Dembry v. Trate
| Decision Date | 25 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-38 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | EDWARD KEITH DEMBRY, Petitioner v. WARDEN TRATE, Respondent |
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by federal prisoner Edward Keith Dembry1 (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On May 24, 2007, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (the "sentencing court") convicted Petitioner of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See ECF No. 16-1. On November 5, 2007, the sentencing court sentenced Petitioner to a term of incarceration of 265 months followed by three years of supervised release. Id. In so doing, the sentencing court determined that Petitioner's three prior robbery convictions and prior felony drunk driving convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See ECF No. 16-2.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit arguing, inter alia, that his classification as an armed career criminal (and, therefore, his enhanced sentence) unreasonably overstated the severity of his criminal history and that his drunk driving offenses no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). ECF No. 16-2. Although the Court of Appeals agreed with Petitioner's interpretation of Begay, it ultimately affirmed the sentencing court's sentence after concluding that the sentence was reasonable "under all the circumstances" given Petitioner's lack of remorse and lengthy criminal history. United States v. Dembry, 535 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2008).
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion with the trial court to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See ECF No. 16-3. Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the sentencing court "erred by using an uncounseled prior conviction and other prior convictions that did not meet the criteria to sentence petitioner under the [ACCA]" to enhance his sentence. Id. The sentencing court rejected both arguments and denied relief, noting that the Eighth Circuit had already affirmed the sentencing court's conclusion that Petitioner's prior robbery convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the ACCA. ECF No. 16-4. The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner's subsequent request for a Certificate of Appealability [ECF No. 16-6] and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.
On June 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief of Judgment in the sentencing court pursuant to Rule 60(a), asking the sentencing court to "correct its findings of fact relating to whether his prior convictions used to enhance his sentence were obtained in proceedings in which he was represented by counsel." ECF No. 16-5. The sentencing court denied Petitioner's motion, noting that it appeared to be a second or successive attempt to seek relief pursuant to 28U.S.C. 2255 and explaining that Petitioner must first seek permission from the Eighth Circuit before filing such a motion. ECF No. 16-6.2
On August 24, 2011, Petitioner, while incarcerated in Terre Haute, Indiana, filed a Petition for Habeas Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. See ECF No. 16-7. As in his prior § 2255 motions, Petitioner again argued that one of his prior convictions had been uncounseled and that his sentence was therefore unconstitutional. Id. The court denied relief after determining that his claim had already been presented to the sentencing court in a § 2255 petition and that Petitioner had not offered any grounds to suggest that "a different resolution - or even further adjudication - [was] now warranted." Id.
Almost eight years later, Petitioner filed the instant writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, continuing to assert his claim that the sentencing court erred in classifying him as an armed career criminal offender under the ACCA because one of his predicate robbery offenses had been uncounseled. ECF No. at 6-8. As relief, Petitioner seeks an order vacating his original sentence and directing Respondent to release him from custody. In response, Respondent maintains that Petitioner's petition must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 16. This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
For federal prisoners, "[t]he 'core' habeas corpus action is a prisoner challenging the authority of the entity detaining him to do so, usually on the ground that his predicate sentence orconviction is improper or invalid." McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535-38 (3d Cir. 2012). "Two federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2255, confer federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by federal inmates." Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535. Section 2255 motions must be filed in the federal district court that imposed the conviction and sentence the prisoner is challenging. 28 U.SC. § 2255(a). In contrast, a habeas corpus action pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the custodial court - i.e., the federal district court in the district in which the prisoner is incarcerated. Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017).3
Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners may challenge the validity of their conviction or sentence on collateral review. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). By enacting § 2255, Congress provided "[a] new remedial mechanism" to "replace[] traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners (at least in the first instance) with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was, inter alia, imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute's "sole purpose was tominimize the difficulties encountered in [traditional] habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum." Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219; see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 428 n.5 (1962). Thus, "a federal prisoner's first (and most often only) route for collateral review of his conviction or sentence is under § 2255." Bruce, 868 F.3d at 178.
As for § 2241, that statute "confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence." Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added); Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005) (). Two types of claims may ordinarily be litigated in a § 2241 proceeding. First, a prisoner may challenge conduct undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP") that affects the duration of his custody. For example, a prisoner can challenge the manner in which the BOP is computing his federal sentence, see, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990), or the constitutionality of a BOP disciplinary action that resulted in the loss of good conduct sentencing credits, Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). Secondly, a prisoner can challenge BOP conduct that "conflict[s] with express statements in the applicable sentencing judgment." Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243. The prisoner must "allege that [the] BOP's conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment." Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536-37 () (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Petitioner's claims in the instant § 2241 action do not fall into either of these categories. Rather than attacking the execution of his sentence, Petitioner contends that a statutory enhancement was unconstitutionally applied to his sentence by the sentencing court. As recounted above, § 2255 ordinarily prohibits a court from entertaining a § 2241 petition filed by a federal prisoner challenging the validity of his underlying conviction or sentence. There is, however, one important statutory exception: where it "appears that the remedy by [§ 2255 motion] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). This provision, commonly referred to as § 2255's "savings clause," forms the lone potential basis for Petitioner's claims in the instant case. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174, 178-79.
Since the amendments to AEDPA were enacted in 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has only recognized one circumstance in which § 2255's remedy has been deemed "inadequate or ineffective": when a prisoner "had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may negate." In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). In Dorsainvil, the inmate-petitioner, Ocsulis Dorsainvil, had been convicted of using a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) despite the fact that he did not "use" the gun; it was merely present in the car from which the drugs were sold. After Dorsainvil had already litigated his initial (unsuccessful) § 2255 motion, the United States Supreme Court decided ...
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