Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F.
Decision Date | 12 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. CV–15–0274–PR.,CV–15–0274–PR. |
Citation | 365 P.3d 353 |
Parties | DEMETRIUS L., Appellant, v. JOSHLYNN F., D.L., Appellees. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Ronald S. Gilleo, Mohave County Legal Defender, Eric Devany (argued), Deputy Legal Defender, Kingman, Attorneys for Demetrius L.
Chad Joshua Winger (argued), Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff, Attorneys for Joshlynn F.
¶ 1 We hold that in a private proceeding to sever parental rights, just as in state-initiated proceedings, a juvenile court may conclude that a proposed adoption benefits the child and supports a finding that severance is in the child's best interests.
¶ 2 Joshlynn F. ("Mother") filed this action to terminate the parental rights of the biological father, Demetrius L. ("Father"), to their now 9–year old child, D.L. We view the facts, which here are largely undisputed, in a light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's findings. In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty., Juv. Action No. JS–8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 106, 876 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1994).
¶ 3 Mother and Father never married but lived together for about three years after D.L.'s birth in September 2006. Their relationship ended in 2009, and Father moved to California while Mother and D.L. remained in Arizona. Thereafter, the parties had an informal visitation schedule for Father's in-person contact with D.L., but Father's visits ended in August 2010, after Father threatened Mother.
¶ 4 Over the next several years, Father had no contact with D.L. other than an unpleasant encounter in Nevada in November 2013, when Father's family members punched Mother in D.L.'s presence. After August 2010, Father provided no child support and, except for one gift delivered by a family member, sent no gifts, cards, or letters to D.L.
¶ 5 Mother married in 2011, and D.L. and Mother's four other children live with Mother and her husband ("Stepfather"). Stepfather has known D.L. for about six years, has a close and loving relationship with D.L., and wants to adopt him. Stepfather views and treats D.L. as his son and would "love for him to have a father." According to Mother, D.L. is terrified of Father's family and also is afraid of Father.
¶ 6 Mother petitioned to sever Father's rights on the ground of abandonment. After a contested severance hearing in December 2014, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned D.L., A.R.S. §§ 8–531(1), –533(B)(1), and found by a preponderance of the evidence that severance was in D.L.'s best interests, A.R.S. § 8–533(B). The court noted that D.L. "is adoptable" and may achieve "stability and permanence" in his Mother's and Stepfather's household. The court therefore granted Mother's petition.
Id. The court of appeals did not address Father's challenge to the juvenile court's finding of abandonment.
¶ 8 We granted review to address whether the court of appeals erred in relying on Jose M. to overturn the juvenile court's finding of best interests. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
¶ 9 Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court's findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250 ¶ 20, 995 P.2d 682, 686 (2000) ; JS–8490, 179 Ariz. at 107, 876 P.2d at 1142. Here, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in D.L.'s best interests, and the court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise based on Jose M.
¶ 10 Like this case, Jose M. involved a private severance action in which the mother successfully petitioned to terminate the father's parental rights to their child, S.M., on the ground of abandonment. 234 Ariz. at 14–15 ¶¶ 1–3, 316 P.3d at 603–04. The court of appeals vacated the juvenile court's finding of abandonment and remanded "for a redetermination of that issue." Id. at 17 ¶ 19, 316 P.3d at 606. Though stating that its resolution of the abandonment issue "renders moot whether the juvenile court erred by finding that severance is in the best interests of the child[,]" id. at ¶ 20, the court of appeals nonetheless addressed that issue and overturned the best-interests finding. Id. at 17–18 ¶ 23, 316 P.3d at 606–07.
¶ 11 In Jose M., S.M. resided with the mother and her fiancé, who "apparently would like to adopt" the child. Id. at 15 ¶ 8, 316 P.3d at 604. Distinguishing state-initiated severance actions in which a child is in foster care, the court of appeals observed that S.M.'s current "living arrangement already offers stability and permanence," and "there is no suggestion that any day-to-day aspect" of that arrangement would change if the father's rights were severed. Id. at 18 ¶ 23, 316 P.3d at 607. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that the mother's "stated intent to marry fiancé on some undetermined future date, and fiancé's interest in adopting S.M., without more, do not establish an increase in stability and permanency for S.M. to the degree necessary to demonstrate a benefit warranting severance of Father's parental rights." Id.
¶ 12 Arizona case law involving state-initiated severance actions indicates that "[t]he best interest requirement may be met if ... the petitioner proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child, or even that the child is adoptable." Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50 ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App.2004) (citations omitted); see also Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377 ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App.1998) ( ). When a current placement meets the child's needs and the child's prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child's best interests. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50–51 ¶¶ 19–21, 83 P.3d at 50–51 ; Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 378 ¶ 6, 982 P.2d at 1292.
¶ 13 In both Jose M. and this case, the court of appeals applied a more onerous standard for establishing best interests in a private severance proceeding than that applied in a state-initiated proceeding. But we find no principled reason for creating an additional hurdle in private severance actions, particularly when the governing statute does not support that distinction or require the unspecified something "more" that Jose M. apparently calls for. 234 Ariz. at 18 ¶ 23, 316 P.3d at 607 ; see A.R.S. § 8–533(A), (B) ( ). There is no legal basis for placing more or less weight on the benefits from adoption depending on the identity of the petitioning party. Rather, juvenile courts must assess the relevant facts in determining on a case-by-case basis whether a preponderance of the evidence supports a best-interests finding.
¶ 14 Of course, a court need not automatically conclude that severance is in a child's best interests just because the child is adoptable; there may be other circumstances indicating that severance is not the best option. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587 ¶ 8, 588 ¶ 11, 177 P.3d 327, 329, 330 (App.2008). Nor can we "assume that a child will benefit from a termination simply because he has been abandoned." In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS–500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5–6, 804 P.2d 730, 734–35 (1990).
¶ 15 "In a best interests inquiry, however, we can presume that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 35, 110 P.3d 1013, 1020 (2005) ; see also In re Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS–6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559, 748 P.2d 785, 788 (App.1988) ( ). Once a juvenile court finds that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to the child's interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31, 287 ¶ 37, 110 P.3d at 1019, 1021. Thus, in considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent's "diluted" interest ...
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