Langford v. United States

• Decision Date: 07 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-3541,19-3541
• Parties: Benjamin Joseph LANGFORD, Petitioner - Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

993 F.3d 633

Benjamin Joseph LANGFORD, Petitioner - Appellant

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent - Appellee

No. 19-3541

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 13, 2021

Filed: April 7, 2021

Nova D. Janssen, Federal Public Defender's Office, Southern District of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Benjamin Joseph Langford, Terre Haute, IN, Pro Se.

Clifford R. Cronk, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Davenport, IA, Kyle J. Essley, U.S. Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Benjamin Joseph Langford moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his concurrent life sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1) and 3559(c)(1). The district court¹ denied his request to vacate the sentence under section 3559, determining that his prior Iowa robbery convictions were serious violent felonies. Langford appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(d) and 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Langford was convicted of bank robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and felon-in-possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) , 924(c) , 922(g)(1) . He had three prior convictions in Iowa state court: attempted breaking and entering in 1974, robbery with aggravation in 1975, and first-degree robbery in 1989. See Iowa Code §§ 708.10 (1973), 711.2 (1975), 711.2 (1987).

On January 7, 2005, the sentencing court² imposed a mandatory life sentence for the bank robbery conviction, ruling that it was a "serious violent felony" and that Langford had at least two prior "serious violent felony" convictions. § 3559(c)(1) (also called the "Three-Strikes Law"). A conviction is a "serious violent felony" if it is at least one of three types:

• it is "a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of ... robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118 )" [the enumerated-offense clause];

• it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" [the force clause];

• it "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense" [the residual clause].

§ 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) , (ii) (brackets added). The sentencing court did not specify whether the prior convictions were under section 3559 ’s enumerated-offense, force, or residual clauses.

The sentencing court also imposed a concurrent life sentence for the felon-in-possession conviction, determining that the three prior convictions were violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See § 924(e)(1) . A "violent felony" is:

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another (the elements clause or force clause); (2) is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives (the enumerated-offenses clause); or (3) otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another (the residual clause).

Dembry v. United States , 914 F.3d 1185, 1186 n.2 (8th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted), quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) , (ii) . The sentencing court did not specify whether the prior convictions were under the ACCA's enumerated-offense, force, or residual clauses.

On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and sentences. See United States v. Langford , 155 Fed. Appx. 936 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), cert. denied , 547 U.S. 1011, 126 S.Ct. 1483, 164 L.Ed.2d 261 (2006).

In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 606, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (holding that the ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague). The Court later held that Johnson ’s rule applies retroactively on collateral review. Welch v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016).

In 2016, Langford moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his life sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (authorizing collateral attack "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, ... or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack") (alteration added). He argued that the prior Iowa convictions were necessarily based on the ACCA's unconstitutional residual clause and on section 3559 ’s residual clause.

The district court agreed in part. It vacated the life sentence under the ACCA, ruling that the first-degree robbery and breaking-and-entering convictions were necessarily (and unconstitutionally) based on the residual clause.

The court did not vacate the mandatory life sentence under section 3559. Applying Johnson , it ruled that section 3559 ’s residual clause is unconstitutional. The life sentence, however, survived because the sentencing court did not necessarily rely on that clause. Rather, the district court said, the prior aggravated robbery and first-degree robbery convictions were serious violent felonies under section 3559 ’s enumerated-offense clause (and the aggravated robbery conviction was also a serious violent felony under the force clause).

Langford appeals the district court's ruling that the prior robbery convictions are serious violent felonies under section 3559.

II.

According to Langford, the prior robbery convictions are necessarily based on section 3559 ’s residual clause. He asserts that the residual clause is unconstitutional, and thus the mandatory life sentence is invalid. See Johnson , 576 U.S. at 606, 135 S.Ct. 2551. The Government agrees that the residual clause in section 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague, but counters that the convictions are serious violent felonies based on section 3559 ’s enumerated-offense and force clauses.

This court reviews de novo the denial of a section 2255 motion, and for clear error any findings of fact. Walker v. United States , 900 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); Garcia-Hernandez v. United States , 915 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The movant "bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to relief under § 2255." Walker , 900 F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted).

Whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause is "a factual question for the district court." Id. (analyzing an ACCA enhancement) (citation omitted). Langford must show "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the residual clause led the sentencing court to apply the enhancement. Id. The "mere possibility" that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause is "insufficient to satisfy this burden." Id. If it is "just as likely that the sentencing court relied on the [force] or enumerated offenses clause, solely or as an alternative basis for the enhancement, then the movant has failed to show that his enhancement was due to use of the residual clause." Id. (alteration added) (citation omitted). To be invalidated, the enhancement must be "necessarily based on the residual clause." Id.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that the record does not show which clause the sentencing court used to enhance Langford's sentence. If the record is inconclusive, "the district court may consider ‘the relevant background legal environment at the time of ... sentencing’ to ascertain whether the movant was sentenced under the residual clause." Id. (alteration in original), quoting United States v. Washington , 890 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2018). This analysis is a "snapshot" of "what the controlling law was at the time of sentencing ." Id. (emphasis added), quoting United States v. Snyder , 871 F.3d 1122, 1129 (10th Cir. 2017).

In 2005, this court used the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction fell within the enumerated-offense clause. See Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 598–602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (considering an ACCA enhancement). A state conviction falls within the enumerated-offense clause if it has the "basic elements" of an offense enumerated in section 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). See id. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Under this approach, the sentencing court normally may not delve into particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction, requiring it to "look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense." Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.

III.

According to Langford, the aggravated robbery and first-degree robbery convictions are not enumerated offenses under section 3559. Section 3559 enumerates "robbery"—"as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118," by "whatever designation and wherever committed"—as a serious violent felony. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) .

Langford asserts that the convictions, though labeled "robbery," are not enumerated offenses because they are not similar to robbery as described in sections 2111, 2113, or 2118. Those sections criminalize robbery within the United States’ special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 2111 ; bank robbery and incidental crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 ; or robbery and burglary involving controlled substances, 18 U.S.C. § 2118 . Each requires as elements: the taking or attempted taking of anything of value, "from the person or presence of another," by "force and violence, or by intimidation." §§ 2111 , 2113 . See also § 2118 . "Intimidation means the threat of force." United States v. Harper , 869 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that section 2113 robbery is a "crime of violence"), quoting United States v. Wright , 957 F.2d 520, 521 (8th Cir. 1992).

To be a section 3559 enumerated offense, it is not necessary for "every detail of the federal offense, including its jurisdictional elements," to be "replicated in the state offense." United States v. Johnson , 915 F.3d 223, 229 (4th...