Delvalle v. Smith, Case No. 11-61196-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
| Decision Date | 14 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-61196-CIV-COHN/SELTZER |
| Parties | NORA B. DELVALLE, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER A. SMITH/6146 and CITY OF HALLANDALE BEACH, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Officer A. Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 39] ("Motion"). The Court has considered the Motion, Plaintiff Nora B. Delvalle's Response [DE 43], Officer Smith's Reply [DE 47], the record in this case, and is otherwise advised in the premises.
This case arises out of events relating to Plaintiff Nora B. Delvalle's arrest on July 20, 2008. On that day, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Plaintiff was driving down Hallandale Beach Boulevard when Defendant Officer A. Smith stopped her. Smith Deposition [DE 40-1] at 18:21-25, 19:1-15, 31:24-25, 32:1-7; see also Delvalle Deposition [DE 40-2] at 9:7-18. Officer Smith maintains that he followed Plaintiff for one quarter mile, id. at 19:12, 19:16-17, during which, "on three separate occasions she drifted from her lane of travel over the fog line on the outside," id. at 19:19-22; see also id. at 20:10-12. In his Complaint Affidavit [DE 24-1], Officer Smith wrote that heobserved Plaintiff's vehicle "sw[e]rving within it[s] own lane and on three separate occasions crossing over the solid white line into the bicycle lane." Compl. Aff. at 1; see also Police Report [DE 24-3] at 3.
After stopping Plaintiff, Officer Smith approached her car. Smith Dep. at 20:16. From where he stood, one and a half feet from her window, id. at 21:6-7, he observed that Plaintiff had a "flushed face, glassy eyes, slow, mumbled speech and [an] odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from her breath," id. at 20:16-19; see also Compl. Aff. at 1. Officer Smith asked Plaintiff to step out of her car. Smith Dep. at 27:23-25. Once Plaintiff was outside the car, Officer Smith could still smell an alcoholic beverage coming from her breath, id. at 29:9-12, and he observed that she had trouble standing, Compl. Aff. at 1, and "swayed as she talked to officers," Police Report at 3. Officer Smith asked Plaintiff to consent to roadside sobriety tests, and she consented. Smith Dep. at 29:15-17; Police Report at 3. Next, he asked if she had any illness or injuries that would keep her from performing the exercises, and she said no. Smith Dep. at 29:17-19; Compl. Aff. at 1; Police Report at 3; Delvalle Dep. at 26:13-15. Officer Smith then began administering the exercises. Smith Dep. at 29:19-20; Compl. Aff. at 1; Police Report at 3.
Officer Smith reports that, in the one-legged stand exercise, Plaintiff hopped, put her foot down, and held her arms out for balance, missing three of the possible four clues that Officer Smith looks for in the exercise. Smith Dep. at 47:22-25, 48:1-3; Compl. Aff. at 1-2; Police Report at 3; see also Delvalle Dep. at 24:20-25, 25:1-2. In the walk and turn exercise, Plaintiff took nine steps heel-to-toe, held her arms out and then completely stopped without turning or walking backwards, as instructed. SmithDep. at 30:19-23; Compl. Aff. at 2; Police Report at 3; see also Delvalle Dep. at 25:19-20. Plaintiff missed her nose at least once out of two attempts on the finger to nose exercise. Delvalle Dep. at 26:1-3; Compl. Aff. at 2; Police Report at 3. Based on her performance on the tests and her swerving while driving, Officer Smith arrested Plaintiff for driving under the influence and took her to the Broward Sheriff's Office, Breath Alcohol Testing ("BAT") unit. Compl. Aff. at 2; Police Report at 3.
At the BAT unit, a Broward Sheriff's Office breath technician observed Plaintiff for 20 minutes, saw that she had a flushed face, her eyes were glassy and red, and her speech was mumbled. Smith Dep. at 35:13-18; see also DUI/Alcohol Influence Report, Exhibit F to Smith Dep. [DE 24-1 at 87]. The technician also administered performance tests and observed that Plaintiff was swaying and was unable to complete the tests. See DUI/Alcohol Influence Report; see also Delvalle Dep. at 17:22-25, 18:1-9.
Plaintiff consented to have her breath tested, and the results were .027 and .025, below the legal limit. Smith Dep. at 36:9-21; Compl. Aff. at 2; Police Report at 3-4. Plaintiff then agreed to provide a urine sample, and testing on the sample ultimately indicated that drugs were not detected in Plaintiff's urine. Smith Dep. 37:22-23; Compl. Aff. 2; Police Report at 4; Final Toxicology Report, Exhibit G to Smith Dep. [DE 24-1 at 89]. Thereafter, the Broward County State Attorney's Offices decided to forego prosecuting Plaintiff for driving under the influence. County Court Disposition Order [DE 24-2].
On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants Officer A. Smith and the City of Hallandale Beach ("the City"). See Complaint [DE 1]. Since then, all claims against the City were dismissed. See Order Granting in Part and Denying inPart Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [DE 30]; Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Proceed [DE 36]. The only remaining claim is Count I of the Amended Complaint [DE 24], which asserts a claim for malicious prosecution against Officer Smith in his individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the instant Motion, Officer Smith seeks summary judgment on this claim.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court may grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To discharge this burden, the movant must show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325.
After the movant has met its burden, the burden of production shifts to the non-moving party, who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact [the Court may] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3).
At the summary judgment stage, the Court's function is not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is agenuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must decide which issues are material, and Id. at 248.
Officer Smith seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim arguing first, that he had probable cause to arrest her and second, that he has qualified immunity from the claim. Plaintiff responds that disputed facts preclude summary judgment. As discussed below, the Court finds that Officer Smith had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and that he has qualified immunity from the claim. The Court further finds that there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts, and Officer Smith is entitled to judgment in his favor. Therefore, the Court will grant Officer Smith's Motion.
The Eleventh Circuit "has identified malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 540 U.S. 879 (2003). "To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures." Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). Florida requires a Plaintiff to prove the following elements in a malicious prosecution claim: "(1) an original judicial proceedingagainst the present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the original proceeding." Durkin v. Davis, 814 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986)). The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV; Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 (11th Cir. 1996), but "[a]n arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment if a police officer has probable cause for the arrest," Wood, 323 F.3d at 878. Therefore, because the absence of probable cause is a required element for a malicious prosecution claim under both the common law analysis and the Fourth Amendment analysis, the presence of probable cause precludes recovery for the claim. See Wood, 323 F.3d at 881-82 ().
Officer Smith argues that he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and therefore, she cannot prevail on her claim. "[T]he standard for determining the existence of probable cause is the same under...
To continue reading
Request your trial