Albite v. Polytechnic Univ. of Puerto Rico, Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–2054 (DRD).
• Citation: 5 F.Supp.3d 191
• Parties: Francisco Arencibia ALBITE, et al., Plaintiff(s), v. POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendant(s).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

5 F.Supp.3d 191

Francisco Arencibia ALBITE, et al., Plaintiff(s),

v.POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendant(s).

Civil No. 10–2054 (DRD).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 25, 2014.

Juan P. Rivera–Roman, Juan P. Rivera Roman Law Office, Ponce, PR, for Plaintiff(s).

Marcelle D. Martell, Marcelle D. Martell Jovet Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant(s).

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMINGUEZ, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are: (a) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, Docket No. 51, (b) Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Objections to Defendants Statement of Uncontested Facts, Docket No. 59, and (c) Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 60.¹ For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the complaint as to all federal claims is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 28th, 2010, Plaintiffs Francisco Arencibia–Albite, Carlos Arencibia–Albite, Francisco Arencibia–Albite, AntonioArencibia–Albite, Aurelia Arencibia–Llanes and Lilian–Albite filed the instant employment discrimination suit as successors in interest on behalf of the deceased Francisco Arencibia–Llanes against the Polytechnic University of Puerto Rico, Inc., Mr. José Borrageros, Mr. Roberto Mate, and Insurance Companies A and B under the American Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Further, invoking supplemental jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367, plaintiffs seek relief under Puerto Rico's Public Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 et seq. (“Law 100”), as amended, Public Law Number 80 of May 30, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. § 501 et seq. (“Law 80”) as amended, Public Law Number 115 of December 20, 1991, 29 L.P.R.A. § 194 et seq. (“Law 115”) as amended, and Articles 1802 and 1044 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, see Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs request: (1) a declaratory judgment against defend due to “violations of the Laws of the U.S. and ... Puerto Rico” (2) damages in the amount no less than $700,000.00 each for mental anguish, mental and emotional suffering, distress and loss of company (3) damages for loss of income, back pay front pay and loss of benefits in an amount “no less than $500,000.00” (4) punitive damages, double damages (5) cost of this action and reasonable attorney fees, and (6) prejudgment interests, see Docket No. 29 at 21–22.

On April 30, 2013, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 51, asserting that plaintiffs' allegations failed to sufficiently establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or to adduce to evidence of age-based animus under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Defendants also sustain that plaintiffs cannot prove retaliation as defendants were unaware of Arencibia–Llanes' filing of a discrimination charge with the EEOC until after May 24, 2010, and Arencibia–Llanes continued to receive his full pay and benefits until his passing on August, 2010. Further, defendants allege that a cause of action under the ADEA for Professors Borrageros and Marte must be dismissed as a matter of law, as there is no individual liability under the ADEA. Finally, that the defendants further argue that the contingent claims of Arencibia Llanes' plaintiffs-heirs are based on Puerto Rico law and should be dismissed given their derivative and contingent nature, as Arencibia Llanes has no viable claim for either age discrimination or retaliation under any statute.

The record shows that plaintiff opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment on August 13, 2013, Docket No. 59, as well as their Objections To Defendants Proposed Uncontested Facts filed under Docket No. 60. The Court finds that plaintiffs' opposition and objections are tardy and were filed without leave of Court, disregarding the Court's Order, Docket No. 58, which indicated that if plaintiffs failed to respond to the summary judgment request by July 12, 2013, the matter would be deemed submitted. Notwithstanding, the Court has reviewed plaintiffs' tardy objections, and finds that plaintiffs' objections are either conclusory allegations or fail to substantiate genuine issues as to any material fact. Therefore, plaintiffs' tardy objections will not alter the Court's analysis or the final ruling. The Court is obligated to examine the request for summary judgment on the merits, notwithstanding that plaintiffs proffer may be late and is not considered. de la Vega v. San Juan Star, 377 F.3d 111, 115–116 (1st Cir.2004) (The summary judgment must be considered on the merits not as a sanction “simple because the opposing party failed to comply with a local rule requiring a response within a certain number of days”) (citations omitted).

At the time the alleged pattern of discrimination occurred, Mr. Arencibia–Llanes was sixty seven (67) years of age. Docket No. 29. Arencibia Llanes began working at PUPR as a lecturer in August, 1986, in the Science and Math Department, and became a full time professor in 1989, as well as a faculty member of the Civil engineering Department in August, 1990. See Docket No. 29 paragraph 22.

Professor Marte had been Arencibia–Llanes' immediate supervisor beginning the academic year of 2006, see Docket No. 54–2, Defendants' Exhibit No. 2. On October 30, 2009, during a department examination, an altercation occurred between Prof. Marte and Arencibia–Llanes, see Docket No. 54–2, Deposition of Prof. Marte. This altercation caused Prof. Marte to complain to Prof. Borrageros in a letter dated November 10, 2009. Id.

A meeting was scheduled by Prof. Borrageros for December 3, 2009 at the Human Resources Department. Arencibia–Llanes, however, through a letter prepared by his Counsel Mariela Maestre–Cordero cancelled said meeting, alleging irregularities with regards to procedure, see Docket No. 61–5, and Docket No. 62–5.

On March, 2010, complaints by students were lodged against Arencibia–Llanes, including from having lost their projects and tests to failure to correct their examination, Docket No. 54–1. On March 11, 2010, Dr. Carlos González, Dean of the School of Engineering, verbally informed Arencibia–Llanes that he would not be providing his courses during the Spring Semester, and directed Arencibia–Llanes to focus instead on attending the student complaints. Nonetheless, Arencibia Llanes was paid in full in the regular course of business, see Docket No. 54–3, and Docket No. 62–5.

On March 2013, 2010, Arencibia–Llanes wrote to Dr. Miguel Riestra, the University's Vice President, as to his perceived suspension and the process involved, Docket No. 62–3. Arencibia Llanes was informed of the need to resolve the formal student complaints against him, Docket No. 54–3. On March 30, 2013, Dr. González provided Arencibia–Llanes a large number of student complaints that were to be addressed by Arencibia–Llanes separately and individually.

On May 17, 2010, Arencibia–Llanes filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging age discrimination. In support of his contention, the charge states that the discriminatory pattern of conduct commenced on March 11, 2010, with the most recent being April 8, 2010. See Docket No. 54–4, Charge of Discrimination, and the Second Amended Complaint, Docket No. 29, ¶ 50. PUPR received a copy of same from the EEOC on May 24, 2011. See Docket No. 54–5, Notice of Charge of Discrimination.

Professor Francisco Arencibia Llanes passed away on August 7, 2010, Docket No. 29. At that time Arencibia Llanes was still employed by PUPR. The Court considers these facts and those in the record in assessing defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Summary Judgment Standard

The principle of the summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). Motions of Summary Judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”), which provides that a judgment may be entered when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.” Thompson v. Coca–Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir.2008); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Facts are considered material if they may potentially “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660–661 (1st Cir.2000). The moving party carries the burden of proving both of these elements. Vega–Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico, 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir.1997).

Where there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it is up to the non-moving party to prove that a trier of fact could reasonably find in his or her favor. Mendez–Martinez v. Caribbean Alliance Ins. Co., 851 F.Supp.2d 336, 342 (D.P.R.2012) (citing DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986)). The court may enter summary judgment if the court examines the record and finds no genuine issue as to any material fact after viewing it in the light most favorable for the non-movant, and indulges in all reasonable references in that party's favor. Pérez v. Saint John's Sch., 814 F.Supp.2d 102 (D.P.R.2011). The record must be reviewed as a whole, and the Court may not engage in assessments of weight or credibility. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147...