DeJong v. Huyser
| Decision Date | 16 November 1943 |
| Docket Number | 46318. |
| Citation | 11 N.W.2d 566,233 Iowa 1315 |
| Parties | DeJONG et al. v. HUYSER. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
H. E. deReus, of Knoxville, and Donald F. Klein of Pella, for appellant.
Johnson & Johnson, of Knoxville, for appellees.
K. P. DeJong the father of plaintiffs herein, married Tryntje Ver Steeg on April 16, 1936. He was then 73 years old, she was 71. Twelve days later, on April 28, 1936, DeJong and his wife, Tryntje executed a joint will, the material portions of which provide as follows:
At the time of this marriage, DeJong was an inmate of a home for the aged at Pella. Tryntje came to live with him there as his wife. Defendant Cornelia Huyser, sister of Tryntje, also lived at this home for the aged from and after Feb. 24, 1936. DeJong had been married before and plaintiffs are children by such prior marriage. Tryntje had also been married before. She inherited from her first husband $1,000 and from her second husband a house and lot in Sully, Iowa, which is involved herein. She had no children. Cornelia, her sister, is her only close relative. The fee for Tryntje's admission into the home for the aged was $1,300. She paid the $1,000 that she had inherited from her first husband and Cornelia paid the balance of $300. DeJong's only property consisted of a contract for the sale of real estate to his son Frans made in 1934 by reason of which Frans was obligated to pay him $150 per year during his lifetime and, if he left a widow surviving him, Frans was to pay her $100 per year for the remainder of her lifetime. As above shown, the joint will refers to the marriage and to an antenuptial agreement which is reaffirmed in the will.
DeJong died September 8, 1938. The joint will was admitted to probate as his will. Tryntje survived him and was paid $100 per year thereafter by Frans. She made no claim to any additional allowance under the joint will.
On December 12, 1939, Tryntje executed a warranty deed of the house and lot in Sully to Cornelia, reserving to herself as grantor a life estate therein. The deed was recorded December 16, 1939. No present consideration was paid for the deed. In addition to the $300 paid by Cornelia when Tryntje entered the home, there was evidence that Cornelia gave Tryntje $100 which was used to purchase a postal savings certificate in the name of DeJong and which was administered upon as an asset of his estate. There was also evidence that Tryntje and her then husband, Jacob Ver Steeg, lived with Cornelia for about eight months in 1935 immediately prior to Ver Steeg's death. The record is silent as to whether Tryntje or her husband paid anything for their living expenses at that time. Evidence was offered to show that Tryntje deeded the property to Cornelia because of what Cornelia had done for her.
Tryntje died October 3, 1941. The balance in the K. P. DeJong estate was $122.45. This was applied upon her funeral expenses. The record indicates that there was a balance above such sum but is silent as to the amount thereof, whether paid, and if so by whom. The value of the house and lot in Sully is shown to be from $1,000 to $1,200. The joint will was admitted to probate as the will of Tryntje DeJong.
Plaintiffs commenced this action in equity, asserting: the deed from Tryntje to Cornelia was executed to defeat the provisions of the joint will; the will is based upon a contract; K. P. DeJong performed his part of the contract and Tryntje was obligated to perform her part; defendant, Cornelia Huyser, is not a bona fide purchaser of the real estate and stands in the shoes of her grantor; Cornelia holds the real estate in trust for plaintiffs; plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the contract by Cornelia as successor to the interest of Tryntje. Plaintiffs prayed that the court declare that defendant holds the real estate in trust for plaintiffs, that Cornelia be required to convey the property to plaintiffs and to account for the income received therefrom and for general equitable relief.
Defendant's answer admitted that plaintiffs are the children of K. P. DeJong, that the joint will was executed and later admitted to probate as the will of each testator, that the estate of Tryntje is solvent, that Tryntje was defendant's sister and conveyed the real estate to defendant and asserted that as such grantee defendant is the absolute owner of same. Other allegations of the petition were denied. The prayer was that the action be dismissed.
Trial was had at which evidence of the facts above stated was introduced. Some additional evidence, taken subject to objection, will be referred to later. The trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law which were later incorporated into the decree by reference. The court determined that it was understood by the parties that the $100, that Tryntje was to receive annually should she survive her husband, was the $100 payable annually under the contract with Frans, that same was paid to her, and her funeral expenses were paid insofar as the assets of DeJong's estate permitted. The court further determined that the will should be interpreted to the effect that the property, that was to go to the children of DeJong should Tryntje be the survivor (described as "her estate"), was intended by the two testators to be the same property described as going to K. P. DeJong should he outlive her, that she received the benefits of the joint will, according to its terms, insofar as the assets of the estate permitted and that the will constituted such a contractual relation as to prevent her transferring her property after the death of K. P. DeJong; the transfer to Cornelia Huyser was not made for such a consideration as to constitute her an innocent purchaser for value and she must be deemed to hold said property in trust for the children of K. P. DeJong under the terms of the joint will.
Pursuant to the foregoing findings a decree was entered adjudging that Cornelia Huyser holds the house and lot in Sully and its income in trust for plaintiffs; she was ordered to execute quitclaim deed for said real estate, and, failing so to do, the decree shall have the same force and effect of such deed; she was also ordered to account for the income thereof accruing since October 3, 1941, and to pay the costs. Defendant Cornelia Huyser appeals to this court.
I. Defendant contended that the joint will is ambiguous and produced the scrivener who testified that, at the time the will was executed, Mrs. DeJong stated her intention as follows:
Disregarding the fact that this testimony is in direct conflict with the explicit language of the will as to the property that was to go to K. P. DeJong should he survive Tryntje, it definitely states that Tryntje had in mind that the property that was to go to her husband's children was the same property that was to go to him should he survive her. The property of Tryntje that the parties had in mind was the house and lot in Sully. The court was right in holding that the parties had no different intention as to the property that was to go to the children from that which was to go to Tryntje's husband should he be the survivor.
II. The court was also right in holding that the joint will constituted a contractual relation which prevented Tryntje transferring her real estate by the deed to Cornelia after the death of K. P. DeJong. We...
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