grounds for immediate dismissal upon the first occurrence of such conduct unless mitigating circumstances, as determined by the department head, render lesser discipline more appropriate.” (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) Examples of group two offenses include, among others, dishonesty, serious leave offenses, abusive conduct, insubordination, and conduct unbecoming an employee. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) Disciplinary action normally recommended for a group two offense is immediate dismissal unless mitigating circumstanceswarrant lesser disciplinary action. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) In other words, progressive step discipline is typically not utilized for group two offenses.

Disciplinary action is administered by the Mayor. When an employee is due to be discharged, the Mayor is to provide written notification to the employee of his intention to dismiss the employee and that the Mayor will conduct a hearing concerning the allegation against the employee, if the employee requests a hearing in writing. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) A copy of the notice should be placed in the employee's personnel file. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The written notice to the employee should contain the following information: (1) the date, time, and place of the hearing; (2) the reason(s) for the proposed disciplinary action; (3) the proposed disciplinary action to be taken and the effective date; (4) notice of the employee's right to appear in person or be represented by someone at her own expense; (5) notice of the employee's right to respond to the allegations orally or in writing; and (6) the employee's right to present evidence in her defense. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The employee has three calendar days in which to respond to the notice and/or request a hearing. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The employee must submit a request for a hearing in writing. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.)

If the employee requests a hearing, it will be conducted informally by the Mayor at the time and place designated in the notice to the employee. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) If the Mayor determines after the hearing is complete that the facts of the case support dismissal, the dismissal will become effective on the date specified in the notice. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) A written notice of dismissal shall be dated, signed by the Mayor, and delivered to the employee no later than the effective date. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) A record of the completed dismissal action shall be placed in the employee's personnel file. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.)

The Mayor has three business days to render a decision following a hearing. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The decision must be in writing and contain a summary of the Mayor's findings and the Mayor's decision. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The employee has seven calendar days to appeal the Mayor's decision and request a review by the City Council. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) The City Council must then render a decision within three business days of receipt of the appeal, and it may sustain, amend, or overrule any previous decision. (Doc. # 13, Ex. 1.) A hearing before the City Council is not required.

C. Complaints About Dejarnett and her Termination

Grier and Mayor Willis began receiving oral and written complaints about Dejarnett's treatment of customers as early as December 2008. The written complaints focused on Dejarnett's poor attitude and uncooperativeness with customers during the permit and inspection process and consist of the following: (1) a December 18, 2008 complaint to Mayor Willis by Frank Bertarelli, a local business owner, about Dejarnett's poor attitude, unhelpfulness, and his concern over an incident during which she called him a “liar;” (2) an April 13, 2010 complaint to Mayor Willis by Paul Pemberton, another local business owner, about Dejarnett's uncooperativeness and that she made every “trip down [to the Building Department] a bad experience;” (3) an April 12, 2011 email complaint ⁴ to Mayor Willis by Sherry Cox with ...