DeMassa v. Nunez
Decision Date | 06 December 1984 |
Docket Number | Nos. 83-6271,83-6363 and 83-6470,s. 83-6271 |
Parties | Philip A. DeMASSA, Robert Kent Lahodny, Robert Marceron, and Marie D. Carlile and Sonny Barger, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Peter NUNEZ, Stephen W. Peterson, Ronald Dulisse, John Rafenstein, James Conklin, Carl Oroz, Lawrence McKinney, Norman Catalano, Paul Duvall, David McGregor, and Diogenes K. Galanos, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants. . Petition for Rehearing Filed |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Law Offices of Barry Tarlow, Barry Tarlow, Thomas V. Johnston, Los Angeles, Cal., for Marceron, Carlile & Barger.
Sheldon Sherman, Pancer & Sherman, San Diego, Cal., amicus curiae for Guerra, Johnson, Otero, Davis, III, Thallas & other clients of Philip DeMassa.
O. Donnell & Gordon, Jeffrey S. Gordon, Josephine E. Powe, Jan B. Norman, Los Angeles, Cal., for Nat'l Asso. of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al.
Peter K. Nunez, U.S. Atty., John R. Neece, Bruce R. Castetter, Roger W. Haines, Jr., Herbert B. Hoffman, Asst. U.S. Attys., San Diego, Cal., for defendants/appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before ANDERSON, TANG and FERGUSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Philip A. DeMassa's petition for rehearing from this court's decision in DeMassa v. Nunez, 747 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1984), is denied.
The petition for rehearing as to appellants Robert Kent Lahodny, Robert Marceron, Marie D. Carlile and Sonny Barger is granted and the cause is remanded to the district court to determine whether these plaintiffs are entitled to relief to vindicate personal rights separable and apart from the rights of Philip A. DeMassa. The district court erred by failing to recognize that these plaintiffs had rights apart from the Fourth Amendment rights of plaintiff DeMassa. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 998 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966-67, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) ). The district court effectively granted these plaintiffs partial relief by enjoining the government search while denying them relief in the form of a return of property without recognizing the legal basis for the disposition of their Fourth Amendment claims. These clients, who are strangers to any potential indictments may appeal this error in the district court's decision to grant the injunction. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 82 S.Ct. 654, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962).
We hold that clients of an attorney maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in their client files.
These clients' right to seek relief depends on whether the expectation of privacy in their attorney's files involving their personal legal matters "is the kind of expectation that 'society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." ' " Hudson v. Palmer, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See also New Jersey v. TLO, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court held: "Legitimation of expections of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 431 n. 12. The clients have such a source in federal and state statutes, in codes of professional responsibility, under common law, and in the United States Constitution.
It is axiomatic that the attorney-client privilege confers upon the client an expectation of privacy in his or her confidential communications with the attorney. Neither the State of California, where the search took place, Congress nor the federal courts dispute this hornbook rule. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 774-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 849, 100 S.Ct. 99, 62 L.Ed.2d 64 (1979); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir.1978) (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2292 (McNaughton Rev.1961)); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 326, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971); Cal.Evid.Code Secs. 952, 954; Fed.R.Evid. 501 ( ). In fact, courts and legislatures explicitly espouse this axiom. Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960-61 (3rd Cir.1984) ( ); United States v. Medows, 540 F.Supp. 490, 499 n. 35 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (); Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo.1982) (); Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000aa-11(a)(3) ( ).
Constitutional guarantees also support the legitimacy of the clients' expectation of privacy in this case. To the extent that the right to effective assistance of counsel in a separate criminal case is at stake, the Sixth Amendment provides an additional "source" and "understanding" of this expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ( ); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) ( ). Because the Fifth Amendment's protection against testimonial self-incrimination may be threatened by the act of disclosure of legal files, that constitutional guarantee also supports the clients' legitimate expectations of privacy. See United States v. Terry, 759 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.1985) () (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 754 F.2d 918, 920 (11th Cir.1985)).
The expectation of privacy in an attorney's client files thus has roots in federal and state statutory and common law and in the United States Constitution, among other sources. Indeed, there is no body of law or recognized source of professional ethics in which this "source" or "understanding" is lacking.
The government's arguments to the contrary are invalid. The government insists that the thing in which the clients must have an expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge the search is the entire law office--"the premises." Finding no such expectation, they conclude that appellants may not challenge the search. DeMassa's clients do not, however, seek the return of DeMassa's premises. They seek the return of their personal client files and they seek to preserve the integrity of those files by enjoining any further search. Thus, the only thing in which they assert a legitimate expectation of privacy are the files themselves.
The government then claims, without citation, that these appellants had no possessory or ownership interest in their files. Aside from the doubtful validity of this proposition (see Kallen v. Delug, 157 Cal.App.3d 940, 951, 203 Cal.Rptr. 879, 885 (1984) ( )); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 ( )), it is clear that neither ownership nor possession is a necessary or sufficient determinant of the legitimacy of one's expectation of privacy. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561-62, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,...
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