Brodnik v. Lanham, Civil Action No. 1:11-0178
Decision Date | 30 March 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:11-0178 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Parties | RANDY MICHAEL BRODNIK, D.O., Plaintiff, v. ROBERT LANHAM, et al., Defendants. |
Pending before the court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment as to Count I of plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 101 and 105). For the reasons discussed below, defendant's motion (ECF No. 105)1 is GRANTED and plaintiff's motion (ECF No. 101) is DENIED.2
According to the Second Amended Complaint, at the time of the events giving rise to the instant Complaint, defendant Robert Lanham was employed as a special agent with the Internal Revenue Service. Complaint ¶¶ 8 and 10. As a result of a six-year investigation of plaintiff Randy Michael Brodnik, D.O.("Brodnik") for income tax evasion, Lanham recommended that Brodnik be prosecuted. See id. at ¶ 10. On March 18, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against Brodnik charging him with conspiracy and six counts of income tax evasion. See id. at ¶ 11. On June 2, 2010, the grand jury returned a seven-count second superseding indictment charging Brodnik with one count of conspiracy, five counts of income tax evasion, and one count of corruptly endeavoring to impede and obstruct the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws. See id. at ¶ 13. After a three-week jury trial, Brodnik was acquitted of all charges. See id. at ¶¶ 14, 20.
Brodnik alleges that one of the government's witnesses, defendant Deborah Beck, testified at Brodnik's trial that she illegally accessed Brodnik's electronic mail and provided it to defendant Lanham. See id. at 17-18. Count I of the Complaint is brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and alleges the violation of Brodnik's constitutional rights.
Lanham filed a motion to dismiss the Bivens claim which the court denied insofar as it alleged a violation of Brodnik's Fourth Amendment rights regarding his email.3 In his complaint, Brodnik alleged as follows:
Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17-19, 32, and 35-36. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, the court found that a fair reading of plaintiff's complaint is that Beck's acquisition of Brodnik's emails was done at the behest and with the encouragement of defendant Lanham, thereby transforming her action into government action. Specifically, the court stated:
The parties engaged in limited discovery on the email issue and the instant motions followed.
With respect to plaintiff's claims regarding Lanham's methods in obtaining his emails, Lanham argues that his actions are entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity shields a government official from liability for civil monetary damages if the officer's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which areasonable person would have known. Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994); Smook v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2002), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving the qualified immunity claims of government officials.
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. 533 U.S., at 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151. Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Ibid. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). The Court has held that courts may exercise discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs "should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." See id. at 818. Id.
Under the first prong, a court must determine whether the facts as alleged, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 ("Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the conduct violated a constitutional right?" ). If the allegations do not give rise to a constitutional violation, no further inquiry is necessary. Id.
A right is clearly established when it has been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). The relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable person that the conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 195 (2002). "Clearly established" does not mean that "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful," but requires the unlawfulness of the conduct to be apparent "in light of preexisting law." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).
The responsibility imposed on public officials to comply with constitutional requirements is commensurate with the legal knowledge of an objectively reasonable official in similarcircumstances at the time of the challenged conduct. It is not measured by the collective hindsight of skilled lawyers and learned judges. . . . "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciarello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 295 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993).
Jackson v. Long, 102 F.3d 722, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 578-79 (4th Cir. 2003) ( ). "In determining whether the specific right allegedly violated was 'clearly established,' the proper focus is not upon the right at its most general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged.'" Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994)(quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff's Bivens claim is that defendants Lanham and Beck violated his Fourth Amendment right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by "illegally" accessing his email. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,...
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