Delta Equities, Inc. v. Larwin Mortg. Investors

• Decision Date: 06 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 49747,49747,3
• Parties: DELTA EQUITIES, INC. v. LARWIN MORTGAGE INVESTORS
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 9

211 S.E.2d 9

133 Ga.App. 382

DELTA EQUITIES, INC. v. LARWIN MORTGAGE INVESTORS.

No. 49747.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Nov. 6, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 1974.

Hugh F. Newberry, Atlanta, for appellant.

Cofer, Beauchamp & Hawes, Peyton S. Hawes, Jr., Robert S. Jones, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Presiding Judge.

This case originally was before us on appeal by appellee from denial of a motion for summary judgment, which was sustained. Larwin Mortgage Investors v. Delta Equities, Inc., 129 Ga.App. 769, 201 S.E.2d 187. It is now before us from the granting of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person which was submitted to the jury by the trial judge, which culminated in a directed verdict. Appeal is pursuant to a certificate for immediate review.

In 1972, a Mr. Colodny, appellant's president, and a Mr. Antokal, loan officer for appellee, first met in a California convention booth maintained to attract real estate developers and to solicit the placing of loans of Larwin funds with developers engaged in construction. After the first meeting, Mr. Antokal contacted Mr. Colodny to pursue the possibility of financing some of appellant's projects. Subsequently, a meeting took place in Florida and Mr. Antokal again pursued the possibility of loans by appellee. Mr. Antokal then came to Atlanta, Georgia for further discussions. Progress having been made at this meeting, a second meeting in Atlanta took place when Mr. Antokal and several associated returned to Atlanta to close the loans on two projects in Georgia. On this visit appellees hired two architects and a law firm in Atlanta. Some differences were unresolved and appellee's contingent returned to California. On the following day, the differences were resolved during telephone conversations between Mr. Antokal and a Mr. Feldman, secretary of appellant corporations, and Mr. Antokal then requested a $10,000 refundable good faith deposit, which was wired to appellee's account in California. Appellee failed to make the loans and did not return the money. Held:

1. It is enumerated that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant and in entering a judgment thereon. We are thus faced with a determination of whether the 'Long Arm Statute' of this state (Ga.L.1966, p. 343; 1970, pp. 443, 444; Code Ann. § 24-113.1(a)) applies in the instant case. That statute provides in essence that a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident generated by an act of the nonresident, if the latter 'transacts any business within this state.' The act, of course, must have some relationship to the state and there must be minimum contacts within the state. See J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145.

In Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 61, 195 S.E.2d 399, the Supreme Court of this State adopted the liberal Illinois Rule in construing the statute's application and cited with approval language from Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 384, 143 N.E.2d 673. This was followed by Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 625, 198 S.E.2d 285 wherein the Supreme Court stated: 'Under our Long Arm Statute jurisdiction over a nonresident exists on the basis of transacting business in this state if the nonresident has purposefully done some act or consummated some transaction in this state, if...