Denial of Application for Issuance of One Original (New) On-Premises Consumption Beer/Wine License, Town Pump of Wolf Point, Matter of

• Decision Date: 25 October 1994
• Docket Number: E-Z,ON-PREMISES,No. 94-096,94-096
• Citation: 51 St.Rep. 1029,267 Mont. 298,883 P.2d 833
• Parties: In The Matter of the DENIAL OF the APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF ONE ORIGINAL (NEW)CONSUMPTION BEER/WINE LICENSE, TOWN PUMP OF WOLF POINT, 401 Cascade, Wolf Point, Roosevelt County, Montana, ApplicantsSupply, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 833

883 P.2d 833

267 Mont. 298

In The Matter of the DENIAL OF the APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE

OF ONE ORIGINAL (NEW) ON-PREMISES CONSUMPTION BEER/WINE

LICENSE, TOWN PUMP OF WOLF POINT, 401 Cascade, Wolf Point,

Roosevelt County, Montana,

Applicants E-Z Supply, Inc., Appellant.

No. 94-096.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 24, 1994.

Decided Oct. 25, 1994.

Thomas E. Richardson, Butte, for appellant.

Lawrence G. Allen, Tax Counsel, Montana Dept. of Revenue, Helena, for respondent.

GRAY, Justice.

E-Z Supply, Inc. (E-Z), an affiliate of Town Pump, Inc., appeals from an order of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, denying its petition for judicial review. We reverse, concluding that the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR) incorrectly interpreted and applied § 16-4-413, MCA, in denying E-Z's application for an on-premises beer and wine license (liquor license).

On December 22, 1988, E-Z applied to the Liquor Division of the DOR (Liquor Division) for a liquor license for use at Town Pump's Wolf Point convenience store and filling station. Following a hearing at which protesters testified against the application because of the impact it would have on the community, the hearing examiner issued a proposed decision denying E-Z's application. E-Z withdrew the application.

On September 15, 1991, E-Z submitted another application for a liquor license for use at the Wolf Point location. In September, 1992, the Liquor Division notified E-Z that the application would be denied pursuant to § 16-4-413, MCA. E-Z requested, and was granted, a hearing. The hearing examiner issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed order denying the 1991 application pursuant to § 16-4-413, MCA. The DOR subsequently adopted the findings, conclusions, and proposed order as its final decision.

E-Z petitioned the District Court for judicial review of the DOR's decision. The District Court denied the petition, concluding that the DOR correctly interpreted and applied § 16-4-413, MCA. E-Z appeals.

The issues before us relate to the interpretation and application of § 16-4-413, MCA. The interpretation and application of a statute to a particular set of circumstances are matters of law. See Minervino v. University of Montana (1993), 258 Mont. 493, 497, 853 P.2d 1242, 1245. An administrative agency's conclusions of law are reviewed by district courts and this Court to determine whether those conclusions are correct. GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dep't. of Revenue (1991), 249 Mont. 261, 264, 815 P.2d 595, 597; Steer, Inc. v. Dep't. of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603.

The first issue raised by E-Z is that the DOR erred by retroactively applying § 16-4-413, MCA, to its application filed September 15, 1991, prior to the statute's effective date. Because our holding on the second issue clarifies that a correct interpretation of § 16-4-413, MCA, results in no detriment or prejudice to E-Z, we decline to address this issue, assuming for purposes of this opinion that § 16-4-413, MCA, is applicable to the liquor license application presently before us.

The second issue raised by E-Z is that the DOR's denial of the 1991 application was based on an incorrect interpretation of § 16-4-413, MCA. E-Z asserts that, under § 16-4-413(1), MCA, the DOR's determination that E-Z's application did not present a "substantially different use" precluded further consideration and required the DOR to simply return the application to E-Z. We agree.

Our function in interpreting statutes is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Minervino, 853 P.2d at 1244. "Our primary tool for ascertaining the legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the words used." Sagan v. Prudential Insurance Company of America (1993), 259 Mont. 506, 509, 857 P.2d 719, 722 (citation omitted). "If the legislature's intent can be determined from the plain meaning of the words used in a statute, we will go no further." State ex rel. Neuhausen v. Nachtsheim (1992), 253 Mont. 296, 299, 833 P.2d 201, 204.

Section 16-4-413, MCA, sets forth procedures governing the DOR's processing of certain reapplications for liquor licenses. The procedures are applicable in the event of a previous denial of a liquor license application for the same premises pursuant to § 16-4-405, MCA. Section 16-4-413(1), MCA. Moreover, "[i]f an application is withdrawn after a hearing ... in which testimony is received regarding any reason for denial provided in 16-4-405, the effect of the withdrawal is the same as if a final decision had been made denying the application...." Section 16-4-413(2), MCA. In this case, E-Z withdrew its 1988 application following such a hearing and, pursuant to § 16-4-413(2), MCA, the effect of the withdrawal was the same as if the 1988 application had been denied. Thus, the DOR's processing of E-Z's 1991 application is governed by the provisions of § 16-4-413, MCA.

Once a previous application has been denied, § 16-4-413(1), MCA, provides that "the department may not consider an application ... for those premises for 5 years unless the department ... determines that the proposed use is substantially different from the use that was rejected." Given the manner in which the statute is structured, it is clear that the "unless" clause in subsection (1) constitutes a condition precedent to...