Dempsey v. Davis
Decision Date | 03 April 1911 |
Citation | 136 S.W. 975,98 Ark. 570 |
Parties | DEMPSEY v. DAVIS |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Columbia Chancery Court; James M. Barker, Chancellor reversed.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
This cause involves the construction of the following deed:
The deed was duly acknowledged and recorded, and is made an exhibit to the complaint in this cause. The children of Selestia Ann Jinett Dempsey are the plaintiffs in the action and they allege:
The prayer of the complaint is that defendants be made to account for the value of the timber cut and removed from the land by the defendants, and that a master be appointed with power to take testimony for the purpose of ascertaining and stating the amount and value of the timber so cut and removed. They further pray that, if the court finds that they are not now entitled to recover the value of the timber cut and removed, the value thereof be impounded and invested for the benefit of such plaintiffs as may take the estate of inheritance in said lands after the life estate of Selestia Ann Jinett Dempsey be terminated.
The defendants, J. M. and V. M. Davis, demurred to the complaint, which was sustained by the court.
The plaintiffs refused to plead further, and, a decree having been entered dismissing their complaint for want of equity, they have appealed.
Decree reversed and cause remanded.
Wade Kitchens and C. W. McKay, for appellants.
1. The deed gave to Selestia Ann Jinett Dempsey a life estate with remainder to her children to be born. 5 Cyc. 679; 137 F. 822. The intent will prevail, taking the instrument as a whole, and the deed will not be declared void unless the various clauses are so repugnant as to leave no other course. Devlin on Deeds, § 836; 3 Am. Dec. 507; 18 Cal. 137; 58 F. 438; 78 Ark. 231; 64 Ark. 240-243; 137 F. 831. The deed created an estate tail at common law, which under our statute gave a life estate to the mother, remainder in fee to her children. 4 Kent, Com. 225; Tiedeman on Real Property, 425; Cooley's Blackstone, vol. 1 (4 ed.) 629; Tiffany on Real Prop. par. 25, 434; 13 Cyc. 662; Washb. Real Prop. vol. 2 (6 ed.), § 1616; 68 Ark. 369; 1 Ind. 107; 14 S.W. 904; 12 Ky. 27; 28 Ala. 314; 84 Am. Dec. 519; 2 Grant, Cas. 249; 161 Pa. 643; 73 S.W. 109; 68 Ark. 369; 47 Md. 513; 87 S.W. 1120; 137 F. 823.
2. If the words "her children, the offspring of her body," are words of limitation (see cases sup.), then the mother took a life estate with remainder in fee to her children--a fee tail at common law. 1 Washb. on Real Prop. (6 ed.) 84, §§ 178, 195; 1 Kerr on Real Prop. 452; 1 Tiedeman, Real Property, § 47; 1 Kerr on Real Prop. § 460; 67 Ark. 520; Cooley's Blackstone (4 ed.) 515, 578, 580; 58 Ark. 313; 4 Kent, Com. (14 ed.) 236, 408.
3. The interest of appellants being that of remaindermen, the appellees are liable for waste. 128 S.W. 581.
Hamby, Haynie & Hamby and Powell & Taylor, for appellees.
1. The word "children" is often construed to be synonymous with "heirs." 68 Ark. 369; 72 Ark. 539. "Children" will be construed to be words of limitation and mean "heirs" when no children were in being at date of the deed. 6 Coke 16a; 14 Gray 174; 16 East 399; 85 Ill. 242; 11 B. Mon. 32; 13 N.J.Eq. 236; 98 Ky. 285; 51 S.W. 173; 8 Bush 434; 149 Ind. 51; 48 N.E. 630; 11 S.C. 294; 57 N.C. 334; 3 Ga. 551; 80 Ga. 391; 24 Miss. 343; 165 Pa. 645; 166 U.S. 83. The after-born children took as heirs, and the deed passed a fee simple estate. 58 Ark. 303. There is no repugnancy in the granting and habendum clauses--the latter enlarges the fee tail to a fee simple estate.
2. The habendum may enlarge or extend, but not abridge, the estate limited in the premises. 53 Ark. 107; 78 Ark. 230; 82 Id. 209; 92 Id. 324; Elphinstone, Interp. Deeds, rule 66, p. 217. If the premises and habendum contain different express limitations, the limitation in the latter, if possible, will be considered explanatory of the granting clause; but, if repugnant, they will be considered in the manner most beneficial to the grantee. Cases supra; 2 Black. Com. 288; 2 Bacon, Abr. 260; 9 S.W. 798; 102 Pa. 347; 50 Mo. 192; 57 N.E. 238; 104 N.W. 579; Coke, Litt. 299a; 2 Sanders, Uses & Trusts (4 ed.), p. 318; Brewster on Conv. par. 131.
3. All deeds shall be construed to convey a complete estate unless expressly limited by words in the deed. Kirby's Digest, § 733. The word "heirs" is no longer necessary to create an estate in fee simple. Ib.
OPINIONHART, J., (after stating the facts).
A deed must be construed according to the intention of the parties, as manifested by the language of the whole instrument; and it is our duty to give all parts of the deed such construction, if possible, as that they will stand together; but where there is a repugnancy between the granting and habendum clauses, the former will control the latter. Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230, 93 S.W. 979.
Bearing in mind these fundamental rules of construction, it is clear that the words "children, the natural offspring of her body," are synonymous with "bodily heirs" or "heirs of her body," and exclude the idea that they are synonymous with the general word, "heirs." When so construed, the estate granted is controlled by the decision in the following cases: Watson v. Wolff-Goldman Realty Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S.W. 581; Wilmans v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517, 55 S.W. 950; Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458. That is to say, according to the rule announced in those cases, the effect of the granting clause was to create an estate tail, which under our statute gave a life estate to Selestia Ann Jinett Dempsey and the remainder in fee simple to the person or persons to whom the estate tail would first pass according to the common law.
The persons to whom the estate tail would first pass, according to the course of the common law, under the granting clause of the deed are the heirs of the body of the life tenant. If there are none such, the estate will by operation of law revert to the grantor. Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. 514; Fales v. Currier, 55 N.H. 392.
It is contended by counsel for defendants that the use of the words, "to hers and their own proper use, benefit and behoof forever in fee simple," enlarged the estate to a fee simple in Selestia Ann Jinett Dempsey.
Mr Washburn...
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