DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Center, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-CIV,1 |
| Citation | 695 P.2d 270,144 Ariz. 21 |
| Parties | Theo DeMONTINEY, surviving parent of Bobby Alcaida, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DESERT MANOR CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC., an Arizona corporation; George M. O'Brien, M.D.; Yuma County, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; and Health Systems Research Institute, a Utah corporation, Defendants-Appellees. 5903. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial in a wrongful death action, which resulted from decedent's suicide. The relevant facts are not in dispute.
On June 7, 1978, appellant's son, Bobby Alcaida, committed suicide while held at appellee Desert Manor Convalescent Center's (Desert Manor) health care facility located in Yuma, Arizona. The decedent had unsuccessfully attempted suicide the previous day in Parker, Arizona and was taken into custody by Parker police, who later transferred him to the Yuma County Sheriff's Department. Deputy Sheriff Buddy McCall brought decedent to Desert Manor on the evening of June 6, 1978. At Desert Manor, decedent was examined by appellee Dr. George O'Brien, an employee of appellee Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI), which had contracted with appellee Yuma County to provide physicians' services to the county. Decedent was ordered admitted as a mental hold patient for emergency detention by Dr. O'Brien, who signed the admission form as Admitting Officer of the Yuma County Health Department.
Desert Manor's security area consisted of three specially designated patient rooms, only one of which contained an exposed pipe in the ceiling. The record shows that after examining the decedent, Dr. O'Brien decided that the decedent was no longer suicidal, ordered him to be placed in the room with the exposed pipe, and issued him bed linens and a gown. Deputy Sheriff McCall then locked decedent in the room, where he remained until he was found dead by hanging the following evening. Following his death, the appellant, Theo DeMontiney, mother of the deceased, instituted this wrongful death action in the superior court against Desert Manor, Dr. O'Brien, Yuma County and HSRI. Appellant's medical malpractice claims against Desert Manor, Dr. O'Brien and HSRI were presented to a Medical Liability Review Panel, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-567, which found in favor of the defendants. After that decision, venue of the case was transferred to the Maricopa County Superior Court and went to trial there.
Following the jury trial but prior to instructing the jury, the judge granted Yuma County's motion for a directed verdict and dismissed it from the action. He also directed a verdict in favor of Dr. O'Brien and Desert Manor on the issue of punitive damages. The remaining issues went to the jury. After the jury returned its defense verdicts, judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.
Appellant presents several issues for our review. Restating them for our convenience, they are:
1. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in favor of Yuma County?
2. Did the trial court err in refusing or modifying several of plaintiff's requested jury instructions?
3. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence the Medical Liability Review Panel decision as to Desert Manor?
4. Did the trial court err in excluding evidence of the non-licensure of Desert Manor's security area and evidence of violation of statutes applicable to licensed nursing homes?
5. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to file amendments to the amended complaint?
6. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict on the issue of punitive damages?
7. Were the jury verdict and judgment entered by the court contrary to law and against the weight of the evidence?
8. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's objections to Desert Manor's Statement of Costs and Notice of Taxation of Costs pertaining to travel expenses?
After considering the record and the law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
We first address the issue of whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Yuma County. The trial court found as a matter of law that Yuma County had delegated by contract any duties it owed decedent to HSRI and that therefore any acts committed by Dr. O'Brien were not committed as an agent or employee of Yuma County, but instead were committed in his capacity as an employee of HSRI, an independent contractor.
In reviewing the granting of a motion for directed verdict, we review the evidence to determine whether reasonable minds could differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adroit Supply Co. v. Electric Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 385, 390, 542 P.2d 810, 815 (1975). While the question of whether an employment relationship is one of master and servant or principal and independent contractor is generally one of fact for the jury, see Arizona-Hercules Copper Co. v. Crenshaw, 21 Ariz. 15, 184 P. 996 (1919), where the evidence is clear and uncontradicted the question is one of law and should be decided by the court. Williams v. Wise, 106 Ariz. 335, 338, 476 P.2d 145, 148 (1970).
Appellant urges that Yuma County had a statutorily imposed nondelegable duty to provide proper treatment to patients admitted to state facilities for emergency evaluation. Appellees answer that Yuma County, by contract, delegated whatever duties it may have had.
We begin by examining the statutes which require Yuma County to provide emergency evaluation services. A.R.S. § 36-545.06 provides that:
A. Each county, or any combination of counties, shall provide directly or by contract the services of a screening agency and an evaluation agency for the purposes of this chapter.
B. Upon a request made by a resident of the county pursuant to this chapter, a county shall be required to provide screening or evaluation.
(Emphasis added). A.R.S. § 36-545.07(A) further provides that:
A. The department may enter into contracts with screening agencies, evaluation agencies and mental health treatment agencies to provide prepetition screenings, court-ordered evaluations, voluntary evaluations, treatment of voluntary patients and treatment of patients under the provisions of § 36-524 regardless of the ability of the patient or proposed patient to pay. A county may be a party to a contract as a provider of services or as a party making payments to an agency to provide services on the part of the county. The state hospital may be included in the contract as a provider of services and may receive consideration not inconsistent with law.
(Emphasis added).
We find the legislative intent clear that, while a county must provide for emergency evaluation services, it may do so either by providing the services itself, or by contracting with another qualified party to provide such services for it. By its very language as expressed in the statute, the legislature intended that the county's duty to provide evaluation services be delegable. Thus, where a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, it is to be given that meaning unless impossible or absurd consequences will result. Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co., 112 Ariz. 160, 540 P.2d 126 (1975).
Having decided that Yuma County had the statutory authority to delegate its duty to provide an evaluation agency, we now decide whether it did in fact do so. Yuma County argues that it contracted away any duties it owed to decedent through three separate contracts with private organizations.
The first contract, dated October 4, 1976 with Desert Manor, provides for the furnishing to the County of the three security rooms used for mental hold patients, and also for the furnishing of nursing, dietary and housekeeping services to those rooms. It further provides that Yuma County retains "professional and legal responsibility for patients confined in said maximum security section."
The second contract, dated August 1, 1977 with HSRI, provides for medical care. Dr. O'Brien's employer, HSRI, explicitly agreed to provide three full-time M.D.s to deliver medical care to mental hold patients. The contract further provides that:
d. Supervision and job performance of the employees will remain with HSRI. Employment of personnel to fill new or vacated positions will also be the responsibility of HSRI.
We find this clause persuasive. It provides that the medical care of decedent at the time of his death was the responsibility of HSRI, and not the responsibility of Yuma County.
The third contract, dated November 4, 1974, is with Yuma Guidance Clinic, which is not a party to this action. The contract is nonetheless significant because it shows that Yuma County exercised its statutory option and delegated its statutory duties to provide mental health screening services and evaluation agencies to Yuma Guidance Clinic (the "Second Party"):
1. The Second Party agrees to act as the Yuma County Mental Health Screening Agency to provide mental health pre-petition screening upon application for court ordered evaluation as contemplated in A.R.S. 36-501(21), 36-541 and 36-542. The pre-petition screening examination will be conducted at the screening agency or at the home of the person to be evaluated, to be determined according to A.R.S. 36-541 B and C.
It is well established that the chief characteristic distinguishing an independent contractor from an employee is his right, independent of his employer,...
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