Delker v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19 CV 43 RWS |
| Parties | EDWARD F. DELKER, Plaintiff, v. MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL, INC. and MASTERCARD TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before me on the defendants', Mastercard International, Inc. and Mastercard Technologies, Inc., motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and to strike portions of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). ECF No. [54]. The plaintiff brings a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as well as two related state law claims. For the reasons discussed below I will grant Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff Edward Delker filed this action in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, State of Missouri on December 14, 2018. Defendants removed the case to this court on January 14, 2019, arguing Plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by ERISA. On June 11, 2019, I denied Plaintiff's motion to remand the case to state court. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on June 18, 2018 and his second amended complaint on July 15, 2020. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to his wife in violation of ERISA, that Defendants breached their contract with his wife, and that they committed fraud by denying him the life insurance benefits they had promised.
Plaintiff's late wife, Mrs. Julie Delker, was an employee of MasterCard International, Inc. from January 1, 1997 to February 29, 2016, and an employee of Master Card Technologies, LLC from March 1, 2016 until her death on August 2, 2016. Defendants', as Mrs. Delker's employers, provided her certain benefits under an ERISA benefits plan. These benefits included core life insurance in the amount of 100% of their annual Earnings for all employees, as well as additional life insurance that employees could opt to purchase if they met the eligibility requirements. See MasterCard International Incorporated Health Care Plan, ECF No. [1-2] at 85-164. As an employee of MasterCard, Mrs. Delker was automatically enrolled in core life insurance. Compl. at ¶ 11 and Ex. B-D. See also Id. at 92-93. In the years prior to her death Defendants represented to Mrs. Delker that because she was hired on or before December 31, 2001, she was entitled to receive enough credits to elect up to three times her salary in life insurance. Compl. at ¶¶ 7, 8, and Exhibits B-D. Mrs. Delkerunderstood these representations to mean that she was entitled to life insurance in the amount of three times her salary and that the premiums would be paid by Defendants. Compl. at ¶ 8. Mrs. Delker believed based on these representations that she was enrolled in life insurance in the amount of three times her salary.
When Mrs. Delker died in August of 2016, Mr. Delker received a letter from MasterCard indicating that he was eligible to receive $432,000, which was three times his late wife's salary. Compl. at ¶ 12. He also received a Beneficiary Statement that he needed to complete and return to the Director of Global Benefits at MasterCard. Plaintiff completed the form and returned it as requested. Compl. at ¶14. MasterCard then submitted Plaintiff's life insurance benefit claim to The Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential"), the claims administrator for MasterCard's life insurance benefits. MasterCard International Incorporated Health Care Plan, ECF No. [1-2] at 60. After reviewing the claim, Prudential advised Mr. Delker that MasterCard had only paid premiums for life insurance in the amount of one times his late wife's salary. Compl. at ¶19. Therefore, Prudential determined that he was only entitled to $144,000 in life insurance benefits. Compl. at ¶ 19. MasterCard then informed Plaintiff that they had made an administrative error and he was not entitled to three times his wife's salary because their records did not indicate that Mrs. Delker had purchased optional life insurance. Compl. at ¶¶ 21-22. Prudential subsequently paidPlaintiff $144,000 for the core life insurance benefit, but the remainder of his claim was denied. Compl. at ¶19.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I must assume the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). I am not, however, bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 555 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.C. 662, 667, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 570). Although "specific facts are not necessary," the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to "give fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
A plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elementsnecessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." i. at 562 (quoted case omitted). This standard "simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element]." Id. at 556. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of his claim." Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), an amended complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading if the "amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The basic inquiry is whether the amended complaint is related to the general fact situation alleged in the original pleading. Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1543 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 1283 (8th Cir.1988)). "The same substantive legal theory need not be alleged in both complaints; rather the claims need only arise out of the same 'conduct, transaction or occurrence.'" Thompson v. IP Network Solutions, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-1239-RLW, 2014 WL 5761127, *3 (E.D. Mo Nov 5, 2014) (quoting Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc, 874 F.2d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 1989). "The rationale of Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigationconcerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations were intended to provide." United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d at1283). "
The Eighth Circuit has stated that since the purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) is to permit cases to be decided on their merits, it has been liberally construed. Alpern, 84 F.3d at 1543. Based on this standard, I find that the allegations in the original complaint were sufficient to provide notice to Defendants. Additionally, the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations. Therefore, liberally construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), I find that the Plaintiff's First and Second Amended Complaints relate back to the original filing in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. Therefore, the claims under ERISA are not time barred.
The Plaintiff asserts a breach of fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), alleging that Defendants failed to pay the premiums required for Mrs. Delker's life insurance, made material misrepresentations regarding the nature of Mrs. Delker's insurance coverage, and failed to provide adequate information indicating that her life insurance benefits were properly accounted for by the Defendants. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because he fails to allege that Defendants are fiduciaries. Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that their actions amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty.
"To plead breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege that 1) defendant was a fiduciary of the plan, 2) defendant was acting in that capacity, and 3) defendant breached a fiduciary duty." In re Xcel Energy, Inc., Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Minn 2004), See also 29 U.S.C. § 1109. An ERISA fiduciary can either be named in the plan or deemed a fiduciary on the basis of their functional authority. Id. Under ERISA, a person or entity is a fiduciary with respect to the plan to the extent they exercise any discretionary authority or control respecting management of the plan or disposition of its assets or have discretionary authority or responsibility for administration of the plan. 29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has stated that the term fiduciary is to be broadly construed consistent with ERISA's policies and objectives.
Whether an entity qualifies as a functional fiduciary under ERISA is a mixed question of law and fact. Xcel Energy, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (quoting In re Electronic Data Sys., 305 F.Supp.2d 658, 665 (E.D. Tex 2004)). Here Plaintiff alleges that Defendants provided plan information, were directly involved in enrollment, and paid employee...
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