Delaney v. Modern Acc. Club

• Decision Date: 24 October 1903
• Citation: 97 N.W. 91,121 Iowa 528
• Parties: MARY DELANEY v. MODERN ACCIDENT CLUB, Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

97 N.W. 91

121 Iowa 528

MARY DELANEY v. MODERN ACCIDENT CLUB, Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 24, 1903

Appeal from Iowa District Court.--HON. M. J. WADE, Judge.

ACTION in equity against the defendant, a mutual benefit association organized under the laws of Iowa to compel an assessment on account of the accidental death of George L. Delaney, a member of said association, holding a certificate in which plaintiff is named as beneficiary, and to require the payment of the proceeds of such assessment, not exceeding the sum of $ 1,000, to plaintiff, under the provisions of the certificate. The defenses interposed were that the certificate was invalid because George L. Delaney was not a member of the Modern Woodmen of America at the time the certificate was issued to him--such being the requirement of the articles of incorporation of the defendant association--and also that the death was not the result of an accident, within the terms of the certificate. A decree was rendered for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Remley & Ney and Hart & Zmundt for appellant.

Thomas Stapleton and J. M. Dower for appellee.

OPINION

MCCLAIN, J.

The defense that the certificate was void when issued is predicated on the fact that it is provided in the articles of incorporation of defendant association that "no person shall be eligible to membership in this association * * * who is not at the time of receiving his certificate of membership a member in good standing of the Modern Woodmen of America, a fraternal organization organized under the laws of the state of Illinois"; that by the certificate of membership in defendant association it is provided that compliance by George L. Delaney with the laws rules, and requirements of the defendant association and of the Modern Woodmen of America is made an express condition of the contract, and that George L. Delaney, in his application represented that he was a member of the Modern Woodmen of America and the Parnell Camp thereof; and that this representation was false. It appears, however, without controversy, that one Burke, the agent of the defendant association, solicited Delaney and others in the town of Parnell to join the defendant association, and when the objection was raised by them that they were not eligible to membership, not being Modern Woodmen, he assured them that they might become members of the Modern Woodmen, and when they did so their certificates of membership in the defendant association would be valid. It further appears that, with this understanding, Delaney signed the application for membership, which contained the recital that he was a member of the Modern Woodmen, and that he was admitted to membership in the Parnell Camp of the Modern Woodmen a week after the date of his certificate of membership. His death occurred several months after the date of his certificate, and while he was a member in good standing of the Modern Woodmen. The mis-statement in the application that Delaney was at the time a member of the Modern Woodmen was immaterial, for Burke, the agent of defendant taking the application, was fully advised as to the facts, and the company was not, therefore, misled or imposed upon. Nor can it be urged that Delaney was not entitled to be a member of the defendant association at the time of his death, for at that time he was a member of the Modern Woodmen.

But the real question is whether the certificate was void from the beginning, on the ground that, at the time it was issued, Delaney was not such a person as could, under the articles of the association, be a member. It may be conceded that, by the terms of the certificate, Delaney was bound to take notice of the provisions of the articles, and that these terms could not be waived by the officers and agents of the association so as to entitle one to the benefits of a certificate in the association without his being a member of the Modern Woodmen. It may be that if, after Delaney became a member of the Modern Woodmen, the defendant association had received dues from him on account of his certificate of membership, the defendant would be estopped from objecting that he was not eligible to membership when the certificate was issued to him, but we find no evidence of the subsequent payment of any dues to defendant. We think, however, that the defense relating to the validity of the contract can be disposed of on a single proposition.

The burden is on the defendant, in order to defeat recovery on the certificate on account of breach of condition, to show that a condition of the contract was broken; that is, specifically, that, at the time Delaney received his certificate of membership in the defendant association, he was not a member of the Modern Woodmen. Burke, as defendant's agent, had undoubtedly authority to contract that a certificate should be issued to Delaney when he became a member of the Modern Woodmen; and although, as a matter of fact, the application was taken before Delaney was such member, if, after the condition was complied with, the certificate was actually delivered, the defendant should not object that its officers did not know at the time the certificate was so delivered that, at the time the application was made, Delaney was not eligible to membership, for the knowledge of that preliminary fact was imputed to it by reason of the knowledge of its agent. For instance, if the condition had been that no certificate should issue to a person under eighteen years of age, and an application had been made by one who was not yet of that age, that fact being known to the agent, but the certificate was not delivered until after such person had attained the required age, then it could not be contended that want of knowledge on the part of the officers issuing the certificate that the applicant was not of age when the application was made--that fact having been known to the agent--would render the certificate invalid. Now, it does not appear when the certificate was actually delivered to and accepted by Delaney; but, even assuming that this delivery and acceptance antedated his admission to the Modern Woodmen, nevertheless the practical effect of the arrangement of the agent was that the acceptance of the certificate should become effectual to render the contract binding when Delaney should be admitted to membership in the Modern Woodmen, and we think that the power to make this arrangement was within the general scope of the authority of Burke as agent for the defendant authorized to act in securing applications for membership in the defendant association. Indeed, we should feel no hesitation, were it necessary, in holding that the practical construction put by the defendant asso iation upon its own articles in framing its contract of membership was that membership in the Modern Woodmen was a condition to the right of recovery under the certificate, for in the certificate it is said that Delaney, "a member of the Modern Woodmen of America, * * * is entitled to all the rights and privileges of the Modern Accident Club, as hereinafter provided," and that "this certificate is issued upon the express condition that the said George L. Delaney shall in every particular, while a member of said Club, comply with the laws, rules and requirements thereof and of the Modern Woodmen of America." And on the back of the certificate is the indorsement, "No one admitted but members of the Modern Woodmen of America in good standing." It seems to us, therefore, that there is no merit in this defense.

It is further contended, however, that under the certificate there is no right of recovery, because the death of Delaney was not within the terms of the contract. To bring the case within the terms of the contract, the death of Delaney must result "solely from accidental injuries." The undisputed facts are that, in a friendly scuffle between Delaney and one Dwire, Delaney received a slight cut on his little finger from the point of a steel eraser which stuck out of the top of Dwire's vest pocket; that inflamation of the finger followed this cut, which developed into erysipelas and blood poisoning, causing Delaney's death; and the question argued is whether the death was solely due to the cut on the finger, or whether it was due to erysipelas and the consequent blood poisoning, as an independent cause. Phyicians testified that the cause of Delaney's death was blood poisoning, due to specific bacilli introduced in some way into the blood in Delaney's hand; and counsel concede that, if...