Delgado v. State
| Citation | 39 N.Y.3d 242,206 N.E.3d 598,185 N.Y.S.3d 729 |
| Docket Number | 83 |
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Parties | Roxanne DELGADO, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of New York et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Cameron J. Macdonald, Government Justice Center, Inc., Albany, for appellants.
Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino, Barbara D. Underwood and Jeffrey W. Lang of counsel), for respondents.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York City (Andrew D. Silverman and Abigail Colella of counsel), for Carl E. Heastie, amicus curiae.
Acting Chief Judge CANNATARO.
In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of part HHH of chapter 59 of the Laws of 2018 (the enabling act), in which the Legislature tasked the Committee on Legislative and Executive Compensation with determining, after consideration of various factors, whether "the salary and allowances of the members of the [L]egislature" and certain other state officials "warrant an increase" (L 2018, ch 59, part HHH, § 2[2]). The enabling act further provided that the Committee's recommendation with respect to any salary changes would become effective unless modified or abrogated by statute. Inasmuch as plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to the enabling act as a duly enacted state statute (see Matter of County of Chemung v. Shah , 28 N.Y.3d 244, 262, 44 N.Y.S.3d 326, 66 N.E.3d 1044 [2016] ), we affirm.
The constitutionality of the enabling act cannot be assessed without an overview of the framework governing adjustments to the compensation of state officers. Historically, legislative salaries were "fixed, primarily on a per diem basis, by the [New York] Constitution, and could be changed only by constitutional amendment" ( Dunlea v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 265, 268, 496 N.Y.S.2d 406, 487 N.E.2d 263 [1985] ).1 In 1948, however, the Legislature amended article III, section 6 to provide that legislators shall receive for "services a like annual salary, to be fixed by law," with the proviso that compensation could neither be increased nor diminished during, and with respect to, the term for which the legislator was elected. Thereafter, the compensation for members of the Legislature and allowances for members serving as officers or in a special capacity were set forth in Legislative Law §§ 5 and 5–a. Similarly, the salaries of the Comptroller of the State of New York and Attorney General were set forth in Executive Law §§ 40 and 60, respectively. Salaries for certain other state officers in the executive branch, such as agency commissioners, were contained in Executive Law § 169. On their face, those statutes resemble Judiciary Law article 7–B (see Judiciary Law §§ 221 — 221–i ), which implements the "Compensation Clause" for judges contained in article VI, § 25(a) of the New York Constitution.
The Compensation Clause provides that the "compensation" of judges covered by article VI of the State Constitution "shall be established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which" the judge was elected or appointed ( N.Y. Const, art VI, § 25 [a] [emphasis added]).2 In accordance with this mandate, salary schedules were typically set forth in statutes enacted by the Legislature (see 4 Charles Z. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York at 590–591 [1906]).
The Legislature altered that practice in 2010 after this Court addressed the Compensation Clause and related separation of powers issues following "the failure of the Legislature and the Executive to come to an agreement on legislation effecting a [judicial] pay raise" from the levels set by the 1998 amendment of the Judiciary Law ( Maron, 14 N.Y.3d at 246, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ). We explained that judicial salary increases had been proposed by Governors on several occasions between 2006 and 2009, but statutes reflecting those increases were not enacted because the relevant bills "did not [also] provide for an increase in legislative pay" or because the Legislature refused to also "enact[ ] campaign finance and ethics reform measures" demanded by the Governor ( id. at 245 ). Maron reaffirmed that "although the diminution in value of judicial compensation by inflation was a concern, the drafters [of the Compensation Clause] decided that the best way to combat the effects of inflation was to count on the Legislature—the body directly accountable to the public—to assure the fair and appropriate compensation of the Judiciary" ( id. at 254, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ). Thus, we recognized that "whether judicial compensation should be adjusted, and by how much, is within the province of the Legislature" ( id. at 263, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ). Nevertheless, we concluded "that the State had unconstitutionally compromised the independence of the judiciary over the course of three years by linking any decision on whether to increase judges’ salaries with other legislative initiatives such as the enactment of legislative pay increases and campaign finance reform" ( Larabee v. Governor of the State of N.Y., 27 N.Y.3d 469, 473, 34 N.Y.S.3d 389, 54 N.E.3d 61 [2016], citing Maron, 14 N.Y.3d at 245–246, 260–261, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ).
Notably, in describing "the continuing inertia underlying [the judicial salary] dispute" ( id. at 246, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ), the Maron Court observed that the Senate passed bills in 2007 "calling for the creation of a commission to review future salary increases for both judges and legislators" and "a commission to examine future increases in judicial salaries taking into account the needs of the Judiciary and the State's ability to pay" ( id. at 245, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899 ; see 2007 N.Y. Senate Bills S5313, S6550). Like the enabling act here, those bills directed the proposed commissions to make recommendations, based upon various non-exclusive factors set forth in the bills, in a report to the Governor, the Legislature and the Chief Judge by a certain date; those recommendations would "have the force of law" and "supersede inconsistent provisions of" the Judiciary Law, Executive Law and Legislative Law unless "modified or abrogated by statute" (2007 N.Y. Senate Bill S5313, §§ 3[i], 4[h]; 2007 N.Y. Senate Bill 6550, § 3[h]).
Shortly after our decision in Maron , the Legislature passed a law creating the Commission on Judicial Compensation (see L 2010, ch 567). The 2010 statute, intended to comply with Maron (see Senate Introducer's Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 567, at 8) and enacted with the support of the Office of Court Administration (see Letter from Off of Ct Admin, Dec. 23, 2010, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 567, at 9), closely resembles the enabling act at issue here. The 2010 statute required the Commission to "make recommendations with respect to adequate levels of compensation and non-salary benefits for judges" after assessing a list of non-exclusive factors (L 2010, ch 567, § 1[a]); following the Commission's submission of those recommendations to the Governor, Legislature and Chief Judge, the recommendations would "have the force of law, and ... supersede inconsistent provisions of article 7–B of the judiciary law, unless modified or abrogated by statute prior to April first of the year as to which such determination applies" (id. § 1[h]).
In Larabee , we explained the effect of the supersession clause contained in the 2010 statute: "Under th[e] new law, when the Commission recommends an increase in judicial salaries, the increase goes into effect by operation of law on April 1 of the year for which it is recommended, unless the Legislature passes a statute rejecting the recommended pay raise" ( Larabee, 27 N.Y.3d at 472, 34 N.Y.S.3d 389, 54 N.E.3d 61 ).3 The Court opined that the enactment of the 2010 statute remedied "the constitutional violation that led to our decision in Matter of Maron , " and "through this legislatively-created process, the issue of judicial compensation now receives consideration independent of other political matters" ( id. ).4
In 2015, as part of its annual budget bill, the Legislature created another similar commission—the Commission on Legislative, Judicial and Executive Compensation—which was charged with meeting quadrennially to make recommendations regarding adequate levels of compensation for members of the Legislature, judges, statewide elected officials and certain state officers (see L 2015, ch 60, Part E, § 2). The 2015 statute was, once again, similar to the enabling act challenged in this action. Under the terms of the 2015 legislation, the Commission was required to submit to the Legislature its recommendations by a specified date; the recommendations would "have the force of law, and ... supersede, where appropriate, inconsistent provisions of article 7–B of the judiciary law, section 169 of the executive law, and sections 5 and 5–a of the legislative law, unless modified or abrogated by statute" by a date certain (L 2015, ch 60, § 1, Part E, § 3[7]). The Commission made recommendations only as to judicial salaries, which first took effect in April 2016.
A declaratory judgment action was commenced challenging the 2015 statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority without reasonable standards or safeguards. Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed (Center for Jud. Accountability, Inc. v. Cuomo, 167 A.D.3d 1406, 1411, 91 N.Y.S.3d 553 [3d Dept. 2018], appeal dismissed 33 N.Y.3d 993, 101 N.Y.S.3d 724, 125 N.E.3d 140 [2019], reconsid denied 34 N.Y.3d 960, 135 N.E.3d 1084 [2019] ; lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 961, 112 N.Y.S.3d 4, 135 N.E.3d 1084 [2019], rearg. denied 34 N.Y.3d 1147, 119 N.Y.S.3d 429, 142 N.E.3d 112 [2020] ). The Appellate Division reasoned that "[t]he factors established by the Legislature" in the 2015 statute "provide[d] adequate standards and guidance for the exercise of ...
To continue reading
Request your trial