Denicola v. G. C. Murphy Co., s. 76-1866
| Decision Date | 09 November 1977 |
| Docket Number | 76-2116,Nos. 76-1866,s. 76-1866 |
| Parties | 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1004, 23 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 503, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7778, 82 Lab.Cas. P 33,568 Rosemarie DENICOLA et al., Plaintiffs, v. G. C. MURPHY COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee-Cross Appellant, and General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union # 249, Defendant, Appellant-Cross Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Before ADAMS, BIGGS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
The case at bar began as a class action brought by 29 named plaintiffs against their employer, the G. C. Murphy Company (Murphy) and their local union, General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local Union No. 249 (Local 249). The complaint, brought on behalf on all female employees of Murphy's McKeesport, Pennsylvania, warehouse who were members of Local 249, alleged that Murphy and Local 249 violated Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., by maintaining under a 1968 collective bargaining agreement separate job classifications, pay scales, and seniority system for male and female employees.
A long exposition of the facts surrounding the instant case is unnecessary since they have been fully discussed in Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 891, (3d Cir. 1977).
Local 249 was the successor collective bargaining agent to the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local No. 940 (Local 940), a defendant in the Glus case. It became the collective bargaining agent for Murphy's warehouse employees on January 30, 1971. The 1968 collective bargaining agreement entered into by Local 940 and the International Union of Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO (the International) 1 with Murphy expired on January 31, 1971. Between February 1, 1971 and June 3, 1971 the parties engaged in contract negotiations. During the course of the negotiations it was agreed that any increases in the hourly rate of pay would be retroactive to February 1, 1971.
The key facts of the contract negotiations are disputed by the parties. Murphy claims that during a negotiating session on June 3, 1971 it offered to retroactively eliminate the wage differential. 2 According to Murphy's witnesses the proposal was rejected by Local 249's representatives as being too complicated. Local 249 contends that no such offer was made by Murphy. The district court found an offer to eliminate retroactively the discrimination was made by Murphy to Local 249 and Local 249 rejected the offer because it was too complicated. 158a.
A contract was agreed upon between Local 249 and Murphy on June 11, 1971. The contract retroactively eliminated all discriminatory practices as of February 1, 1971, with the exception of the wage differentials. The wage differentials were eliminated on June 21, 1971.
Plaintiffs filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission based upon the claim which eventually led to the suit from which this appeal has been taken.
Murphy, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(g) brought a cross-claim against Local 249. As explained in Glus, supra, Murphy reached a settlement agreement with plaintiffs. The settlement agreement provided that Murphy would pay the plaintiffs $548,000, of which $448,000 was apportioned to plaintiffs' Title VII complaint and $100,000 was apportioned for violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (Equal Pay Act), 29 U.S.C §§ 201 et seq. 3 In addition, Murphy agreed to pay plaintiffs' counsel's fees of $100,000.
A hearing was held on October 2, 1972 concerning the proposed settlement. Present at the hearing, in addition to plaintiffs' and Murphy's counsel, was Frank P. G. Intrieri, Esquire, counsel representing Local 249. The district court inquired whether there were any objections to the settlement. Mr. Intrieri did not object.
Trial was held on the remaining issue, Murphy's claim for contribution against Local 249.
The trial court found Murphy and Local 249 were equally liable for the discrimination against the plaintiffs that occurred between February 1, 1971 and June 30, 1971. The court held Local 249 to be liable for $18,393. This represented 50 per cent of 5/72's of the plaintiffs' Title VII recovery and a similar proportion of the attorney's fees deemed to be for the Title VII portion of the recovery. 4 The court, however, held that as a labor organization, Local 249 could not be liable for contribution under the Equal Pay Act. Local 249 appeals from the judgment of the district court. Murphy cross-appeals on the denial of contribution for violation of the Equal Pay Act.
In its appeal Local 249 raises three contentions: 1) The district court erred in ruling that Local 249's actions violated Title VII, 2) the district court erred in finding that Murphy offered to retroactively remove the discriminatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and 3) the district court abused its discretion in granting remedial relief in the form of monetary damages against Local 249. We are unable to agree with Local 249.
Local 249's argument that its actions were not violative of Title VII is without merit. Local 249's argument is that it should not be responsible for the 1968 collective bargaining agreement and that it met its statutory obligations by negotiating, what it terms, "(a) totally nondiscriminatory collective bargaining agreement." 5 However, Local 249 overlooks the fact that the district court did not base its liability upon its refusal of Murphy's offer to eliminate retroactively the discriminatory features of the 1971 contract. 6 There can be no doubt that Local 249's refusal violated Title VII.
Local 249's contention that the district court erred in finding that Murphy offered to retroactively eliminate the discriminatory provisions of the 1971 contract cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals cannot sit as a finder of fact or review de novo the facts finding of the district court. Our review of the record indicates that the district court's finding that Murphy made an offer to retroactively eliminate the discriminatory pay differentials was not clearly erroneous.
Local 249's last point, that the district court abused its discretion in awarding relief in the form of monetary damages against Local 249, is wholly without merit.
Murphy has made numerous contentions regarding the district court's refusal to find Local 249 liable for contribution for violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Murphy first argues that the district court erred in ruling that a labor organization is not liable to employees for discrimination under 29 U.S.C. § 206, and therefore is not liable for contribution to an employer found liable under the Act. 7 See 161a-164a. We are unable to accept Murphy's contention.
The Equal Pay Act provides for both injunctive relief and damages for, inter alia, sex discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which gives affected employees a cause of action for violation of the Equal Pay Act, provides in part:
"Any employer who violates section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected . . . ." (Emphasis added).
Section 216(b) should be contrasted with § 216(a) which deals with criminal sanctions for violation of the Act which provides in relevant part:
"Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 215 of this title shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. . . . " (Emphasis added).
As this Court observed in Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1943), "The congressional intent is very plain and the pattern of the statute is perfect." An employee may bring an action for back pay under the Equal Pay Act only against his or her employer. Therefore, we must reject Murphy's first theory of liability based upon its contention that the International could be liable for back pay. See Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 410 F.Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y.1975); Cook v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F.Supp. 1217, 1226 (D.Ariz.1975); Hunter v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 E.P.D. P 10,457, at 5975 (N.D.Cal.1975); Tuma v. American Can Co., 367 F.Supp. 1178 (D.N.J.1973).
We note that a few decisions have indicated that an employer may maintain an action under the Equal Pay Act against a labor organization for contribution. Compare Wirtz v. Hayes Industries, Inc., 1 E.P.D. P 9874, at 1089 (N.D.Ohio 1968), with Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 371 (D.Md.1971), aff'd sub nom., Hodgson v. Baltimore Regional Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 462 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1972) (Per Curiam).
In Hodgson v. Sagner, Inc. supra, the Secretary of Labor sought an injunction against a...
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