Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep
| Decision Date | 28 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 54538,54538 |
| Citation | 652 P.2d 271,1982 OK 106 |
| Parties | DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF OKLAHOMA; et al., Petitioners, v. Reverend Wendell R. ESTEP et al., Respondents, v. REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE, et al., Intervenors. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Original proceeding for a Prerogative Writ.
The Democratic Party of Oklahoma seeks to compel respondents' performance of duties prescribed by the Oklahoma Campaign Finance Act and to declare ineffective an Attorney's General opinion which invalidates those provisions of the Act which authorize distribution of certain public funds to eligible candidates for public office and to recognized political parties.
JURISDICTION ASSUMED, WRIT DENIED.
Carl Hughes, Hughes, Nelson, Blessington & Holden, Oklahoma City, for petitioners.
Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Barry Albert, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for respondents.
Stephen Jones, Gen. Counsel, Republican State Committee, J. Craig Dodd, Atty. for Republican State Committee, Jones & Gungoll, Oklahoma City, for intervenors.
This original proceeding tenders for judicial testing the constitutional validity of the Oklahoma Campaign Finance Act [Act]. 1 Important first-impression questions are presented as to the legality of public subsidy for campaign-related activities of candidates and their parties. The issue for decision is whether it is constitutionally permissible to use public funds in payment for campaign-related expenses of candidates for public office and of political parties. We find the controversy over this issue lacks justiciability because the Act is devoid of an articulate pronouncement of legislative policy that embodies standards or guidelines capable of administrative implementation.
Petitioners [Democratic Party of Oklahoma and certain of its officials and members] bring this proceeding to compel respondents' performance of their statutory duties under the Act and to declare ineffective an Attorney's General opinion which invalidates vital portions of the Act. The respondents are members of the Campaign Commission [Commission] created by the Act and certain other state officials who stand charged with various duties to be performed under its terms. The Republican State Committee of Oklahoma was allowed to intervene in the case.
The controversy before us had its genesis in an Attorney's General opinion by which funding provisions of the Act were found to be violative of our fundamental law that prohibits gifts of public funds to private entities for a nonpublic purpose. 2
In this opinion we (1) outline the salient terms of the Act, (2) evaluate the petitioners' legal standing to raise issues sought to be litigated, (3) comment on the Attorney's General opinion and issues dealt with in it and (4) conclude that absent an articulately declared legislative policy with standards or guidelines that can be implemented lawfully by an administrative agency, the case presents no justiciable issues for our review of the Act's constitutionality.
The Act, passed by the 1979 legislature, has as its ultimate objective the distribution of public money to (a) the nominees of recognized political parties and to independent candidates for eight statewide offices and to (b) the recognized political parties in the State. Pertinent provisions of the Act are:
1. A campaign finance fund is to be created from funds collected by the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Any person whose state income tax liability for any taxable year is one dollar or more may designate one dollar of his total liability for transfer to the fund. 3
2. A Campaign Commission is to be created and given power to enact all necessary rules for implementation of the Act. The Commission is given authority to define those campaign expenses for which the fund may be used and to provide for proper accounting procedures. 4 Any person expending public money from the fund in violation of Commission rules may be prosecuted for the commission of a felony. 5
3. The Act provides for (1) certification by the State Treasurer 6 of funds that are available under the Act and (2) for like certification by the Secretary of the State Election Board of political parties and candidates eligible for receipt of these funds. 7
4. The Act also provides for the allocation, distribution and expenditure of the fund. Fifty percent of the fund is to be allocated to eligible public office candidates 8 and fifty percent to eligible political parties. 9
5. Funds to be allocated to political parties are to be distributed in the following manner: each eligible political party is to receive ten percent of the funds to be allocated to political parties and the balance of the funds is to be distributed to the recognized political parties in accordance with the ratio that the registered voters affiliated with that party bear to the total number of registered electors in the State. 10
6. Funds designated for candidates whose names appear on the general election ballot are to be distributed as follows: (a) Governor--twenty percent, (b) Lieutenant Governor--fifteen percent, (c) Treasurer--ten percent, (d) Auditor and Inspector--ten percent, (e) Commissioner of Insurance--ten percent, (f) Superintendent of Public Instruction--ten percent and (g) Corporation Commissioner--ten percent. 11
The Attorney's General opinion broadly condemns as unconstitutional all the funding provisions of the Act. The petitioners seek to have the entire opinion declared invalid.
In this proceeding to challenge the validity of an attorney's general opinion, we are called upon to declare the rights of the Democratic Party in the provisions of the Act that benefit it. Standing to raise issues in a proceeding such as this which is essentially a declaratory judgment action 12 must--as in other litigation--be predicated on interest that is "direct, immediate and substantial". 13 Standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before the court and not on the issues tendered for determination. In standing problems, the inquiry posed is whether the party invoking the court's jurisdiction has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the tendered controversy. 14 One who is not "aggrieved" by a decision--however erroneous--may not bring a challenge to its validity. 15
The Act designates two classes of beneficiaries for the governmental largesse to be dispensed--political parties and certain public office candidates. The Democratic Party, who is doubtless adversely affected by the challenged opinion, is properly before us. Inasmuch as none of the petitioners named in the caption hereof can qualify as a "political candidate", the claims of that class are not here subject to judicial vindication. The issues sought to be raised must hence be confined to those which affect the interest of the Democratic Party alone. The legal hurdle sought to be removed by that party's suit cannot be overcome without judicial intervention. Public officials act at their peril when their action is in contravention of an opinion by the attorney general. 16 Judicial power was thus properly invoked but only insofar as this court is called upon to determine whether the challenged opinion can pass muster as a valid legal obstacle to an expenditure of public funds under the Act for the use of recognized political parties.
THE ATTORNEY'S GENERAL OPINION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The opinion in suit was issued in response to a legislative inquiry about the constitutionality of the Act. The inquiry was directed to the following constitutional considerations:
The Attorney General answered the first two questions by finding the bill to be constitutional. He found it unnecessary to answer the federal-law question because he concluded that the Act violates the state constitutional restrictions in Art. 10 §§ 14 and 15, Okl.Const. 17 He viewed the use of public funds by political candidates and political parties to be an impermissible gift to private individuals and private associations for nonpublic purposes.
In this proceeding the petitioners contend the Act has a public purpose and is therefore valid. They reason that if the expenditure of funds, as contemplated by the Act, is declared to be for a valid public purpose, it cannot be classified as a "gift". This is so because any expenditure in furtherance of a public purpose is, by its terms, the very antithesis of a prohibited gift. Until the Commission promulgates rules, the petitioners argue, the constitutional hurdles erected by the challenged opinion are not ripe for review since only the rules--not yet promulgated--may fashion the various categories of permissible public expenditures. They want us to assume that the rules will meet the pertinent constitutional requirements.
The Attorney General does not address the ripeness issue, but advances the...
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