DeLong v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., City and County of Denver

Decision Date14 January 1963
Docket NumberNo. 20410,20410
Citation151 Colo. 364,377 P.2d 737
PartiesCecil W. DeLONG, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, Colorado, and Joseph A. Barron, an Acting Judge Thereof, Respondents.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Cole & Maley, Denver, for petitioner.

Salazar & DeLaney, Denver, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

It is ordered that the rule to show cause heretofore issued herein, be and the same is hereby discharged.

MOORE, Justice (specially concurring).

The majority of the court has directed that the rule to show cause heretofore issued in this action be discharged without written opinion. For the reasons hereinafter set forth I concur in the result obtained by the entry of that order. However, I think the controversy is worthy of an opinion and accordingly I submit the following as an expression of my views.

This is an original proceeding in which Cecil W. DeLong filed his petition for the issuance of rule directed to the respondents above named to show cause why certain orders entered by the district court of the City and County of Denver should not be set aside.

It was alleged in said petition that DeLong was the plaintiff in an action for divorce pending in said court; that his wife filed a motion in said action for temporary alimony, attorneys fees, and court costs. She also served written interrogatories on him under Rule 33 R.C.P.Colo., in which she sought information concerning his employment, his assets, and the amount and sources of his income; that these interrogatories were duly answered; that upon hearing of the motion for temporary alimony he was called for cross-examination by the attorney for the wife and she also took the stand and gave testimony pertinent to the inquiry; that the trial court refused to permit counsel for DeLong to ask him any questions and refused to permit cross-examination of the wife, and refused to permit any representation whatever on behalf of DeLong at the time of the hearing. It is further alleged that DeLong was denied due process of law and that the district court and the judge thereof by the entry of the orders complained of, '* * * exceeded their jurisdiction and abused their discretion and plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy by Writ of Error or otherwise * * *.'

Rule to show cause issued and the respondents have answered by asserting, inter alia, that the court properly refused to permit counsel for DeLong to examine his client ...

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  • THE COLORADO APPELLATE RULES
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Appellate Handbook (CBA) Appendices
    • Invalid date
    ...may not be used as a substitute for appeal. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 151 Colo. 358, 377 P.2d 738 (1963); DeLong v. District Court, 151 Colo. 364, 377 P.2d 737 (1963). Nor may writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus will not lie where an appeal is adequate and may not be used as a substitute......
  • Rule 1 SCOPE OF RULES.
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure (CBA)
    • Invalid date
    ...may not be used as a substitute for appeal. Douglas v. Municipal Court, 151 Colo. 358, 377 P.2d 738 (1963); DeLong v. District Court, 151 Colo. 364, 377 P.2d 737 (1963). Nor may writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus will not lie where an appeal is adequate and may not be used as a substitute......

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