Dement v. Dekalb County
| Decision Date | 07 February 1896 |
| Citation | 25 S.E. 382,97 Ga. 733 |
| Parties | DEMENT v. DEKALB COUNTY |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where an action for damages to realty was brought against a county within 12 months from the time the claim for such damages arose, the plaintiff's action was not barred because he failed, before bringing the action, to present such claim to the proper county authorities. The bringing of the suit within the time limited was a sufficient presentation of the claim, within the meaning of section 507 of the Code.
Error from superior court, Dekalb county; R. H. Clark, Judge.
Action by Albert Dement against Dekalb county. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
John C Reed and H. B. Moss, for plaintiff in error.
John S Candler, for defendant in error.
Dement brought an action against the county of Dekalb for damages to certain realty, alleged to have been occasioned in the manner set forth in his declaration, the particulars of which are immaterial. He did not, before bringing the action, present any claim to the county commissioners or other county authorities, but his declaration was filed within 12 months from the time his claim for damages arose. The question is Was the bringing of the suit, as stated, a sufficient presentation of the claim, within the meaning of section 507 of the Code, which provides that "all claims against counties must be presented within twelve months after they accrue or become payable, or the same are barred," except in the case of minors, etc.? The cases of Powell v. Muscogee Co., 71 Ga. 587, Murphey v. Educational Board of Burke Co., Id. 856, and Maddox v Randolph Co., 65 Ga. 216, are not in point, because they relate to actions commenced after the expiration of the 12 months, with no previous presentation of the claim. In fact, the identical question now under consideration has never, so far as we have been able to ascertain, been definitely decided by this court. Section 491 of the Code declares, without qualification, that every county may be sued in any court. Section 506 makes it the duty of the ordinaries to audit all claims against their respective counties, which duty, of course, would devolve upon officials who, by operation of law, took the place of the ordinary in managing the county's affairs; as, for instance, where the ordinary is superseded as to these matters by a board of county commissioners, as in the present case. The material portion of section 507 has already been quoted. It will be observed that this latter section was a part of our law a very long time before the provisions of section 506 () constituted a part of the Code. The requirement that all claims shall be presented within 12 months, or else be barred, was made without imposing upon the claimant any burden whatever with respect to the auditing of the same by the county officials. All he had to do was to present his claim within the 12 months prescribed by law. The subsequent act of 1871 merely directed the county officials as to what they should do with such claims when presented, and in no way sought to change the pre-existing law as contained in section 507, or to impose upon c...
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