Demps v. State, 62169

Citation416 So.2d 808
Decision Date24 June 1982
Docket NumberNo. 62169,62169
PartiesBennie E. DEMPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

John Middleton, Gainesville, and John L. Carroll and Dennis N. Balske, Montgomery, Ala., for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Gregory C. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.


Bennie E. Demps is before this Court on appeal from the denial without hearing of his motion for post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. Concurrent with the appeal, he seeks a stay of execution now scheduled for June 29, 1982. Demps was sentenced to death in 1978 for the jailhouse slaying of a fellow inmate. We have affirmed this sentence. Demps v. State, 395 So.2d 501 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933, 102 S.Ct. 430, 70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981).

Appellant claims that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because his motion for post-conviction relief presents substantial arguments that, if established, would warrant relief from the death sentence. Five of the six points that appellant claims are error may be dismissed. The claims that the trial judge improperly restricted voir dire and he improperly restricted presentation of a mitigating circumstance, the victim's criminal history, are both issues which could have been raised on direct appeal and are therefore not proper matters under rule 3.850. See Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980). The third claim, spun from the first two, is that since counsel during the direct appeal failed to raise these issues, which are now barred, his representation was ipso facto ineffective. The same counsel who made the direct appeal now makes this claim of his own ineffectiveness. Treating this one claim as a petition for habeas corpus, since review of appellate counsel's efforts is not a matter for the trial court, Smith v. State, 400 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla.1981), we are more impressed with its novelty than the argument. Appellant's counsel admits that at the time of direct appeal, his considered legal judgment was not to raise these issues. Unless we are to assume an intentional effort at building an element of ineffectiveness into this case, we must allow counsel the benefit of his original position, and avoid questioning his tactics. Certainly we cannot call these omissions a "serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel." Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla.1981). The fourth claim is that the state illegally solicited the testimony of its central witness, Larry Hathaway, through inducements. This claim was effectively raised on direct appeal when appellant attacked the trial court's disallowance of evidence showing Hathaway was homosexual and that his testimony was given in exchange for a transfer to a prison with his lover. See Demps v. State, 395 So.2d at 504. If not exactly raised, it could have been. Witt v. State. Appellant next attacks the imposition of the death sentence in spite of two invalid aggravating factors. This is consistent with Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Fla.1977), since there were no mitigating factors.

Appellant's sixth claim is not so easily discounted. He contends that the state through the Department of Corrections, induced a witness, Michael Squires, not to testify. Demps asserts that Squires would have given exculpatory testimony, but that a Department of Correction's investigator promised Squires an early parole in exchange for his silence, and that Squires in fact received a presumptive parole date reduced by seventeen years for his cooperation. Needless to say, these are serious allegations which warrant a close examination. Because we cannot say that the record conclusively shows appellant is entitled to no relief, see LeDuc v. State, 415 So.2d 721 (Fla.1982), Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, we must remand this issue to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.

In opposition to such a hearing, the state asserts that the appellant may not raise "newly discovered evidence" under the rule 3.850 motion. The state is quite correct in this assertion. See Smith v. State, 400 So.2d 956 (Fla.1981); Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla.1979). But we do not view this situation as involving "newly discovered evidence." Appellant's defense counsel was aware of Squire's exculpatory testimony prior to trial. At the commencement of trial, however, defense counsel became aware through the state's deposition that Squires had changed his testimony, and therefore did not call Squires. If the allegations of appellant are true, this situation is one in which the state affirmatively manipulated testimony, a violation more egregious than the mere passive, nondisclosure disapproved in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Here appellant does not merely allege that he has discovered new evidence, which if considered, would have prevented entry of judgment. Rather, he urges that because of prosecutorial interference with a defense witness he was denied due process of law. Although not directly a discovery violation, this violation is nevertheless more akin to a Brady violation; it is established that such a claim is proper in a rule 3.850 motion:

Since this challenge is based on the ground that the judgment was entered in violation of the due process clause of the constitution, since [he] ...

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31 cases
  • State v. Montgomery, 84-1671
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 26, 1985
    ...there is no requirement that it be clearly exculpatory or essential to the defense. See Virgin Islands, 615 F.2d at 969 n. 7. Cf. Demps, 416 So.2d at 810 (prejudice to defendant presumed where state interferes with testimony of defense witness).8 We note for clarity that even if the requisi......
  • Demps v. Dugger, 87-3767
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • March 28, 1989
    ...for the petitioner's claim of state interference with a defense witness, which was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Demps v. State, 416 So.2d 808, 809 (1982). The trial court conducted a hearing and again denied the petitioner's motion. The denial was affirmed on appeal. Demps v. State,......
  • Nova v. State, 82-1766
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • September 13, 1983
    ...of a defendant's rights which "will always be harmful, and it is very difficult for a court to determine when it is not," Demps v. State, 416 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla.1982), quoting United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1013 (5th Cir.1979); in short, one that goes to the essence of a fair and......
  • People v. Daly
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • December 27, 1983
    ......        In this State, the constitutional right to call witnesses has been supplemented by CPL 60.15 (subd. 1) which ...Oklahoma, 585 P.2d 367 [Okl.]; People v. Wilson, 24 Ill.2d 425, 182 N.E.2d 203; Demps v. Florida, 416 So.2d 808 . Page 171. [Fla.] ). Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 ......
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