Delong v. Am. Home Furnishings Alliance
| Decision Date | 02 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-2766 |
| Citation | 464 F.Supp.3d 727 |
| Parties | Meghan DELONG et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN HOME FURNISHINGS ALLIANCE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Adam Rose, Thomas Scolaro, Leesfield Scolaro PA, Miami, FL, Michael J. Witherel, Michael J. Witherel and Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, Christopher J. Marzzacco, Marzzacco Niven & Associates, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew J. Gallogly, Margolis Edelstein, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant American Home Furnishings Alliance, Inc.
Thomas L. Mueller, Lucas & Cavalier LLC, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant American Society for Testing and Materials.
Meghan DeLong alleges that non-profits American Home Furnishings Alliance, Inc. and the American Society for Testing and Materials negligently issued and promoted voluntary furniture safety standards, thus causing her son to perish when an IKEA dresser meeting those standards tipped onto him. (Compl. at 4, Doc. No. 6-1.) In moving to dismiss, Defendants argue that they have no legal duty to furniture users. Doc. Nos. 9, 10; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). I will grant their Motions.
Plaintiff initiated this matter in May, 2019, filing her Complaint in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. (See Doc. No. 6.) Invoking diversity jurisdiction, ASTM removed to this Court in June, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 1, 24); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. It is undisputed that the Parties are diverse. Because Plaintiff seeks "[m]ore than $50,000,000" in damages, the jurisdictional threshold is met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Both Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The matter has been fully briefed. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 37.)
I must conduct a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, I will accept Plaintiff's factual allegations and disregard legal conclusions or mere recitations of the elements. Id. I must then determine whether the facts alleged make out a "plausible" claim for relief. Id. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Defendants must show that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).
A Florida resident, Ms. Delong is the mother and survivor of two-year old Conner Delong, who was asphyxiated when an Ikea "Hemnes" bedroom dresser fell onto him. (Compl. at 5, 10.) She proceeds in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of her son's estate. (Id. at 4.) She does not sue Ikea, which designed, manufactured, and distributed the dresser.
ASTM, a non-profit, is organized under the law of Pennsylvania, where it has its principal place of business. (See id. ) It promulgates voluntary industry safety standards for products and materials, including furniture. (Id. at 4–5.) AHFA is a non-profit organized under the law of North Carolina, where it has its principal place of business. (See id. at 4.) AHFA "is the voice of the residential furniture industry." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that to forestall government regulation, AHFA encourages manufacturers to adopt and comply with ASTM's voluntary industry standards. (Id. at 7–10.) As alleged, these standards are considered baseline safety ‘best practices.’ (Id. )
ASTM standard F2057 sets out extensive dresser stability requirements, including the following: (1) the dresser must not tip over when all drawers are fully extended; and (2) it must not tip over when any single drawer is fully extended and a 50-pound weight is hung from the drawer. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges the "Hemnes" dresser met these requirements, that Ikea relied on F2057 "in designing and manufacturing the [Hemnes] dresser," and that ASTM and AHFA knew that products designed to that standard would be used in homes with small children. (Id. at 5–7.) Plaintiff further alleges that ASTM and AHFA knew that compliance with F2057 could not prevent injuries to young children who often climb dressers "like a ladder." (Id. ) Finally, she alleges that both Defendants ignored calls from independent consumer groups to implement more rigorous stability standards. (Id. at 5–7.)
Ms. Delong's Complaint is not a model of clarity. Although she charges "negligence" as to both AHFA and ASTM, she appears to raise two theories of liability: (1) Defendants negligently breached their duty of care to end-users in promulgating F2057 (Id. at 11); and (2) Defendants undertook a third-party duty that they negligently failed to carry out. (Id. ) There is a difference between these theories. As to the first, the law imposes a duty of care on the defendant. As to the second, the defendant assumes a duty of care. Pursuant to the second, Plaintiff thus alleges that AHFA and ASTM "undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to promulgate, implement, or amend—or substantially participate in the promulgation, implementation, or amendment of—furniture stability safety standards, including but not limited to F2057[ ]," and were negligent in doing so. (Id. at 11, 15.) As each Defendant notes in its Motion to Dismiss, this language mirrors "Good Samaritan" liability set out in Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10.)
Ms. Delong apparently alludes to other possible claims, which Defendants address in seeking dismissal. In responding to Defendant's Motions, however, she either does not mention them or explicitly disclaims them. (Pl. Sur-reply at 1 n.1, Doc. No. 30 ().) She thus limits her claims as follows: the trade organizations were negligent in promulgating and promoting ASTM F2057, and assumed responsibility for setting criteria for designing and testing furniture but did so negligently ("Good Samaritan" liability).
Defendants argue that Ms. Delong: (1) lacks capacity to sue; and (2) has failed to allege that Defendants breached any cognizable legal duty to her. I agree with the second contention.
Although neither side has addressed choice of law, I will apply the law of Florida. Specialty Surfaces Intern., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 609 F.3d 223, 229–36 (3d Cir. 2010). A claim of wrongful death is created by Florida statute. Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 116 So. 3d 363, 374 (Fla. 2013) ; Fla. Stat. §§ 768.20 et seq. A wrongful death action must be brought by the decedent's personal representative. Fla. Stat. § 768.20.
Plaintiff has alleged she is "or in the near future will be" appointed her as son's personal representative. (Compl. at 4.) In opposing Defendants' Motions, she notes that she has in fact been so appointed. I will consider this as a supplement to Plaintiff's Complaint, thus satisfying Florida law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
More difficult is the question of whether the law imposes (or likely would impose) on voluntary standards-issuing organizations a duty to a product's consumer or user. This is purely a legal determination. Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cty., 161 So. 3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015). Once again, I am bound to apply Florida law. Covington v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004). If there is no controlling statute or decision from Florida's highest court, I must give significant weight to intermediate appellate court decisions. Id. If there are none, I may also consider decisions from other jurisdictions, secondary sources, and treatises. Id.; see also Jaworowski v. Ciasulli, 490 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007) () (citation omitted).
There is no governing Florida statute. Because Florida Courts have not addressed the issue, I must predict how they would rule. I conclude they would hold that the law does not impose on a trade association issuing voluntary industry standards a duty to the end users of products manufactured in accordance with the standards.
The argument that the law imposes such a duty on standard-setting organizations has had very limited success in decisions that are largely inapposite here. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that the American Association of Blood Banks was liable for negligently promulgating transfusion standards intended to protect recipients from contracting HIV/AIDS. Snyder v. Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 676 A.2d 1036, 1048 (1996). Because of the AABB's unique degree of authority, Snyder is minimally useful here. The Court emphasized that the "[AABB] has dominated the establishment of standards for the blood-banking industry," and so Id. at 1050. Indeed, a blood bank could not operate in New Jersey unless it was a member of the AABB and followed the Association's mandatory safety procedures. Id.
Typical of most standards-setting organizations, Defendants here "govern" nothing. As alleged, to the extent furniture manufacturers or designers adopt Defendants' standards, they do so voluntarily. (E.g. Compl. at 9 () (emphasis added)). Indeed, the AABB's unique authority likely explains why Plaintiff can offer only a single decision where Snyder was followed directly. Weigand v. Univ....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Suing the Certifiers – A Dangerous Undertaking
...recant of its earlier willingness to entertain such liability. A second decision, DeLong v. American Home Furnishings Alliance, 464 F. Supp.3d 727 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2020), also from Pennsylvania, but applying Florida law, came down a few months after the first Russell decision. This time, t......