DeMario v. Lamadrid-Maldonado

• Decision Date: 18 January 2023
• Docket Number: CIVIL 16-2897(RAM)
• Parties: DINO DEMARIO, et al. Plaintiffs v. ANTHONY LAMADRID-MALDONADO, et al. Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

DINO DEMARIO, et al. Plaintiffs
v.
ANTHONY LAMADRID-MALDONADO, et al. Defendants

CIVIL No. 16-2897(RAM)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

January 18, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

RAUL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on co-defendant Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's (“PREPA”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket Nos. 252 and 259-1). Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court GRANTS PREPA's Motion for Summary Judgment at Docket No. 252. (Docket Nos. 264, 265, 275, and 276).

I. BACKGROUND

Dino DeMario and Cheryl Steele (collectively "Plaintiffs") are the parents of the late Nicholas DeMario. (Docket No. 99 ¶¶ 34). On November 1, 2015, Nicholas DeMario was assisting his friends with pushing their vehicle, a Mazda Protege with license plate number 1KG-492, which had suffered a mechanical breakdown on a road in the Municipality of Hormigueros. (“Hormigueros” or the "Municipality"). Id. ¶ 16. Anthony Lamadrid-Maldonado (“Lamadrid”) was driving a Mitsubishi Eclipse with license plate number GLG-

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871 in the same direction. Id. ¶ 17. Lamadrid's Mitsubishi impacted the rear end of the Mazda and Nicholas DeMario was pronounced dead at the scene. Id.

On October 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Lamadrid, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”), the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”), the Municipality, and unnamed insurance companies, seeking emotional damages as well as medical and funeral expenses caused by the loss of their son. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs subsequently filed three (3) amended complaints incorporating as co-defendants various insurance companies. (Docket Nos. 2 ¶ 10; 61 ¶¶ 11-12; 99 ¶ 13).^[1]

Essentially, Plaintiffs assert that the street light poles in the area where accident occurred were not energized. (Docket No. 99 ¶ 26). Plaintiffs further allege that those street light poles were under the jurisdiction, ownership, care, custody and control of PREPA, the PRHTA, and the Municipality. Id. Accordingly, they maintain that said co-defendants negligently failed to maintain the street light poles functional and are thereby liable. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

On January 28, 2019, PREPA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 252). PREPA avers that the highway where the accident occurred corresponded to a construction project titled

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Project AC-200213 (“Project AC-200213” or “Project”). Id. at 3. PREPA maintains it was neither the owner nor the contractor of the Project, and its only duties regarding the same consisted of approving the design of the lighting system and certifying that it was built accordingly. Id. However, PREPA avers Project AC-200213 was never finished nor delivered to PREPA for energization, therefore barring it from liability. Id.

Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to PREPA's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 265). Their main argument is that on June 6, 2006, pursuant to a document titled Notification of the Constitution of Access Easement and Cession of Transfer and Warranty (“Notification of Cession and Transfer”), the PRHTA ceded and transferred the distribution or transmission of Project AC-200213 to PREPA for the conservation and installation of all the posts, structures, and necessary equipment that make up the electrical system of the project. Id. at 5. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges PREPA can be held liable in the case at bar. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs take issue with PREPA's claim that the Project was never energized because the area where the accident occurred had been temporarily illuminated by the PRHTA for the Central American and Caribbean Games of 2010. Id. at 8-9.

Lastly, PREPA replied to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket No. 276). Therein, PREPA highlights that the June 6, 2006 Notification

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of Cession and Transfer provides that it will become effective on the date that PREPA “incorporates and connects the project's distribution and transmission system” to PREPA's electrical grid. Id. at 2. PREPA maintains that the Project was not completed and thus, it was never energized and the cession and transfer from the PRHTA to PREPA never occurred. Id. at 2-3. PREPA re-asserts it is not liable because it neither designed the lighting system nor did it energize it. Id. at 4-5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that (1) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and (2) they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine' if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008). A fact is considered material if it “may potentially ‘affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'” Albite v. Polytechnic Univ. of Puerto Rico, Inc., 5 F.Supp.3d 191, 195 (D.P.R. 2014) (quoting Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-661 (1st Cir. 2000)).

The moving party has “the initial burden of demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with definite and

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competent evidence.” Mercado-Reyes v. City of Angels, Inc., 320 F.Supp. 344, at 347 (D.P.R. 2018) (quotation omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, to present “competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Bautista Cayman Asset Co. v. Terra II MC & P, Inc., 2020 WL 118592, at 6* (quoting Mendez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2005)). A nonmoving party must show “that a trialworthy issue persists.” Paul v. Murphy, 2020 WL 401129, at *3 (1st Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).

While a court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, it will disregard conclusory allegations, unsupported speculation and improbable inferences. See Johnson v. Duxbury, Massachusetts, 931 F.3d 102, 105 (1st Cir. 2019). Moreover, the existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007) (quotation omitted). Hence, a court should review the record in its entirety and refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000).

In this District, summary judgment is also governed by Local Rule 56. See L. CV. R. 56(c). Per this Rule, an opposing party must “admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the

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moving party's statement of material facts.” Id. Furthermore, unless the fact is admitted, the opposing party must support each denial or qualification with a record citation. Id.

Additionally, Local Rule 56(c) allows an opposing party to submit additional facts “in a separate section.” L. CV. R. 56(c). Given that the plain language of Local Rule 56(c) specifically requires that any additional facts be stated in a separate section, parties are prohibited from incorporating numerous additional facts within their opposition. See Natal Perez v. Oriental Bank & Trust, 291 F.Supp.3d 215, 218-219 (D.P.R. 2018) (quoting Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) and Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F.Supp.2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013)).

If a party opposing summary judgment fails to comply with the rigors that Local Rule 56(c) imposes, “a district court is free, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to accept the moving party's facts as stated.” Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, litigants ignore this rule at their peril. See Natal Perez, 291 F.Supp.3d at 219 (citations omitted).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

To make findings of fact, the Court analyzed PREPA's Statement of Uncontested Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 259-1) and Plaintiffs' Opposing Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 264).

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After only crediting material facts that are properly supported by a record citation^[2] and uncontroverted, the Court makes the following findings of fact:^[3]

A. Project AC-20013

1. Project AC-200213 (also referred to as the “Project”) began in 2003 and entailed the construction of an interchange at the intersection of Highways PR-2 and PR-309 and of an overpass at the intersection of Highway PR-2 and PR-319. (Docket No. 259-1 ¶¶ 12, 18).

2. The proposed works for the Project included constructing two prestressed concrete bridges over highways PR-2 and PR-319 as well as drainage, pavement markings, lighting, traffic signs, relocation of PREPA and Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewer Authority ("PRASA") utilities, among other miscellaneous works. Id.

3. The improvements to the existing lighting system consisted of the installation of: (a) forty 40-foot aluminum light poles with double luminary through the central aisle of Highway PR-2; and (b) 104 single-arm posts on the marginal streets and intersections leading into the Municipality of Hormigueros

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(the “Municipality” or “Hormigueros”). (Docket Nos. 259-1 ¶¶ 13-14; 281-1).

4. Project AC-200213 was owned by the PRHTA. (Docket Nos. 281-3 at 1; 184-2 at 2).

5. The Project, which totaled $18,949,884.00, was financed with funds apportioned by the PRHTA. (Docket No. 259-1 ¶¶ 12, 19).

6. The general contractor for the Project was Construcciones Jose Carro. Id. ¶ 16.

7. The Project's designer was CMA Architects & Engineers LLC. Id. ¶ 17.

8. The electrical sub-contractor for Project AC-200213 was Mega Power. Id. ¶ 20.

9. Project AC-200213 includes the area of the accident, which occurred in the vicinity of road PR-309. (Docket Nos. 256-5 at 76; 259-1 ¶ 62).

B. PREPA's relationship to Project AC-20013

10. The stages of PREPA's participation in a project such as Project AC-200213 are the following:

a.

...