Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC13–932.,SC13–932.
• Citation: 161 So.3d 384
• Parties: Abel LIMONES, Sr., et al., Petitioners, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

161 So.3d 384

Abel LIMONES, Sr., et al., Petitioners

v.SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY et al., Respondents.

No. SC13–932.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 2, 2015.

David Charles Rash of David C. Rash, P.A., Weston, FL, and Elizabeth Koebel Russo of Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Miami, FL, for Petitioners.

Traci McKee of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, FL, and Scott Andrew Beatty of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Bonita Springs, FL, for Respondents.

Jennifer Suzanne Blohm and Ronald Gustav Meyer of Meyer, Brooks, Demma and Blohm, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida School Boards Association, Inc.

Leonard E. Ireland, Jr., Gainesville, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida High School Athletic Association, Inc.

Mark Miller and Christina Marie Martin, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation.

Opinion

LEWIS, J.

Petitioners Abel Limones, Sr., and Sanjuana Castillo seek review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Limones v. School District of Lee County, 111 So.3d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court in McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla.1992), and several other Florida decisions.

BACKGROUND

At approximately 7:40 p.m. on November 13, 2008, fifteen-year-old Abel Limones, Jr., suddenly collapsed during a high school soccer game. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Abel collapsed due to a collision with another player. The event involved a soccer game between East Lee County High School, Abel's school, and Riverdale High School, the host school. Both schools belong to the School District of Lee County. When Abel was unable to rise, Thomas Busatta, the coach for East Lee County High School, immediately ran onto the field to check his player. Abel tried to speak to Busatta, but within three minutes of the collapse, he appeared to stop breathing and lost consciousness. Busatta was unable to detect a pulse. An administrator from Riverdale High School who called 911, and two parents in the stands who were nurses, joined Busatta on the field. Busatta and one nurse began to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation

(CPR) on Abel. Busatta, who was certified in the use of an automated external defibrillator (AED), testified that he yelled for an AED. The AED in the possession of Riverdale High School was actually at the game facility located at the end of the soccer field, but it was never brought on the field to Busatta to assist in reviving Abel.

Emergency responders from the fire department arrived at approximately 7:50 p.m. and applied their semi-automatic AED to revive Abel, but that was unsuccessful. Next, responders from the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) arrived and utilized a fully automatic AED on Abel and also administered several drugs in an attempt to restore his heartbeat. After application of shocks and drugs, emergency responders revived Abel, but not until approximately 8:06 p.m., which was twenty-six minutes after his initial collapse. Although Abel survived, he suffered a severe brain injury

due to a lack of oxygen over the time delay involved. As a result, he now remains in a nearly persistent vegetative state that will require full-time care for the remainder of his life.

Petitioners, Abel's parents, retained an expert, Dr. David Systrom, M.D., who determined that Abel suffered from a previously undetected underlying heart condition. Dr. Systrom further opined that if shocks from an AED had been administered earlier, oxygen would have been restored to Abel's brain sooner and he would not have suffered the brain injury

that left him in the current permanent vegetative state. Petitioners then filed an action against Respondent, the School Board of Lee County.¹ They alleged that Respondent breached both a common law duty and a statutory duty as imposed by section 1006.165, Florida Statutes (2008),² when it failed to apply an AED on Abel after his collapse. The School Board moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and entered final judgment.

On appeal, the Second District recognized that Respondent owed a duty to supervise its students, which in the context of student athletes included a duty to prevent aggravation of an injury. Limones, 111 So.3d at 904–05 (citing Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla.1982) ; Leahy v. Sch. Bd. of Hernando Cnty., 450 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) ). However, the Second District proceeded to expand its consideration of the duty owed and enlarged its consideration into a factual scope, extent, and performance of that duty analysis. Id. at 905 (citing Cerny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 262 Neb. 66, 628 N.W.2d 697, 703 (2001) ). In this analysis, the Second District considered and evaluated whether post-injury efforts in connection with satisfying the duty to Abel should have included making available, diagnosing the need for, or using an AED. Id. The Second District relied on the discussion provided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in L.A. Fitness International, LLC v. Mayer, 980 So.2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), even though that case did not consider the same “duty” and the health club did not have a duty involving students or any similar relationship.

In L.A. Fitness, the Fourth District considered whether a health club breached its duty of reasonable care owed to a customer who was using training equipment when the health club failed to acquire or use an AED on a customer in cardiac distress. Id. at 556–57. After a review of the common law duties owed by a business owner to its invitees, the Fourth District determined that a health club owed no duty to provide or use an AED on a patron in cardiac distress. Id. at 562. The Second District in Limones found no distinction between L.A. Fitness and the present case, even though the differences are extreme, and concluded that reasonably prudent post-injury efforts did not require Respondent to provide, diagnose the need for, or use an AED. Limones, 111 So.3d at 906. The Second District also determined that neither the undertaker's doctrine³ nor section 1006.165, Florida Statutes, imposed a duty to use an AED on Abel. Id. at 906–07. Finally, after it concluded that Respondent was immune from civil liability under section 768.1325(3), Florida Statutes (2008), the Second District affirmed the decision of the trial court. Id. at 908–09. This review follows.

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction

We first consider whether jurisdiction exists to review this matter. Petitioners assert that the decision below expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court in McCain and other Florida decisions. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Specifically, Petitioners claim that the Second District defined the duty in a manner that conflicts with the approach delineated in McCain. We agree.

We have long held that to succeed on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish the four elements of duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages.See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 994 So.2d 1062, 1065–66 (Fla.2008). Of these elements, only the existence of a duty is a legal question because duty is the standard to which the jury compares the conduct of the defendant. McCain, 593 So.2d at 503. Florida law recognizes the following four sources of duty: (1) statutes or regulations; (2) common law interpretations of those statutes or regulations; (3) other sources in the common law; and (4) the general facts of the case. Id. at 503 n. 2. As in this case, when the source of the duty falls within the first three sources, the factual inquiry necessary to establish a duty is limited.⁴ The court must simply determine whether a statute, regulation, or the common law imposes a duty of care upon the defendant. The judicial determination of the existence of a duty is a minimal threshold that merely opens the courthouse doors. Id. at 502. Once a court has concluded that a duty exists, Florida law neither requires nor allows the court to further expand its consideration into how a reasonably prudent person would or should act under the circumstances as a matter of law.⁵ We have clearly stated that the remaining elements of negligence—breach, proximate causation, and damages—are to be resolved by the fact-finder. See Dorsey v. Reider, 139 So.3d 860, 866 (Fla.2014) ; Williams v. Davis, 974 So.2d 1052, 1056 n. 2 (Fla.2007) (citing McCain, 593 So.2d at 504 ); see also Orlando Exec. Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla.1983) (“[I]t is peculiarly a jury function to determine what precautions are reasonably required in the exercise of a particular duty of due care.” (citation omitted)), receded from on other grounds by Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So.2d 119, 121 (Fla.1995).

The Second District determined that a clearly recognized common law duty existed under both Rupp and Leahy. Rupp established that school employees must reasonably supervise students during activities that are subject to the control of the school. 417 So.2d at 666 ; see also Leahy, 450 So.2d at 885 (explaining that the duty of supervision owed by a school to its students included a duty to prevent aggravation of an injury). However, the Second District incorrectly expanded Florida law and invaded the province of the jury when it further considered whether post-injury efforts required Respondent to make available, diagnose the need for, or use the AED on Abel. Limones, 111 So.3d at 905. This detailed analysis exceeded the threshold requirement that this Court established in McCain. Therefore, conflict jurisdiction exists to consider the merits of this case and we choose to exercise our discretion to resolve this conflict. We review de novo rulings on summary judgment with respect to purely legal questions. See, e.g., Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla.2003).

Common Law Duty

As a general principle, a party does not have a duty to take affirmative action to...