Delta Lines, Inc. v. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC., C-75-422-CBR.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. C-75-422-CBR.,C-75-422-CBR.
• Citation: 409 F. Supp. 873
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: DELTA LINES, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, v. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS AND AUTO TRUCK DRIVERS, LOCAL 85, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, an unincorporated association, Defendant.

409 F. Supp. 873

DELTA LINES, INC., a California Corporation, Plaintiff, v. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS AND AUTO TRUCK DRIVERS, LOCAL 85, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, an unincorporated association, Defendant.

No. C-75-422-CBR.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

March 12, 1976.

Richard H. Harding, Littler, Mendelson & Fastiff, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Kenneth N. Silbert, Brundage, Beeson, Tayer & Kovach, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RENFREW, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Delta Lines, Inc. ("Delta"), for summary judgment. The action was originally brought in the Superior Court of the State of California for the City and County of San Francisco, but was removed to this Court on January 28, 1975, by petition of defendant Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers, Local 85 ("Union").¹ Jurisdiction was invoked under Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

I

The parties agree that this case may properly be disposed of by way of summary judgment, as the facts are not in dispute. On March 28, 1974, Kenneth R. Weaver, then employed as a truck driver by Delta, was accused of stealing freight from the shipment assigned to him. Faced with this charge, Weaver resigned his employment. Thereafter defendant Union, of which Weaver was and is a member, filed an "Application for Dispute Hearing" with the Joint Council 7 Labor-Management Committee ("Labor-Management Committee"), pursuant to Article 44 of the "Joint Council No. 7 Local Pickup and Delivery Supplemental Agreement". This agreement details the procedure by which the parties have contracted, inter alia, to resolve disputes over the discharge of an employee. The motion considered by the Labor-Management Committee was whether, based on Weaver's signed resignation, there was a discharge before the Committee. The Committee deadlocked on that issue and, in accordance with Article 44 of the aforementioned agreement, submitted the matter to an impartial arbitrator, Howard E. Durham. Arbitrator Durham found that Weaver "did not voluntarily resign", and therefore returned the matter to the Labor-Management Committee for a further hearing on whether Weaver's constructive discharge was for just cause. Once again the Committee deadlocked and was obliged to submit the matter to arbitration.

The arbitrator selected, Morris L. Myers, stated the issues before him as follows:

"1. Whether the Employer violated Section 5(b) of Article 44 by failing to send the grievant, Kenneth Weaver, and the Union written notice of termination within five days following issuance of the Durham Award?

"2. Whether the Employer violated Section 5(b) of Article 44 by failing to reinstate the grievant to his former position following issuance of the Durham Award?

"3. Whether there was just cause for the discharge of Kenneth R. Weaver? If not, what shall the remedy be?"

Arbitrator Myers' resolution of these issues is set out in his Award dated February 3, 1975. Myers found no violation with respect to sending written notice of termination, but did find a violation in Delta's failure to reinstate Weaver to his former position following issuance of the Durham Award; accordingly, he awarded Weaver pay for the period from Durham's Award to February 3, 1975. Finally, Myers found that although Weaver did not actually commit theft, there was just cause for his discharge.

Plaintiff contends that Arbitrator Myers had no authority to decide the first two questions set out in his statement of the issues. Plaintiff asserts that these alleged violations were not presented to the Labor-Management Committee and that Myers' Award is void to the extent it goes beyond the specific issue over which the Committee deadlocked: Whether Weaver was discharged for just cause. Defendant Union apparently does not dispute that the first two issues delineated by the arbitrator were not formally brought before the Committee.² Defendant instead maintains first, that plaintiff's objection to their consideration was merely a procedural issue which the arbitrator had authority to decide, and second, that Myers' Award was within his authority to fashion an appropriate remedy.

II

The law defining the scope of an arbitrator's authority is well settled. The limits of an arbitrator's jurisdiction are defined by the collective bargaining agreement and the issues submitted by the parties. The cases which comprise the "Steelworkers Trilogy"³ make clear that the judicial role in reviewing arbitration awards is a narrow one. Ambiguities and doubts are to be resolved in favor of enforcement of such awards. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409, 1417 (1960). Nevertheless, an arbitration award which clearly goes beyond the issues submitted by the parties is unenforceable. Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500, 502-503 (10 Cir. 1975); Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 897 (4 Cir. 1961). Indeed, the agreement by which these parties contracted to settle such disputes explicitly provides that "the decision of the arbitrator shall be specifically limited to the matter submitted to him * * *." Joint Council No. 7 Local Pickup and Delivery Supplemental Agreement, Article 44, Section 7. Therefore, the only issue facing this Court is whether the arbitrator's Award went beyond the scope of the parties' submission.

Defendant Union's first legal argument is that plaintiff's insistence that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction to consider the issues of notice and reinstatement raised a question of contract interpretation which the arbitrator had authority to decide. The...