Delph v. Trent

• Decision Date: 08 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 99-618-AM.,Civ.A. 99-618-AM.
• Citation: 86 F.Supp.2d 572
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: David L. DELPH, Plaintiff, v. D. TRENT, et al., Defendants.

86 F.Supp.2d 572

David L. DELPH, Plaintiff, v. D. TRENT, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 99-618-AM.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

February 8, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David L. Delph, Jarratt, VA, plaintiff pro se.

William Wayne Muse, Wright, Robinson, McCammon, Osthimer & Tatum, Richmond, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LEE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff, who is presently incarcerated in the Mental Health Unit (MHU) at Greensville Correctional Center (GRCC), alleges that defendants Garraghty, Trent, Pugh, and Swetter created or condoned official policies, procedures, and customs that allowed plaintiff to be assaulted by another inmate and which denied plaintiff adequate medical care for his injuries from the assault. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Rogers deliberately allowed plaintiff to be assaulted.

All defendants have filed dispositive motions and plaintiff has replied to these motions. It has come to the Court's attention, however, that plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Limited Discovery. Defendants have responded by filing a Motion for a Protective Order and several Objections to this discovery. Defendants argue that they have asserted a defense of good faith qualified immunity and they request that the Court stay discovery until resolution of this issue. As the Court finds that it requires additional information before it may resolve the issue of qualified immunity, the Court will grant plaintiff's motion for discovery, but will limit the scope of required discovery.

Furthermore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Rogers. Accordingly, Rogers will be dismissed.

I.

The doctrine of good faith qualified immunity shields government employees performing discretionary functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir.1995). For an individual official to be held liable, the "contours of the law must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Judging whether qualified immunity attaches turns on a standard of objective reasonableness. Id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. This immunity defense provides "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In determining whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established "the proper focus is not upon the right at its most general or abstract level but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged." Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir.1994). The basic question for a court adjudicating a defense of qualified immunity, however, is whether official would have reasonably known his conduct violated clearly established law.

Here, the conduct at issue is whether defendants Garraghty, Trent, Pugh, and Swetter created or condoned policies, practices, or customs which allowed plaintiff to be injured and failed to provide adequate medical care. Therefore, plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable in their roles as supervisors.

It is a well-established principle that respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Phrased differently, § 1983 does not permit a state official to be held liable solely because one of his or her employees committed a tort. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

The doctrine of supervisory liability, however, renders supervisors liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts committed by employees in furtherance of official policies, including regulations, ordinances, decisions, and informal customs. See id. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The Fourth Circuit has held that supervisors may also be held liable for indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct. See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1984); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 935-36 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that municipalities may be liable for "omissions," which include indifference or tacit authorization).

In making a claim of supervisory liability in the prison context, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that "prisoners face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source [and that] the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or `tacit authorization ...'." Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373 (quoting Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir.1980)). Moreover, a plaintiff "cannot satisfy this burden of proof by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents...." Id. (emphasis added). Instead, supervisory liability may only be imposed where "there is a history of widespread abuse." Wellington, 717 F.2d at 936. Therefore, a plaintiff who is able to prove deliberate indifference, tacit authorization, or widespread and pervasive abuses may be able to establish supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As a result, there is a complex intersection between qualified immunity and supervisory liability. If a plaintiff can establish the requisite indifference in the face of a policy or widespread and pervasive abuses caused by a policy, the plaintiff may hold the responsible official liable in a supervisory capacity. However, if the official can respond that a reasonable person would not have known of the effects of the policy or that the policy violated clearly established laws, then that official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

Plaintiff in the instant action alleges that his injuries resulted from policies, procedures, or customs in the MHU at GRCC. Plaintiff, however, can only describe those isolated incidents in which he was injured or was denied appropriate medical care. Plaintiff has not shown that other inmates were also injured by these policies, procedures, or customs, nor has plaintiff identified these policies, procedures, or customs with specificity. As a result, plaintiff has requested discovery to enable him to better establish his claims of supervisory liability.

Generally, discovery is not appropriate when a defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. As the Supreme Court stated:

Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (citations omitted). The purpose underlying qualified immunity is to protect officials from the distractions that accompany civil actions, to remove inhibitions to discretionary action, and to encourage individuals to enter public service. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727. To permit the plaintiff to seek discovery would expose an official to the types of abuses qualified immunity was intended to prevent. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806.

The Supreme Court, however, has allowed limited discovery in the face of a qualified immunity defense, subject to the discretion of the trial court. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 1596, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998). In doing so, the Court has constructed two hurdles the plaintiff must overcome to win the right to discovery. First, the trial court must insure that plaintiff has alleged a cognizable injury with sufficient specificity that officials are not subject to burdensome or unnecessary discovery. See id. The trial court may require the plaintiff to make specific factual allegations or may grant motions by defendant for more definite statements under Rule 12(e). Second, once plaintiff has made a sufficient allegation, the trial court must then resolve the threshold issue of immunity before proceeding to discovery. In doing so, the trial court must determine whether the officials violated clearly established law, assuming the plaintiff's allegations as true. If so, plaintiff may be entitled to discovery, subject to the discretion of the trial court and the limits of Rule 26. See id. at 1596-97. Crawford-El concludes:

The trial judge can therefore manage the discovery process to facilitate prompt and efficient resolution of the lawsuit; as the evidence is gathered, the defendant-official may move for partial summary judgment on objective issues that are potentially dispositive and are more amenable to summary disposition.... Of course, the judge should give priority to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified immunity defense, such as the actions that the official actually took, since that defense should be resolved as early as possible.

Id. at 1597.

Here, the Court holds that limited discovery is necessary to resolve the issues of supervisory liability and qualified immunity. First, the Court finds that plaintiff has made sufficiently specific factual allegations and defendants have not moved for a more definite statement. Second, the Court finds that, taking plaintiff's allegations as true, plaintiff has stated a violation of clearly established law. Plaintiff has claimed violations of his Eighth...