Dekrone v. Bussitil

• Decision Date: 30 November 1950
• Parties: Stella Dekrone, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>Emanuel Bussitil, Defendant, and Joseph D. McGoldrick, as State Rent Administrator, Intervener, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

199 Misc. 70

Stella Dekrone, Plaintiff,

v.Emanuel Bussitil, Defendant, and Joseph D. McGoldrick, as State Rent Administrator, Intervener, Defendant.

HALLINAN, J.

November 30, 1950.

Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General (Emory Gardiner of counsel), for intervener, defendant.

Milo O. Bennett for plaintiff.

Armen D. Anderson, Jr., for defendant.

HALLINAN, J.

In this action for a declaratory judgment, in which plaintiff seeks to have declared unconstitutional the Residential Rent Law (L. 1946, ch. 274, as amd. by L. 1950, ch. 250) and the Rent and Eviction Regulations promulgated by the Temporary State Housing Rent Commission, pursuant thereto, the State Rent Administrator, by the Attorney-General, has moved to dismiss the complaint; first, for legal insufficiency, and second, for failure to state facts sufficient to justify the court's exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, and the plaintiff has cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings.

The second ground of the motion of the State Rent Administrator is denied since the remedy of a declaratory judgment is peculiarly appropriate in cases such as this where a constitutional question is involved and there is totally lacking any question of fact. (Dun & Bradstreet, v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 206-207.)

As to the merits, although a declaration of unconstitutionality of the law and the regulations in their entirety is sought by the plaintiff, her attack is actually directed against subdivision 2 of section 4 and subdivision 4 of section 9 of the law and sections 12 and 59 of the regulations. Since subdivision 4 of section 9 of the law and section 12 of the regulations are virtually identical, only the former is here set forth. That section provides: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to require any person to offer any housing accommodations for rent, but housing accommodations already on the rental market may be withdrawn only after prior written approval of the state rent commission, if such withdrawal requires that a tenant be evicted from such accommodations."

Section 59 of the regulations, which implements subdivision 4 of section 9 of the law, provides: "A certificate shall be issued where the landlord establishes that he seeks in good faith to recover possession of the housing accommodations because of an immediate and compelling necessity and exceptional circumstances, and the continued operation of the housing accommodations by the landlord will impose undue hardship on him. The landlord must further establish that he intends to permanently withdraw them from both the housing and non-housing rental markets without any intent to sell the housing accommodations."

Specifically, the constitutional grounds of attack here urged by plaintiff are: (1) that her property is being taken without due process of law; (2) that she is being denied equal protection of the laws; (3) that her property is being taken for a public use without just compensation; (4) that she is being forced to render services in violation of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, and (5) that there is an unwarranted delegation of legislative power. It is evident that those grounds are as a whole "the familiar objections which are addressed to the court whenever the exercise of legislative power on private rights is in question." (People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 442 [POUND, J.].) Without belaboring the point, suffice it to say that those objections are as devoid of merit here as they have in similar cases been held to be in the past. (Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170; Loab Estates v. Druhe, 300 N.Y. 176; People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, supra.)

In the Loab Estates case (supra) the Court of Appeals held, in a situation closely analogous to that here presented, that the omission of an unrestricted clause permitting withdrawal of occupied rental accommodations from the rental market did not render the local law unconstitutional. "Confronted with the threat of `chaos and confusion'", said that court (p....