Dekalb County School Dist. v. J.W.M.

• Decision Date: 11 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.1:06CV0125-TCB.,CIV.A.1:06CV0125-TCB.
• Citation: 445 F.Supp.2d 1371
• Parties: DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. J.W.M. and S.M., as Parents of W.M., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

445 F.Supp.2d 1371

DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff, v. J.W.M. and S.M., as Parents of W.M., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.1:06CV0125-TCB.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

August 11, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harold N. Eddy, Jr., Weekes & Candler, Decatur, GA, for DeKalb County School District, Plaintiff.

Chris E. Vance, Office of Chris E. Vance, Atlanta, GA, for J.M. as Parent of W.M, S.M. as Parent of W.M, W. M., Defendants.

ORDER

BATTEN, District Judge.

I. Background

On January 19, 2006, Plaintiff DeKalb County School District ("DCSD") filed this action as an appeal from the final decision of a State of Georgia Administrative Law Judge (the "ALP) in the special education due process hearing for W.M., a sevenyear-old boy. In 2005 W.M.'s parents, on his behalf, filed two due process hearing requests alleging that DCSD failed to provide W.M. with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400;¹ Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The ALJ concluded in her final decision that W.M. was not offered and did not receive a FAPE from DCSD.

On March 17, 2006, W.M.'s parents filed their answer and counterclaim. Counts one and two of the counterclaim alleged that DCSD restrained W.M. and deprived him of food and that this restraint and deprivation violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, Section 504, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Count three seeks enforcement of the judgment rendered in the ALJ's final decision. Count four appeals the ALJ's decision and requests compensatory education and reimbursement for educational services that W.M.'s parents have provided for him. Finally, count five seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs.

On April 10, 2006, DCSD filed a motion to dismiss W.M.'s² counterclaim. W.M. then filed an amended counterclaim,³ which DCSD has also moved to dismiss.⁴

II. DCSD's Motion to Dismiss W.M.'s Amended Counterclaim

A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the party moving for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted has the burden of proving that a claim has not been stated. To prevail, the movant must show "beyond doubt that the [claimant] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim [that] would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The Court accepts the non-moving party's factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. The Court also construes the pleader's allegations liberally. Fuller v. Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349-50 (11th Cir.1996).

B. W.M.'s Amended Counterclaim

1. Counts One and Two

DCSD argues that counts one and two of W.M.'s amended counterclaim must be dismissed because W.M. has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to these claims.⁵ W.M. disagrees, contending that the record of the due process hearing reflects that he raised his restraint and deprivation claims before the ALJ. In support of this contention, W.M. cites footnote 3 of the ALJ's final decision, where the ALJ indicates that the issue of restraint had been raised.

"The IDEA allows plaintiffs to seek `remedies available under the Constitution, [the ADA, Section 504], or other Federal Laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.'" M.T.V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)). The IDEA subjects these claims to an exhaustion requirement: "Before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this subsection shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter." Id. at 1158.

Claims must first be exhausted in state administrative proceedings whether they are brought pursuant to the IDEA, the ADA, Section 504 or the Constitution. Id. Claims for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are also subject to the exhaustion requirement. N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir.1996). The Eleventh Circuit has held that any student who seeks relief that is available under the IDEA must follow the IDEA's procedural provisions, even if he invokes a different statute. Id. (citing Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 n. 10 (11th Cir.1998)).

W.M. acknowledges that his allegations of restraint and deprivation fall under the IDEA's complaint provision because they "relat[e] to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A). The issue is whether W.M. complied with the exhaustion requirement.

W.M. argues that he raised his restraint and deprivation claims at the due process hearing. W.M. initiated the due process hearing by filing two separate due process hearing requests. However, neither of these requests included W.M.'s restraint and deprivation claims. The raising of these claims during the due process hearing itself is insufficient to establish exhaustion. See M.T.V., 446 F.3d at 1159.

Section 1415(i)(2)(A) of the IDEA allows parties to file an action challenging an ALJ's decision and provides that "[A]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision under this subsection shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section ...." The plain language of the IDEA required W.M. to file a separate administrative complaint to raise his restraint and deprivation claims and exhaust all administrative remedies with regard thereto before filing a judicial action, but W.M. failed to do so. See id. As W.M. has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, he may not proceed with counts one and two of his counterclaim. Accordingly, the Court grants DCSD's motion to dismiss counts one and two of W.M.'s amended counterclaim.

The Court also notes that W.M.'s claims in counts one and two fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to the extent that they are based upon the Eighth Amendment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) ("The primary purpose of [the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes." (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968))).

2. Count Three

Count three of W.M.'s amended counterclaim seeks the enforcement of two provisions of the ALJ's final decision: (1) the directive that DCSD provide compensatory education of forty hours per week of one-to-one Applied Behavior Analysis/Discrete Trial Training ("ABA/DTT") for fifty-two weeks,⁶ and (2) the $14,875 award to W.M. for reimbursement of the cost of private education services provided to W.M. and paid for by his parents.

In support of its motion for dismissal of this count of the counterclaim, DCSD cites the IDEA's "stay-put provision" found at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Pursuant to that subsection and 34 C.F.R. § 300(a), during the pendency of any judicial proceeding regarding a due process hearing complaint, unless the State or local agency and the parents of the child agree otherwise, the child involved in the complaint must remain in his or her current educational placement. However, paragraph (c) of the same regulation provides that if the ALJ agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement is to be treated as an agreement between the State or local agency and the parents for purposes of the subsection and paragraph (a) of the regulation. In other words, a child must remain in his then-current educational placement during the pendency of an appeal unless the ALJ agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate.

According to DCSD, the ALJ's final decision in this case does not order a change of placement for W.M., so the stayput provision does not apply. However, the two portions of the ALJ's final decision that W.M. seeks to enforce do not involve a change in his educational placement. Therefore, the issue is whether, during the pendency of the appeal, the Court should order enforcement of provisions of the ALJ's decision that do not order a change of W.M.'s placement. The Court finds that it should not.

If the Court reverses the ALJ's order, which is the relief DCSD seeks, W.M. obviously will not be entitled to enforce the $14,875 reimbursement award, nor would DCSD be obligated to provide the fifty-two weeks of compensatory education. Conversely, if the Court affirms the ALJ's decision, then DCSD presumably will comply with that decision, including the two provisions that are the subject of count three of W.M.'s amended counterclaim.

The Court also finds that enforcement of the two provisions of the ALJ's final decision at issue should be stayed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d). Although the language of Rule 62(d) suggests that the appellant must always post a supersedeas bond in order to obtain a stay on appeal, case law establishes that the district court has discretion as to the amount of the bond, and in some instances, whether to order the posting of any at all. See 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2905, at 522, n. 12 (2d ed.1995).

Appellant DCSD is a governmental entity, and the size of the ALJ's award to W.M. (both the cost of fifty-two weeks of compensatory education and the $14,875 reimbursement award) is relatively modest. W.M. cannot seriously challenge DCSD's ability to enforce the final decision if it is affirmed on appeal by this Court.

Moreover, ...