Wood v. Kesler
| Decision Date | 04 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-15827.,01-15827. |
| Citation | 323 F.3d 872 |
| Parties | Melvin Alan WOOD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael KESLER, individually and in his capacity as an Alabama State Trooper, Defendant-Appellant, Brian Jones, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Jack Curtis, Robert E. Morrow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Public Safety, Legal Unit, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.
John R. Benn, Sheffield, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before CARNES, HULL and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges.
Defendant Michael Kesler, a state trooper, appeals the denial of immunity on plaintiff's § 1983 claims and state law claims. We reverse because defendant Kesler was entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims and discretionary-function immunity on the state law claims.
On March 30, 1998, plaintiff Melvin Alan Wood ("Wood") was driving a large tractor truck called a "mobile home hauler." Instead of a mobile home, Wood was carrying a pickup truck "piggyback," and the pickup truck was completely off the ground. Wood's passenger was Bob Payne. Traveling behind Wood, David Martin was driving another "mobile home hauler," also without a mobile home.
Both Wood and Martin were driving their tractor trucks northbound on I-65 in Alabama to pick up mobile homes for transport in Nashville, Tennessee. Kesler, a state trooper in Alabama, was monitoring northbound traffic on I-65 north of Athens, Alabama. This stretch of interstate highway was under construction and had been reduced to a single lane of traffic on the northbound side. Only the left lane of the northbound interstate was open. Marker barrels were positioned between the left lane and the closed right lane of the northbound interstate. Trooper Kesler was parked in the closed right lane with his vehicle at the bottom of a hill and facing the oncoming northbound traffic. Because of the construction and barrels, the normal speed limit of 70 mph was reduced to 45 mph for the single open lane of the northbound side.
Trooper Kesler stopped both Wood and Martin for speeding. They each produced a driver's license, log book, and medical card. Kesler cited Wood and Martin for speeding and not having updated log books. The citation for Wood charged him with speeding at 62 mph in a 45 mph zone. Trooper Kesler advised both drivers to update their log books at the nearest truck stop.
In his deposition, plaintiff Wood denies that he was speeding. Wood testified that he was traveling Upon seeing Trooper Kesler's blue lights flashing, Wood "didn't hit [his] brakes or anything," but just "went on down the hill and pulled off."1 According to Wood, Kesler never informed him that his conduct constituted reckless driving.2
Further, Wood's passenger Payne testified that Wood did not lock his brakes, swerve or lose control of his truck. Martin, driving behind Wood, testified that Wood slowed his vehicle to approximately 45 to 50 mph.
Trooper Kesler's traffic citations set plaintiff Wood's initial court appearance for May 4, 1998. Wood appeared in court, pled not guilty, and requested a trial date, which was set for July 8, 1998. Later, Wood, pro se, filed a document request for Kesler's records. On the advice of his superiors and the district attorney's office, Kesler did not provide the documents or respond.
At trial on July 8, 1998, plaintiff Wood refused to accept a plea bargain and decided to defend against the charges.3 At that time, Assistant District Attorney Brian Jones spoke with both plaintiff Wood and Trooper Kesler about the circumstances surrounding the speeding and log book citations. Kesler advised prosecutor Jones that Wood had lost control of his vehicle due to Wood's locking his brakes, but that Kesler had decided not to issue a reckless driving citation to Wood. After speaking with Trooper Kesler, prosecutor Jones instructed Kesler to issue Wood a citation for violation of the reckless driving statute.4
Trooper Kesler complied with Jones's instruction, back-dating the reckless driving citation to March 30, 1998, the date of the speeding charge.5 Kesler also obtained an arrest warrant on the reckless driving charge. Kesler did not believe that he could refuse when prosecutor Jones told him to write the reckless driving citation. Kesler felt that Jones was his superior.
Wood refused to sign the reckless driving citation, despite being informed that it was not an admission of guilt and that refusing to sign it would result in his being arrested and taken to jail. Trooper Kesler then arrested Wood and took him to the county jail. The full custodial arrest was based on Wood's refusal to sign the citation. On the way to the jail, Kesler asked Wood why he had not taken the plea agreement and why he had requested Kesler's records. Wood spent four to five hours at the jail before being released.
At a subsequent trial on the charges, the court found Wood guilty as charged of speeding 62 mph in a 45 mph zone and not guilty of reckless driving.6
Wood filed this action against Trooper Kesler in his individual and official capacities alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and false arrest and malicious prosecution under Alabama law.
Following discovery, defendant Kesler moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in Kesler's favor on all claims against him in his official capacity and on Wood's § 1985 claim against him individually. The district court, however, denied summary judgment to Kesler individually on Wood's § 1983 claims and state law claims. Kesler timely appealed seeking immunity on all remaining claims.7
We first address whether Trooper Kesler is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff Wood's § 1983 claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and retaliation.8 Wood asserts that Kesler lacked probable cause to charge him with reckless driving and to arrest him. Wood contends that Kesler did so maliciously and in retaliation for Wood's exercising his rights to trial and to subpoena records.
"Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To receive qualified immunity, "the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that Trooper Kesler was acting within the course and scope of his discretionary authority when he charged and arrested Wood. "Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Id.
The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for the qualified immunity analysis. "The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. However, "[i]f a constitutional right would have been violated under the plaintiff's version of the facts, `the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.'" Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151). Thus, we now analyze whether Trooper Kesler's conduct violated Wood's constitutional rights.
An arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment if a police officer has probable cause for the arrest. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194-95; Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1996); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). "For probable cause to exist,... an arrest must be objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances." Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. "This standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Although probable cause requires more than suspicion, it does not require convincing proof, and need not reach the [same] standard of conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to support a conviction." Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original).
To receive qualified immunity protection, "an officer need not have actual probable cause but only ...
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