DeMarrias v. United States

Docket Number1:22-CV-1003-CBK
Decision Date18 March 2022
PartiesTHOMAS DION DEMARRIAS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHARLES B. KORNMANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Thomas DeMarrias ("petitioner") motions this Court to vacate and set aside his two federal convictions for which he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. Doc. 1. Petitioner, who is currently confined at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, pleaded guilty to Abusive Sexual Contact (18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(1), 2246(3)) and Felony Child Abuse (18 U.S.C § 1153, and SDCL §§ 26-8A-2, 26-10-1) and was sentenced on November 4, 2019, to 120 months custody for each sentence, with the two counts to run consecutively. See 1:18-CR-10019-CBK-l ("Original Proceeding"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence on November 4, 2020. See United States v. DeMarrias, 833 Fed.Appx. 30 (8th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). The mandate issued on November 25 2020. Original Proceeding, doc. 113.1 have conducted an initial review of the motion pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings.

Mr DeMarrias now contends that his guilty pleas were not in fact knowing and voluntary because of ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial proceedings. Additionally, petitioner couches a brief argument under the banner of "actual innocence," yet not explaining whether he means to use actual innocence as a gateway to plead procedurally defaulted claims that would otherwise be blocked before this Court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), or rather a freestanding innocence claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Both sets of arguments are addressed.

I. BACKGROUND

The underlying facts behind petitioner's guilty pleas stretch to the outer limits of mankind's cruelty. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit referred to these circumstances as "horrific." DeMarrias, 833 Fed.Appx. at 31. For approximately four years, DeMarrias "psychologically, sexually, and physically abused his two minor stepdaughters." Id. To somehow make matters even worse, these two girls were only four and eight-years-old when the abuse began.[1] This abuse was not one-off events; rather, it would take place "on average four times a day five days a week." Id. Making a mockery of contract law, DeMarrias forced his three young stepchildren to sign "contracts" which would "govern" what would happen if they got into trouble. Id. One example included "requiring] a child who got into trouble to pick one of their siblings to receive a beating. "If the child was unwilling or emotionally unable to pick a sibling to be beaten - (which was usually the case) -DeMarrias would beat all three." Id. Petitioner also would force the children to brawl against each other, which one child opined were attempts to try and drive wedges between the children.

This matter was raised to law enforcement back in January 2012 when the victims' mother, Ms. Chantel Brant, caught DeMarrias laying on her daughter M.M.B's bed. Petitioner was masturbating while holding M.M.B's underwear next to his mouth and nose. DeMarrias was promptly kicked out of the home and Brant called the police. After fleeing their home in Rehab Village on the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in South Dakota and eventually residing in Mitchell, South Dakota, M.M.B. began unraveling the horrors she endured. Not only was she physically abused, but also molested throughout her childhood from individuals besides DeMarrias, such as her grandfather's brother who began sexually abusing the young girl when she was only in kindergarten. Other individuals included her grandfather, Mr. Roland Brant, as well as the defendant.

To take just one example of how DeMarrias treated M.M.B.: the young girl was forced to watch pornography with him, stating that this is what happens to nasty girls who wear short skirts. When it came to their physical abuse, M.M.B. and her sister M J.D. would have to "choose" if they would want the beating to be from a hanger or a belt covered in metal studs. No. place was safe in the household. Not only would DeMarrias sexually abuse M.M.B. (and be upset if she showed clear signs of pain) by inserting his fingers into her vagina when she was alone, but also watch her shower through a hole in the bathroom wall. Not content with being the only cause of sexual trauma, DeMarrias even forced M.M.B. and M.J.D. to touch each other sexually while taking a shower, with threats of beatings if they did not comply. And, venturing far beyond the civilized mind, DeMarrias even forced M.M.B. - at 10 or 11-years-old to put a nail into her own anus.

M.M.B. was not alone in the abuse. In addition to the constant beatings with the hangar and belt, M.J.D. recalls how the petitioner would order her to lay on the bed but not fall asleep. Eventually, though, once M.J.D. did slip into unconsciousness she would be awoken by the enraged DeMarrias punishing her with further beatings, from which he took pleasure inflicting. To call these actions depraved would be a gross understatement. Tragically, this is not even the end of this house of horrors.

M.J.D. reported how petitioner would place tacks around her bed while she was sleeping. Why? So she would step on them when getting out of bed. Once M.J.D. was given a jelly donut. She decided that she did not like the filling. So, she squeezed the jelly filling into a soiled diaper in their garbage and thought that would be the end of this particular story. But she lived with DeMarrias, a man seemingly bent on causing as much pain and horror as he could. Taken it as a personal afront, the petitioner forced M.J.D. to retrieve the diaper and eat the jelly out of it, one of the many acts in which he delighted.

These children are survivors. They endured day after agonizing day confined to a "prison" with a cruel and inhumane warden, a man committed to causing unspeakable pain. This was from physical torment to sexual trauma to forcing children to fight and molest each other; these young girls endured more than any person should in a lifetime, let alone as children. This Court has presided over the darkest acts man can cause against another, but the actions underlying DeMarrias' two guilty pleas remain among the worst.

"The right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system." Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012). All defendants are owed meaningful representation, and as this Memorandum and Order explains, Mr. DeMarrias was awarded constitutionally sound trial counsel when he pleaded guilty to these two counts.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. Standard of Review

To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-prong test must be met. Mr. DeMarrias must show that his trial counsel's performance '"was deficient and that [he] suffered prejudice as a result.'" O'Neil v. United States, 966 F.3d 764, 770 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. United States, 762 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2014). See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). The petitioner must prove prejudice by showing '"that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Donelson v. Steele, 16 F.4th 559, 570 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the context of a guilty plea, petitioner must show that '"but for counsel's errors, [DeMarrias] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" United States v. Sisk, 999 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 643 F.3d 639, 642 (8th Cir. 2011)). The heavy burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel is on the petitioner. Langford v. United States, 993 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2021); Golinveaux v. United States. 915 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2019). "The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry. 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003).

2. Trial Counsel was Not Constitutionally Defective

Petitioner contends he would not have pleaded guilty if he had effective counsel.

Specifically, DeMarrias argues constitutionally sound trial counsel must have sought expert testimony concerning purportedly unfounded and false abuse allegations raised against him, and with such assistance he would not have pleaded guilty. Mr. DeMarrias is now contending, for the first time, that his plea could not have been given knowingly and voluntarily because trial counsel supposedly "pressured him into taking the plea deal even though [petitioner] continued to assert his innocence." Memorandum in Support of Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate and Set Aside Conviction, doc. 3 at 5.

Because any concerns of whether DeMarrias' guilty plea was knowing and voluntary were assuaged in his prior exchanges with the Court, such allegations hold no merit.

Petitioner's waiver of his Constitutional right to insist the charges against him be tried to a jury can only be waived by a guilty plea if it was done "knowingly and voluntarily." United States v. Grady, 931 F.3d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). The United States Supreme Court has set forth the standard as to voluntariness:

A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT