DeMaria v. Enfield Planning and Zoning Commission
| Decision Date | 23 June 1970 |
| Citation | 271 A.2d 105,159 Conn. 534 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph L. DeMARIA v. ENFIELD PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION. Joseph L. DeMARIA v. ENFIELD PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION et al. Peter RUSSELL et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF ENFIELD et al. |
L. Paul Sullivan, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff) in the first case and appellee (plaintiff) in the second case.
Charles W. Page, Hartford, and Arthur A. Frankl, Springfield, Mass., of the Massachusetts bar, for appellant (defendant Connecticut Diversified Investors Corp.) in the second and third cases.
John D. Adams, Corp. Counsel, for appellee (named defendant) in the three cases.
William B. Collins, Manchester, for appellees (plaintiffs) in the third case.
Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.
These three cases are closely interrelated although the factual background of the three appeals is somewhat complicated.
The town of Enfield adopted a zoning ordinance effective December 15, 1966. The town was divided into three residential districts, four business districts, and an industrial district. The ordinance also provided for planned residential development districts, and for that purpose the town was divided into sixteen neighborhood districts. In nine of these districts apartment dwellings were allowed by special permit upon approval by the planning and zoning commission. The ordinance set out the usual requirements for such apartment construction, such as building height, and yard, basement and utility requirements, and required that applications for special permits be accompanied by the customary filing of plans and specifications setting forth the details of any proposed apartment complex. Section 10-4 of the ordinance established the maximum number of 'apartment unit equivalents' for each of the nine neighborhood districts where apartments are permitted, each such unit being determined by the number of rooms in each apartment. In the lower Enfield Street neighborhood district, 375 apartment unit equivalents were authorized. The ordinance (§ 10-6) also provided that petitions for apartment house permits 'shall be considered in the order in which they are filed.'
An applicant, Four Winds Realty Corporation, applied for a permit to construct 212 apartment unit equivalents in the lower Enfield Street neighborhood district, and the planning and zoning commission approved the application on April 6, 1967. Approval of that application is not challenged in these proceedings, and with the granting of that permit there remained 163 units for allocation in that neighborhood. On December 29, 1966, Joseph L. DeMaria applied to the planning and zoning commission for a permit to erect 162 apartment unit equivalents in that neighborhood district. At a meeting of the commission held on March 30, 1967, the commission denied DeMaria's application by a 4-2 vote. Its records disclose that the 'Reason for Denial' was stated to be: On April 17, 1967, DeMaria appealed the decision of the commission to the Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the commission acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of the discretion vested in it and that the stated reasons for the denial of his application were insufficient as a matter of law.
In the meantime, on February 20, 1967, Connecticut Diversified Investors Corporation, hereinafter referred to as CDIC, applied to the planning and zoning commission for a permit to construct 112 apartment unit equivalents in the same neighborhood district, but in a different area of it. The commission heard this application on April 19, 1967, and approved it on May 17, effective on May 23, 1967. June 1, 1967, DeMaria appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from this decision, alleging that the intent and the effect of the action of the commission in granting the permit to CDIC were to exhaust 'the number of 'Equivalents" allotted to the lower Enfield Street neighborhood district, thereby precluding him from constructing his proposed apartment complex in the event that he should be successful in his pending appeal from the denial of his application for a permit. He further alleged that the effect of the commission's action in granting the application of CDIC was 'to frustrate the plaintiff's appeal and to deprive the plaintiff of any meaningful benefit which has been afforded him by reason of his statutory right to appeal, and to avoid the proper supervision of its activity by the Court of Common Pleas,' since, had the commission granted his prior application for a permit, that permit would have precluded the commission from granting the application of CDIC because to do so would exceed the maximum number of apartment unit equivalents authorized in the neighborhood. DeMaria further alleged that under the circumstances the commission had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion and by its action had deprived him of 'his right to property without due process of law.' The amended answer of the commission admitted the truth of each of these allegations. By stipulation, CDIC was added as a party defendant on this appeal, which will hereinafter be referred to as DeMaria's second case.
The commission's decision to grant a permit to CDIC was attacked on a second front when, on June 5, 1967, Peter Russell and two other owners of property near the location of CDIC's proposed apartment complex appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the decision of the commission. We shall hereinafter refer to this case as the Russell case. In this case, to which CDIC was also made a party defendant, the plaintiffs alleged that they were aggrieved by the decision of the commission to grant a permit to CDIC because CDIC's proposed complex would adversely affect the value of their properties and would increase traffic, and that the plan was not in harmony with the general area and would adversely affect the public health, safety and general welfare of the community. They further alleged that the commission had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion, asserting twelve reasons for this claim.
DeMaria's second appeal and the Russell appeal were consolidated for hearing in the Court of Common Pleas. On March 12, 1968, the Court of Common Pleas rendered judgment for the plaintiffs in those two cases. In its memorandum of decision discussing the consolidated cases, the court indicated that it had made no decision on the substantive merits of CDIC's...
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