Denezpi v. United States

• Decision Date: 13 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-7622
• Parties: Merle DENEZPI, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 1838

Merle DENEZPI, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES

No. 20-7622

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued February 22, 2022

Decided June 13, 2022

Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Erica L. Ross for respondent.

Justice BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a person from being prosecuted twice "for the same offence." An offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily different from an offense defined by another, even when the offenses have identical elements. Thus, a person can be successively prosecuted for the two offenses without offending the Clause. We have dubbed this the "dual-sovereignty" doctrine.

This case presents a twist on the usual dual-sovereignty scenario. The mine run of these cases involves two sovereigns, each enforcing its own law. This case, by contrast, arguably involves a single sovereign (the United States) that enforced its own law (the Major Crimes Act) after having separately enforced the law of another sovereign (the Code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe). Petitioner contends that the second prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the dual-sovereignty doctrine requires that the offenses be both enacted and enforced by separate sovereigns.

We disagree. By its terms, the Clause prohibits separate prosecutions for the same offense; it does not bar successive prosecutions by the same sovereign. So even assuming that petitioner's first prosecutor exercised federal rather than tribal power, the second prosecution did not violate the Constitution's guarantee against double jeopardy.

I

A

In 1882, Secretary of the Interior H. M. Teller wrote to his Department's Office of Indian Affairs (now known as the Bureau of Indian Affairs) to suggest that the Office "formulate certain rules for the government of the Indians on the reservations." Letter to H. Price, Comm'r of Indian Affairs (Dec. 2, 1882), in Dept. of Interior, Rules Governing the Court of Indian Offenses 3–4 (1883). In response, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs adopted regulations prohibiting certain acts and directing that a "Court of Indian Offenses" be established for nearly every Indian tribe or group of tribes to adjudicate rule violations. Id. , at 5. Given their basis in what is now the Code of Federal Regulations, the courts are sometimes called C.F.R. courts.

Today, most tribes have established their own judicial systems, thereby displacing the C.F.R. courts. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.104 (2021). But some tribes, often due to resource constraints, have not. Five C.F.R. courts remain, serving 16 of the more than 500 federally recognized tribes. Their stated purpose is "to provide adequate machinery for the administration of justice for Indian tribes" in certain parts of Indian country "where tribal courts have not been established." § 11.102. The Department's Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs appoints C.F.R. court judges, called magistrates, subject to a confirmation vote by the governing body of the tribe that the court serves. § 11.201(a). The Assistant Secretary may remove magistrates for cause of his own accord or upon the recommendation of the tribal governing body. § 11.202.¹ Unless a contract with a tribe provides otherwise, a Department official appoints the prosecutor for each C.F.R. court. § 11.204.

C.F.R. courts have jurisdiction over two sets of crimes. See § 11.114. First, federal regulations set forth a list of offenses that may be enforced in C.F.R. court. See §§ 11.400–11.454. In addition, a tribe's governing body may enact ordinances that, when approved by the Assistant Secretary, are enforceable in C.F.R. court and supersede any conflicting federal regulations. §§ 11.108, 11.449.

B

The reservation of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe spans over 500,000 acres in southwestern Colorado, northern New Mexico, and southeastern Utah. The Tribe has more than 2,000 members. It has not created its own court system, so it makes use of the Southwest Region C.F.R. Court. The Tribe has, however, adopted its own penal code, which is enforceable in that court.

A violation of the tribal code lies at the heart of this case. Merle Denezpi and V. Y., both members of the Navajo Nation, traveled to Towaoc, Colorado, a town within the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation. While the two were alone at a house belonging to Denezpi's friend, Denezpi barricaded the door, threatened V. Y., and forced her to have sex with him. After Denezpi fell asleep, V. Y. escaped from the house and reported Denezpi to tribal authorities.

An officer with the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs filed a criminal complaint in C.F.R. court. That complaint charged Denezpi with three crimes: assault and battery, in violation of 6 Ute Mountain Ute Code § 2 (1988); terroristic threats, in violation of 25 C.F.R. § 11.402 ; and false imprisonment, in violation of 25 C.F.R. § 11.404. Denezpi pleaded guilty to the assault and battery charge, and the prosecutor dismissed the other charges. The Magistrate sentenced Denezpi to time served—140 days’ imprisonment.

Six months later, a federal grand jury in the District of Colorado indicted Denezpi on one count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country, an offense covered by the federal Major Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a)(1), (a)(2), 1153(a). Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the consecutive prosecution, but the District Court denied the motion. After a jury convicted Denezpi, the District Court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. It concluded that the second prosecution in federal court did not constitute double jeopardy because the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe's inherent sovereignty was the ultimate source of power undergirding the earlier prosecution in C.F.R. court. 979 F.3d 777, 781–783 (2020). We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 395, 211 L.Ed.2d 212 (2021).

II

A

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Clause by its terms does not prohibit twice placing a person in jeopardy " ‘for the same conduct or actions .’ " Gamble v. United States , 587 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1965, 204 L.Ed.2d 322 (2019). Instead, it focuses on whether successive prosecutions are for the same "offence."

That term, we have explained, " ‘was commonly understood in 1791 to mean "transgression," that is, "the Violation or Breaking of a Law." ’ " Ibid. ; see, e.g. , 2 R. Burn & J. Burn, A New Law Dictionary 167 (1792) ("OFFENCE, is an act committed against law, or omitted where the law requires it"). An offense, then, is "defined by a law." Gamble , 587 U. S., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 1965 ; see Moore v. Illinois , 14 How. 13, 19–20, 14 L.Ed. 306 (1852). And a law is defined by the sovereign that makes it, expressing the interests that the sovereign wishes to vindicate. Gamble , 587 U. S., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 1965 ; see United States v. Lanza , 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922) ("Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other"). Because the sovereign source of a law is an inherent and distinctive feature of the law itself, an offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily a different offense from that of another sovereign. See Gamble , 587 U. S., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 1965 ; Moore , 14 How. at 20. That means that the two offenses can be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause—even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. See Gamble , 587 U. S., at ––––, n. 1, ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 1965, n. 1, 1965 ; cf. Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (offenses defined by a single sovereign are distinct offenses only if each "requires proof of a different element").

This dual-sovereignty principle applies where "two entities derive their power to punish from wholly independent sources." Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle , 579 U.S. 59, 68, 136 S.Ct. 1863, 195 L.Ed.2d 179 (2016). The doctrine has come up most frequently in the context of the States. See, e.g. , Heath v. Alabama , 474 U.S. 82, 88–90, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985) (States are separate sovereigns from one another); Lanza , 260 U.S. at 382, 43 S.Ct. 141 (States are separate sovereigns from the United States). It applies, however, to Indian tribes too.

United States v. Wheeler , 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 1978, is the seminal case. There, a member of the Navajo Tribe was convicted in tribal court of violating a provision of the Navajo Tribal Code; he was later charged in federal court with violating a federal statute based on the same underlying conduct. Id. , at 314–316, 98 S.Ct. 1079. Citing the dual-sovereignty doctrine, the Court rejected Wheeler's double jeopardy argument. We explained that before Europeans arrived on this continent, tribes "were self-governing sovereign political communities" with "the inherent power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws." Id. , at 322–323, 98 S.Ct. 1079. While "Congress has in certain ways regulated the manner and extent of the tribal power of self-government," Congress did not "creat[e] " that power. Id. , at 328, 98 S.Ct. 1079. When a tribe enacts criminal laws, then, "it does so as part of its retained sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government." Ibid. Thus, Wheeler's prosecution for a tribal offense did not bar his later prosecution for a federal offense.

Our reasoning in Wheeler controls here. Denezpi's single act transgressed two laws: the Ute Mountain Ute Code's assault and battery ordinance and the United States Code's proscription of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, like the Navajo Tribe in Wheeler , exercised its "uniq...