Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1989
• Docket Number: Nos. 88-1733,88-1797,s. 88-1733
• Citation: 874 F.2d 402
• Parties: 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1253, 50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,972, 57 USLW 2652, 13 Fed.R.Serv.3d 475 Colleen DONNELLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 402

874 F.2d 402

49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1253,

50 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,972, 57 USLW 2652,

13 Fed.R.Serv.3d 475

Colleen DONNELLY, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 88-1733, 88-1797.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 2, 1988.

Decided April 28, 1989. ¹

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 17, 1989.

Steven J. Teplinsky, Fagel Haber & Maragos, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee.

Paul L. Salzetta, John J. Henely, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, CUMMINGS, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Chief Judge.

This case is before us on appeal from a judgment by the district court entered in favor of plaintiff, Colleen Donnelly. Plaintiff brought suit against her employer, defendant Yellow Freight System, Inc., on charges of sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's decision on all issues, except the court's order denying an award of prejudgment interest.

I.

Donnelly applied for a dock-worker position at Yellow Freight on October 26, 1982. Although Yellow Freight was not hiring at the time, Neil Casey, the terminal manager, told her that when Yellow Freight began hiring again, Donnelly would be the next dock worker hired. About the same time, Donnelly also applied for jobs at Jewel Food Stores and Retail Inventory Service Co. (RIS). In December of 1982, RIS hired Donnelly on a part-time basis and she worked there through June of 1984.

Despite securing a job at RIS, Donnelly called Casey weekly to inquire about job openings at Yellow Freight. Although Yellow Freight began hiring dockworkers again in February of 1983, Casey not only continued to tell Donnelly that Yellow Freight was not hiring, but also falsely reported that Yellow Freight was laying off dockworkers. Eighteen months later, Donnelly was finally hired by Yellow Freight.

In March of 1985, Donnelly filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In her first charge she alleged that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex by failing to offer her employment as a dock worker. In her second charge she alleged that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex subsequent to her hiring at Yellow Freight. (This charge was later dismissed on summary judgment and no appeal was taken.) On March 15, plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue Within 90 Days from the EEOC.

On May 22, 1985, within the 90-day limitation period, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against the defendant in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging sex discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, p 1-101 et seq. (1983). On June 28, 1985, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies as required by the IHRA. On July 17, Donnelly sought leave to file an amended complaint, appending proposed Counts III and IV. Counts III and IV realleged the same facts as in Counts I and II of the original complaint but were premised under Title VII. Although Donnelly had not yet filed the motion to amend her complaint, Yellow Freight objected to the proposed motion. On August 9, Donnelly actually filed her motion to amend the complaint. On the same date, the circuit court entered an agreed order dismissing her original complaint with prejudice and continuing her contested motion for leave to file an amended complaint. This order essentially resulted in a lawsuit without a complaint. For a discussion of the problems attending the agreed order, see n. 10, infra.

On August 14, 1985, Yellow Freight filed a petition to remove the case to the United States District Court. The district court granted Donnelly's motion to file an amended complaint on September 13, and the complaint was filed on September 20. Yellow Freight moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was filed more than 90 days after the EEOC issued the right to sue letter. The court denied the defendant's motion.

On November 3, 1987, the case was tried before a United States magistrate pursuant to the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c). Because Yellow Freight admitted liability for sex discrimination, only the issues of back pay and mitigation of damages were tried. The magistrate concluded that Donnelly had exercised reasonable diligence in her search for other employment and awarded her damages equal to the amount she would have earned had she been hired by Yellow Freight on February 8, 1983, less her wages earned at RIS. The magistrate also found that plaintiff was entitled to salary increases adopted at Yellow Freight during the eighteen-month period in which she was not hired, and that she was entitled to pension fund contributions and prejudgment interest. The district court affirmed the magistrate's judgment in all respects except that it reversed the magistrate's award of prejudgment interest to the plaintiff.

Yellow Freight then brought this appeal. First, Yellow Freight alleges that the 90-day limitations period within which to file a Title VII complaint expired before Donnelly filed her federal claim. Second, Yellow Freight alleges that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Donnelly acted with reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages. On cross-appeal, Donnelly argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to award her prejudgment interest. We reject both of Yellow Freight's arguments and we agree with Donnelly's contention that she is entitled to prejudgment interest.

II.

Before reaching the merits of this case, we first must decide whether Donnelly's Title VII cause of action was timely filed. In order to bring the action, Donnelly had to file suit against Yellow Freight within 90 days of the issuance of the EEOC's Notice of Right to Sue. Although Donnelly filed her state claim in state court within the 90-day window, she did not file her Title VII claim in federal court within the requisite time period. Yellow Freight's first argument is that any filing in state court, whether before or after the close of the 90-day window, cannot toll the limitation period because Title VII jurisdiction is exclusively federal. Therefore, defendant continues, plaintiff did not effectively file her complaint until she filed it in federal court on September, 20, 1985, which was more than six months after the EEOC issued the Notice of Right to Sue. Second, defendant argues that even if federal and state courts share jurisdiction over Title VII claims, plaintiff's amended claim does not relate back to her original claim because her original complaint was brought under the IHRA.

A.

Unless Congress includes in the statute an explicit statement vesting jurisdiction exclusively in federal court, state courts may presume that they share jurisdiction concurrently with the federal courts over a federal cause of action. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2874-75, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). This is a presumption deeply imbedded in the history of our federal system. See The Federalist No. 82 (A. Hamilton). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850), state courts must stand ready to vindicate federal rights, subject to review by the Supreme Court, should Congress decide not to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear a particular federal claim. See Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. at 2875 n. 4 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 346-48, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816)). The presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction may be rebutted only by an "unmistakable implication (of exclusive jurisdiction) from legislative history," id. at 478, 101 S.Ct. at 2875 (citing California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66-68, 99 S.Ct. 919, 924-25, 59 L.Ed.2d 144 (1979)), or by a "disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and state-court adjudication." Id. at 477-78, 101 S.Ct. at 2875-76 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08, 82 S.Ct. 519, 522-23, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962); see also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876)).

Because Congress failed to address this issue explicitly, Yellow Freight urges us to find that the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is not applicable to Title VII and that the circumstances warrant a finding of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In so doing, Yellow Freight asks us to adopt the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.1984), and hold that both the statutory language and the legislative history of Title VII raise the unmistakable implication of exclusive federal jurisdiction. ² See also Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112 (3rd Cir.1986) (Title VII jurisdiction is exclusively federal); ³ Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F.Supp. 43 (E.D.Mich.1978) (same). But see Bennun v. Board of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F.Supp. 1274 (D.N.J.1976) (Title VII jurisdiction is concurrent); Greene v. County School Bd., 524 F.Supp. 43 (E.D.Va.1981) (same). ⁴

We decline the invitation to join in the conclusion of the Valenzuela court. The Valenzuela court found Congress' grant of jurisdiction to the federal district courts, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(3) ("[e]ach United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter"), and the accompanying procedural directives, ⁵ to be a persuasive indication of exclusive federal jurisdiction. However, "the mere grant of jurisdiction to a federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction over the cause of action." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 479, 101 S.Ct. at 2876 (citing ...